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Abstract 
Technological advancements have paved the way for fast, easy and relatively cheap collec-
tion, aggregation and analysis of large volumes of data by organisations, with little or some-
times, no human interventions. Such technological advancements have also made it increas-
ingly possible for organisations to; electronically establish the social connections of many 
people, provide location independent services and seamless flow of information. The World 
Economic Forum has even projected that by the year 2015, about 1 trillion devices will be 
connected to the Internet worldwide. Such a phenomenal development is given credence by 
effective exchanges of personal identity information, since many commercial transactions and 
social interactions require some degree of personal information disclosure. Thus, personal 
identity information has become an integral part of modern business models.  
However, the risk of not realizing such value of personal information is evident in many in-
stances, given the height of societal concerns about security and privacy, and the diminishing 
level of trust in transacting parties. Such societal concerns also have governance implications 
in many countries. Policy makers therefore try to implement identity policies with the view of 
curtailing identity abuses, promote the seamless flow of business transactions, and to provide 
citizens the ability to exercise informational self-determination. Identity policies are usually 
also associated with implementation of identity management systems.  
Previously, the design of such systems has largely focused on stringent security requirements 
with minimal attention focus on citizens and their concerns (citizen-centric). Various identity 
related research initiatives have thus, been carried out in OECD member countries, aimed at 
designing and developing identity management systems that is user centric and privacy en-
hancing. 
Many of the proposed privacy enhancing solutions implicitly assume availability of internet 
connectivity, user awareness and exposure, and high level of literacy. Ironically, developing 
countries are characterised by many infrastructural challenges, low literacy level and thus, 
hampering effective uses of identity management systems. Moreover, implementation of such 
systems unduly emphasize on silo identity management systems and on physical verification 
of credentials with its propensity to limit the benefits that can be derived from such invest-
ments.   
This PhD study adapts the Delone and Mclean’s IS success model to analyse the factors that 
affect effective uses of national identity management systems, using a qualitative case study 
research approach. Empirical data were gathered in Ghana through a combination of quasi 
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statistical survey and problem structuring methodology. The choice of Ghana as case country 
was due to the fact that the dynamics typify the identification challenges in many developing 
countries. The study has shown that effective uses of identity management systems depend on 
efficient civil registration systems, user involvement and institutional cooperation. It has also 
shown that, for effective uses of identity management systems, policy makers must ensure the 
attainment of the threshold level of trust. This is the level where privacy concern is low and 
trust is high enough to encourage institutional cooperation and secondary uses of personal 
information.  
The study contributes to the identity management literature by enriching our current under-
standing of the key factors that are essential for the successful implementation of national 
identity management systems, and also provides guidelines for developers and policy makers 
for establishing future ecosystem of trusted identities. 
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Resume 
Teknologiske fremskridt har banet vejen for, at organisationer hurtigt, nemt og relativt billigt 
kan indsamle, aggregere og analysere store datamængder, ofte uden menneskelig medvirken. 
Sådanne teknologiske fremskridt har også i stigende grad gjort det muligt elektronisk at etab-
lere omfattende sociale netværk, levere lokationsuafhængige tjenester og muliggøre uhindret 
informationsudveksling. World Economic Forum forudsiger, at omkring 1 billion enheder vil 
være forbundet til Internettet på verdensplan i 2015. En så fænomenal udvikling vil bl.a. kræ-
ve en effektiv udveksling af personlig identitetsinformation, fordi mange kommercielle trans-
aktioner og sociale interaktioner indebærer, at der frigives personlig information. Personlige 
oplysninger er således blevet en integreret del af moderne forretningsmodeller. 
Men risikoen for ikke at udnytte værdien af personlige oplysninger er åbenbar, set i lyset af de 
samfundsmæssige betænkeligheder omkring sikkerhed og privatlivets fred og den manglende 
tillid mellem de involverede parter ved transaktioner på Internettet. Sådanne samfundsmæssi-
ge hensyn har også reguleringsmæssige konsekvenser i mange lande. Politikerne må derfor 
forsøge at indføre regler for håndtering af identiteter med henblik på at begrænse identitets-
misbrug, fjerne hindringer for forretningstransaktioner og give borgerne mulighed for at ud-
øve kontrol og selvbestemmelse over deres data. 
Sådanne identitetspolitikker er som regel også knyttet til implementering af identity manage-
ment-systemer. Tidligere har design af sådanne systemer i vid udstrækning fokuseret på de 
strenge sikkerhedskrav og kun i ringe omfang på borgerne og deres bekymringer, hvad angår 
personlige data. Et antal identitetsrelaterede forskningsinitiativer er derfor blevet gennemført i 
forskellige OECD-lande med henblik på at designe og udvikle identity management-systemer, 
der er mere brugercentrerede og privatlivsfremmende. 
Desværre bygger mange af de foreslåede løsninger til beskyttelse af persondata på implicitte 
antagelser om tilgængeligheden af internet-adgang, brugernes bevågenhed og et højt niveau af 
læsefærdigheder. Ironisk nok er udviklingslande præget af manglende infrastruktur og analfa-
betisme, og dette vanskeliggør effektive anvendelser af identity management-systemer. End-
videre har den hidtidige implementering af sådanne systemer haft karakter af “siloer” med 
fokus på fysisk verifikation af identitetsbeviser, hvilket har ført til begrænsninger af de forde-
le, der kan opnås. 
I dette ph.d.-projekt anvendes og udbygges Delone og McLean’s succesmodel for informati-
onssystemer til at analysere de faktorer, der er væsentlige for en effektiv anvendelse af natio-
nale identity management-systemer med en kvalitativ case study-orienteret forskningstilgang. 
De empiriske data blev indsamlet i Ghana gennem en kombination af quasi-statistisk under-
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søgelse og problemstruktureret metodik. Valget af Ghana som case understøttes af, at de iden-
tifikationsmæssige problemer og udfordringer kan anses som værende typiske for mange ud-
viklingslande. Projektet har vist, at effektiv anvendelse af identity management-systemer er 
afhængig af velfungerende cpr-systemer, brugerinddragelse og samarbejde på tværs af institu-
tioner. Det har også vist, at for at sikre en sådan effektiv anvendelse må de politiske beslut-
ningstagere først etablere de fornødne rammer for, at tilliden mellem de involverede parter 
kan være til stede. Der kræves et vist tærskelniveau, hvor bekymringen om beskyttelse af pri-
vatlivet er tilstrækkeligt lav, og tilliden er tilstrækkeligt høj til at fremme institutionelt samar-
bejde og sekundære anvendelser af personlige oplysninger, f.eks. til kommercielt brug. 
Projektet bidrager til identity management-litteraturen med en øget forståelse af de nøglefak-
torer, der er væsentlige for en vellykket implementering af nationale identity management-
systemer og med anbefalinger til udviklere og politikere om etablering af et fremtidigt økosy-
stem for trusted identities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research conducted during the entire PhD project 
spanning February 2010 to January 2013. It begins with an initial observation of the research 
gap in trusted identity management system (IDMS). Subsequently, it continues logically with 
a presentation of the theoretical rationale of the study by touching on the need for guidelines 
for trusted national identities policy formulation, within the context of developing countries1. 
This background provides the basis for specifying the phenomenon of interest, defining the 
research questions and objectives, and the positioning of the research within the domain of 
identity management. A summary of the philosophical paradigm, research methodology  and 
findings are then presented. The chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of the the-
sis. 
1.1 Background & Purpose 
The overarching purpose of this research effort is to examine the ensuing phenomenon when 
government agencies implement identity management systems with the aim of enabling effec-
tive interactions, identity verification, provision of access to government services, and to fa-
cilitate electronic commerce transactions, particularly “secondary uses2” of personal identity 
information3. 
Technological advancements have paved the way for fast, easy and relatively cheap collec-
tion, aggregation and analysis of large volumes of data by organizations, with little or some-
times, no involvement of the originator and/or the data subject4 (France Bélanger & Crossler, 
2011; Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004). Presently there are about 6 billion mobile phone 
subscriptions in the world, and on a daily basis, 10 billion text messages are exchanged, and 1 
billion entries are posted on blogs or social networks worldwide (World Economic Forum, 
2012a). It is even becoming increasingly possible to see the social connections of many peo-
                                                 
 
1A developing country is a country with relatively low standard of living, undeveloped industrial base, moderate 
to low Human Development Index relative to other countries and dependent on low value added sectors, e.g. 
agriculture, mining, etc. For the purpose of this study countries in the lower middle income group are also re-
garded as developing countries. 
2
 Secondary use of personal information is the collection and storage of information for purposes other than 
originally intended, whether legitimate or otherwise. 
3
 See section 2.4. Privacy and Personal identity information for detailed explaination 
4Data subject is an individual to whom personal data relates. 
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ple on the Internet. Intertwined with such staggering technological advancement is also the 
increasing relevance of cloud computing with its unique characteristics of on-demand self-
service, resource pooling that is independent of location, ubiquitous network access, flexibil-
ity, and thoughtful service, all of which are geared toward a seamless flow of information and 
transactions. In fact, it is estimated that by 2015, 1 trillion devices will be connected to the 
Internet worldwide (World Economic Forum, 2012a).  
At the core of these phenomenal developments is the commoditisation5 of personal identity 
information, which has become a key component of modern business models. Thus, the effec-
tive use of personal information can drive innovation, investment and sustainable economic 
growth, and greatly improve social security and security services (World Economic Forum, 
2012a). 
However, the risk of not realizing such value of personal information is evident given the 
height of societal concerns about security and privacy, and the diminishing level of trust be-
tween transacting parties. Yet parties in business transactions and social interactions usually 
rely on the issue of claims, and disclosure of unique attributes and credentials6 for proofs of 
identity. Governments in many countries have responded to the challenge and the uncertain-
ties by implementing various forms of electronic identity management systems as a critical 
enabler of government to citizens’ interactions, facilitating business transactions and citizens’ 
access to social services (J. K. Adjei, 2012).  
Ironically, implementation of IDMS and adoption by citizens usually present complex issues, 
for the key stakeholders, given that identity policies usually transcend technological, security, 
institutional, and economic barriers and also borders on issues of information privacy and 
trust (J. K. Adjei & Olesen, 2012). The complexity is often compounded by the rate at which 
standards and technological solutions become obsolete; and the increased link-ability of in-
formation to the data subject, with its tendency to raise privacy concerns (M. Culnan, 1993). 
Governments therefore find it difficult to justify such investments, and thus often leads to 
discomfort (Seltsikas & O’Keefe, 2010; E. A. Whitley & Hosein, 2010). Thus the concept of 
privacy, user-centricity, trusted identities and identity assurance have taken centre-stage in the 
IDMS discussions, even beyond the architectural issues like identity federation and silos 
                                                 
 
5
 Commoditisation is used interchangeably with commodification to describe the process of making commodities out of any thing that did 
not used to be available for trade previously 
6Credential is a generic term that can apply to both paper documents like Passports or Birth Certificates, and 
non-paper based objects such as smartcards and other tokens. 
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(Camenisch et al., 2011; Crosby, 2008a; Evry, 2010; Grant, 2011a; E. Whitley & Kanellopou-
lou, 2010a). Various privacy enhancing IDMSs are being piloted in many OECD7 countries 
(Camenisch, 2012; IBM, 2010; Microsoft, 2011).  
In developing countries, identification challenges continue to persist, although various forms 
of credentials and tokens have been issued to citizens. There is also an undue emphasis on 
physical verification of credentials, with many of the IDMS being in silos, yet many of the 
structural identification challenges persist. In Ghana, for instance, several different IDMS 
have been implemented leading to the issue of various forms of credentials. National Identifi-
cation Cards, Birth Certificates, National Health Insurance Cards, Biometric Passports, Bio-
metric Driver's Licenses, Biometric Voter's Identity Cards and Tax Identification Numbers 
(TIN) are some of the widely used credentials and identifiers8. Many of the source documents 
required for the issue of credentials are usually unreliable and takes longer time to verify. For 
example the civil registration coverage is currently 71% according to UNICEF 2012 statistics 
(UNICEF, 2012), implying that birth certificates could not be the only reliable source docu-
ment for acquisition of identity credentials. This situation hinders the reliability of identity 
credentials and tokens for proofs of identity and for secondary uses by businesses and gov-
ernment agencies.  
Existing IDMSs are primarily used by the credential issuers or (identity providers)9 as a 
means of fulfilling their primary functions – e.g. voters’ identity card is for electoral purposes. 
Changes to citizens personal data (addresses, etc.) are handled by each of the credential issu-
ers separately resulting in various errors and data and effort duplications. Moreover, Internet 
applications of IDMS are not given the requisite attention and thus identification systems typ-
ically focus on physical credential examination that cannot be verified electronically by the 
other institutions that depend on it. Thus, service providers have no legal process of verifying 
and authenticating credentials in real-time, resulting in each service provider devising their 
own specific means of identity verification. In spite of its use being lower than expected, 
                                                 
 
7
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is currently made up of 34 countries 
including European Union member countries, Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Korea, Israel, Mezico, New Zea-
land, Turkey and USA. 
8
 An identifier is a name that identifies or labels the identity of a person or entity. An identifier may be a word, 
number, letter, symbol, or any combination of those. 
9
 Credential issuers or (identity providers) are institutions that issue credentials which can be used for proofs of 
identity. 
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identity management can play a central role, if the factors that affect its takeoff are properly 
addressed as it is evidenced in recent statistics in Europe (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011). For 
instance a recent euro-barometer survey revealed that 62% of users better understand how to 
protect their identity in offline transactions using data minimization techniques, whilst 86% 
trust public institutions and 73% banks (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011).  
Contrarily, the 2012 global information technology report (Dutta & Bilbao-Osorio, 2012) 
rated Ghana and many African countries at the lowest in all the indices. Ghana was ranked 
97th out of the 142 countries covered whilst the top 20 positions were all occupied by either 
European or OECD countries. In the United States, trusted identities ecosystems have been 
found to be very critical to the success of digital IdMS (Grant, 2011a). This study focuses on 
understanding the stakeholder concerns on identity management and offering design guide-
lines for developers and policy makers in crafting trusted identity management systems that 
ensure citizens’ trust and information privacy regarding the collection, storage, use, and dis-
semination of personal identity information (Bennett & Raab, 2003a).  
1.2 Theoretical Rationale of the Study 
"How can a person just DECIDE what he's going to think? Doesn't he have to think FIRST, and then try  
to discover what it is that he's THOUGHT?" 
                   - Lucy and Linus, "Peanuts" by Charles Schulz, April 196110 
The central theme of this study is positioned within the Information Systems (IS) broad sub-
ject. Thus, a digital identity management system is a type of information system whereas citi-
zen-centric digital identity management falls within the broad theme of digital identity man-
agement systems as depicted in Figure 1. 
Since DeLone and McLean developed their seminal paper, IS Success model in 1992, several 
studies on IS success or effectiveness have ensued in the past twenty years. A preliminary 
analysis of IS success studies by juxtaposing IDMS studies revealed a paucity of literature on 
the key factors that influence the success or effectiveness of national identity management 
system (NIDMS). Even more pronounced were IS success studies that deal with stakeholder 
involvement, or with privacy and trust issue. Moreover, research has mainly focused on as-
sessing success from either organizational or user perspectives (Petter, DeLone, & McLean, 
                                                 
 
10
 Charles Monroe Schulz (November 26, 1922 – February 12, 2000) was an American cartoonist, best known 
for the comic strip Peanuts. 
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2012). Since NIDMS has societal implications, its success must be measured by taking into 
consideration, the impact on society.  
Ironically, in their recent study on the past, present and the future IS of success, Petter et al., 
(2012) posited that “in the current generation of systems and in future eras, we must go be-
yond the undue focus on developers, users, and managers and find other key stakeholders, 
including customers, employees, suppliers, stockholders, vendors, and governments” (Petter 
et al., 2012). Such calls sum up the need for IS success study that takes a multi-stakeholder 
perspective. 
Secondly, existing IDMS research discourse revolves around IDMS technologies, and design 
and solutions that claim to address minimum disclosure issues like touch2id, U-prove, idemix, 
etc. (Evry, 2010; IBM, 2010; Microsoft, 2011; Recordon & Reed, 2006) and also address the 
fine-grained concerns of stakeholders. Digital identity management must however strike a 
balance between usability, security, and privacy (Bertino, Paci, Ferrini, & Shang, 2009; Ber-
tino & Takahashi, 2010; Rahaman & Sasse, 2010), For instance, how to make personal identi-
fication information available, only to the appropriate individuals or services; how to build 
trust between parties involved in identity transactions; and  how to reduce the abuse of per-
sonal identity information (Baldwin, Casassa Mont, Beres, & Shiu, 2010). Such a condition 
requires clear understanding of the consequences of lack of trust. 
 
Figure 1 Research Focus. 
In particular, factors that contribute to lack of trust in national IDMS and the relationship be-
tween trust and citizens' concerns regarding secondary uses of personal identity information. 
 
 
Digital Identity 
Management Systems 
Information Systems 
Citizen Centric  
Identity 
Management 
System 
Information Systems 
Digital Identity 
Management Systems 
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How to build trusting relationships within the identity ecosystem are major concerns that re-
search must address. Lack of trust or otherwise does not exclusively originate from techno-
logical factors but rather many of such factors might be shrouded in contextual colours. A 
critical analysis of trusted identity management systems literature manifested the need for 
guidelines on its effective uses, especially from developing countries' perspectives, given that 
much of the existing research and initiatives fails to anticipate the contextual issues in such an 
important constituency. 
There is therefore the need to draw from information systems success literature to find an-
swers to such questions. DeLone & McLean’s IS success model (Delone & McLean, 2003; 
DeLone & McLean, 1992; Petter, DeLone, & McLean, 2008; Petter et al., 2012), technology 
acceptance model (TAM) (F. D. Davis, 1989) and user involvement theory (B. Ives & Olson, 
1984) could be beneficial lenses for addressing user concern in order to ensure effectiveness 
of identity management systems. In particular the IS success model is used in accessing the 
overall benefits that can be derived from the implementation of IS. Although several varia-
tions of it have been introduced (V. Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003), TAM has 
been predominantly used to explain consumer behavior with respect to technology acceptance 
and user satisfaction. IS success model also ensure consistency in success measures and the 
clarification of an important dependent variable in IS success research (Delone & McLean, 
2003; DeLone & McLean, 1992; Petter et al., 2008). 
Additionally, many innovative privacy enhancing IDMS technological initiatives assume a 
certain baseline of user awareness and literacy. However, the high illiteracy level in many 
developing countries is obvious, as Figure 2 indicates. In Ghana for instance, the literacy per-
centage from age fifteen (15) upwards is on average 67% based on the most recent UNESCO 
report as shown in Figure 2 (UNESCO, 2010). Clearly, this implies that 33% of the popula-
tion are illiterate. Thus the relevance of privacy enhancing principles and guidelines that 
seeks to give users control over their personal information use, minimal data disclosure, and 
justifiable consent (K. Cameron & Jones, 2007; OECD, 1980, 2011a) will be in doubt in this 
context, given that many of the citizens cannot read, and even those who do might not have 
the necessary exposure to invoke these principles. Thus, such principles assume an informed 
and exposed users who are capable of reading and performing basic tasks on computers and 
the Internet.  
Similarly, trusted and user-centric identity management literature take for granted, a credible 
source document (e.g. Birth Certificate) integrity that could be used to support the acquisition 
of primary credentials. Regrettably, civil registration systems in developing countries and 
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Ghana in particular remain a challenge, with civil registration coverage at 71% (UNESCO, 
2010).  
 
Figure 2  Adult Literacy rate in Sub Sahara Africa (Source: (UNESCO, 2010)). 
Another phenomenon driving the theoretical analysis of IS success measures is the generation 
of customized experiences and personalisation of services as a result of the increased rele-
vance of the internet in commercial transactions and social interactions. Primarily, Google, 
Facebook, and Yahoo! customize search results based on user location, browser used, and 
other user account settings in a way that two different individuals, using the same keywords 
in Google, would get different outcomes for their search results (Pariser, 2011). The IS suc-
cess model is adapted in this study to address the above issues that remain to be addressed 
since it has never been applied specifically in IdMS context.  
Empirical data for this study were collected from a series of interviews, stakeholder work-
shops and focus group discussions in Ghana, in addition to a quasi statistical analysis and 
media content analysis. This study highlights the important role of trust and information pri-
vacy in IdMS success. The study contributes to the identity management literature by enrich-
ing our current understanding of the key factors that affect successful implementation national 
IdMS and also provides guidelines for policy makers and developers. All the existing initia-
tives on effective means of identity verification and authentication depends on the context. 
For instance Internet connectivity and the speed of internet connectivity is taken for granted 
in many of such initiatives. 
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Figure 3  Adult Literacy rate in OECD countries (Source: (OECD, 2011b)). 
 
1.2.1 Opportunities for Theoretical Contributions 
Sarker and Wells, (2003) have posited that merely instantiating an existing theory in a new 
context can undermine the peculiar contextual issues (Sarker & Wells, 2003). This study re-
frains from such a practice by taking cognisance of the contextual issues in the application of 
theory.  
The issues raised in the previous section highlight the theoretical gaps and also provide the 
following opportunities for theoretical contributions to IS success and Identity management 
literature and practice. In the foremost, effectiveness of IdMS in a societal context transcend 
technical architecture and perceived information quality. Thus the criteria used by organisa-
tions to measure success are not sufficient in the measurement of IdMS quality, given that the 
latter must address effectiveness from a multi-stakeholder perspective. In essence, IdMS ef-
fectiveness or success will also depend on the level of user involvement and how relying par-
ties are able to collaborate in the use of the system for authorized secondary purposes. This 
study addresses such theoretical gaps in the measurement of IdMS effectiveness and legiti-
mate secondary uses of personal information. 
Secondly, “use” of IdMS may not be a good indicator of IS success, given that governments 
in many countries possess coercive powers in the enforcement of its policies (Turner, 2009, p. 
47). The exercise of such coercive powers can make the “use” of IdMS mandatory. In such a 
situation, user satisfaction is what explains IdMS effectiveness. Trust in government and in 
technology is essential in ensuring user satisfaction, and thus a necessary precondition for the 
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diffusion of such technology, especially, in secondary and commercial uses of identity cre-
dentials and attributes. This study explains the role of trust in moderating the behaviour of 
citizens with respect to effective uses of IdMS. Thus, the inclusion of trust dimension presents 
a major opportunity for theoretical contribution.  
Thirdly, in the physical world (face to face transactions and interactions) identity management 
(IdM) is critical in dealing with the associated risks, by helping to increase the confidence 
between parties to such transactions. IdM has thus been touted as a critical enabler of gov-
ernment to citizen interaction and the provision of access to social services (OECD, 2011c). 
In online interaction and transactions however, lack of a demonstrable link between a physi-
cal person and a “digital identity”11 can create additional uncertainties that do not exist of-
fline12. There has been a clarion call for the development of effective and efficient digital 
identity management strategies in order to harness the economic and social potential of the 
Internet and unleashing innovation to create trust-based digital services (OECD, 2011c). It is 
interesting to learn how and in what ways the contributions to economic development are de-
rived in an economy and what factors can hinder such benefits in developing countries. This 
study can contribute new theoretical understanding about what factors must be considered in 
the introduction of IDMS in a developing country. 
Moreover, effective uses of IDMS thrive on a high level of privacy protection that technology 
enables, and an appropriate level of assurance. Such privacy protection and assurance are also 
critical to further developing the market for online and in particular high value services. Ironi-
cally, many of the privacy principles fail to anticipate the possibility of educationally and 
technologically un-empowered users (de Villiers, 2005), a phenomenon common in many 
developing countries. For instance, user control and user consent as in the laws of identity (K. 
Cameron & Jones, 2007); and collection limitations and use limitation principles, specified in 
the OECD guidelines (OECD, 1980, 2002, 2011a). Highlighting these weaknesses in the ex-
isting privacy principles will strengthen the generalisability in their application and thus pre-
sent a good opportunity to contribute to theory. 
In summation, identification of the key factors that contribute to trusted IdMS from a devel-
oping country perspective, requires a critical analysis of the phenomenon within the context 
of its application and interacting with key stakeholders. 
                                                 
 
11
 Digital identity is an electronic or digital representation of a physical entity (person or object) 
12
 Face to face transactions or transactions that does not involve the internet as a medium 
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1.3 Phenomena of Interest, Research Questions and Objectives  
Researchers using deductive approaches often argue that a researcher must specify research 
questions prior to embarking on the inquiry. Others hold contrary views by arguing that prior 
specification of research questions are not suitable in exploratory and inductive research and 
thus hold in preference, the definition of the phenomenon of interest since the exploratory 
process can lead to the discovery of pertinent questions (M. W. Lewis & Grimes, 1999; Lin-
coln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Modell, 2010).  
Ideally, this study should follow the second approach by merely focusing on the specification 
of the phenomena since this study takes the interpretive exploratory route. However, I do 
acknowledge the extreme importance of research questions for establishing focus in explora-
tory studies. Thus I first specify the phenomenon of interest in this section and then present 
the three interrelated research questions in the next section. All the questions largely fall with-
in the bounds of the phenomenon as presented in the collection of papers that make up the 
thesis. 
Taking a cue from the research background and the theoretical rationale, an outline of the 
phenomenon of interest which acts as a guide in all the phases of the study , which is also in 
line with the title of the study is as follows; “trusted and citizen-centric national identity 
management system”. Thus, attention is given to understanding what constitutes IdMS suc-
cess, the role of privacy concern and trust in fostering IdMS effectiveness within the identity 
ecosystem13. In the quest to understand the phenomenon, the researcher attempts to situate 
him/herself in the place occupied by the subject within the context in order to appreciate the 
situation on the ground (Bourdieu, 1996).  
A combination of quasi statistics, open ended interviews, problem structuring methods using 
stakeholder workshop (Papamichail, Alves, French, Yang, & Snowdon, 2007; Sinkko et al., 
2008) and focus group discussions (Kitzinger, 1995a; Krueger & Casey, 2009) will be em-
ployed in the acquisition of general comprehension of the context and social conditions. This 
approach gives the researcher a degree of control over the reality and the social mechanisms 
which exert their effects on the circumstances (Bourdieu, 1996). Secondly, the phenomenon 
                                                 
 
13
 Identity ecosystem is a trusted identity environment where individuals and organizations bounded by standards 
and policies for identifying and authenticating their digital identities, can transact and interact with confidence 
that the other party is not impersonating another person or taking undue advantange of the persoanl information 
exchange. 
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of interest focuses on shaping the behaviour of the key actors within the identity ecosystem by 
acknowledging the existence of different roles each actor can play to inculcate trust and con-
fidence. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
     The number of rational hypotheses that can explain any given phenomenon is infinite14 
Robert M. Pirsig 
In spite of the extensive research on IdM, factors affecting citizen-centric IDMS implementa-
tion have not been adequately addressed (G. Aichholzer & Strauß, 2009; Dass & Pal, 2009). 
For instance, governments in many countries have invested in identity policies but identity 
abuses and lack of trust in government and technology remains a challenge, especially in de-
veloping countries. Ironically several innovative technologies professing to address many of 
such concerns have been implemented – touch2ID (Evry, 2010; Touch2ID, 2012), Priva-
cyABC (Sabouri, Krontiris, & Rannenberg, 2012), etc. It is therefore interesting to understand 
the major factors that affect the effectiveness of IDMS, and effective guidelines for address-
ing such fine-grained concerns will be very useful.  
Formulating a research question is an intellectually challenging and time consuming under-
taking (Saunders & Lewis, 1997). Yet the research questions act as a useful guide in shaping 
the research and as a tool for evaluation. I am therefore conscious of comprehensiveness and 
parsimony (Reay & Whetten, 2011; Whetten, 1989). 
Question 1: The first research question focuses on understanding identity formation and the 
factors that contribute to its effectiveness or success. The ensuing question then is: 
What are the major factors that influence (or contribute to) an effective or suc-
cessful national identity management system? Given the developing countries' 
perspective, it is also important to examine the factors that influence identity 
management system's effectiveness in developing countries. Various sections of 
papers one, two and three addressed this research question. 
 
Question 2: The second question is in line with the second research objective and is as fol-
lows:  
                                                 
 
14
 By Robert M. Pirsig in his book ‘Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance’ 
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How does trust and information privacy concern affect the effectiveness of nation-
al identity management systems?  
There is therefore the need to investigate the effects of citizens’ concerns on the effectiveness 
of identity management systems. Addressing this question also involves an analysis of the 
nature of the relationship between trust and information privacy concern. Question two is ad-
dressed in papers two, four and five. 
 
Question 3: The third research question is also in line with the third research objective and 
is as follows:  
What measures must be put in place to ensure a trusted and citizen-centric identi-
ty ecosystem?  
This question is based on the notion that given the multi-stakeholder perspective of national 
identity policies, it is important to define the common rules of engagement and the necessary 
assurances that can help in addressing the major stakeholder concerns. 
1.3.2  Statement of Objectives 
The trouble with not having a goal is that you can spend your life running  
up and down the field and never scoring. — Bill Copeland15 
The ambition of this inquiry is in threefold, to examine the trusted and user centric identity 
management systems that are privacy enhancing, understand the factors that contribute to 
IDMS effectiveness and to propose guidelines for instilling trusted identity ecosystem from a  
developing country’s perspective. It is important to also know more about the formation of 
identity and their implication on the effectiveness of IDMS.  
According to (Rojon & Saunders, 2012), in order to operationalise research questions, re-
search objectives must demonstrate a “fit-for-purpose”, and must be; comprehensible, specif-
ic, relevant, coherent, answerable and measurable. The objectives must thus be clearly linked 
to the study as a whole. Thus, the broad aim is divided into the following three specific objec-
tives: 
1. Identify the key factors that contribute to the effectiveness of identity management sys-
tems. A detailed analysis of the various factors that determine the success or effective-
                                                 
 
15
 Bill Copeland was  an Australian Test Cricket match Umpire 
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ness of IDMS is critical for a better understanding of design and identity policy con-
siderations. The first research question is specified to address this research objective. 
2. Understand how and in what ways trust and privacy concern affect or contribute to 
the effectiveness of the IDMS. Governments implement national identity management 
systems and identity policies in order to facilitate interaction, business transaction and 
to address information security challenges. Trust and information privacy concern 
have become a major subject in contemporary digital identity management discus-
sions. Thus, a clear understanding of the role of trust and information privacy concern 
will ensure IDMS effectiveness. This will be an interesting addition to future identity 
policies and design guidelines. 
3. Propose guidelines for ensuring trusted and citizen-centric identity management sys-
tem that is privacy enhancing. The trusted identity management system depends on 
carefully crafted guidelines that address trust, regulatory and interoperability frame-
works (Grant, 2011a), which takes into consideration, the context and the major con-
cerns of all the key stakeholders within the identities ecosystem. Such an environment 
encourages legitimate secondary and commercial uses of personal information and the 
reliability of credentials and identity attributes. 
1.4. Research Methodology 
A summary of the research design which is an adaptation of (Crotty, 1998) is depicted in Fig-
ure 4. This study takes an interpretivist stance with a blend of pragmatic trajectory in under-
standing the factors that contribute to trusted and citizen centric identity management. Such a 
scientific paradigm enables the researcher to move beyond his horizon of understanding to see 
what is out there. This worldview is also significant since it reinforces the key attributes of the 
case study research strategy being adopted in this study. Thus, it opens an avenue for the re-
searcher to gather evidence from multiple sources (Yin, 2008a, 2011a). 
This study has been categorised into three integrated phases of inquiry – Phase 1, Phase 2 and 
Phase 3. Each of the phases entails a certain degree of fieldwork and desk research. The pre-
liminary study, phase 1 involved gathering of empirical data using a combination of inter-
views and quasi statistics on citizens' perceptions and how identity credentials are used in 
developing countries. The interviews and the perception survey took place in Ghana. A com-
bination of interviews and stakeholder workshop (forum) was used to gather empirical data 
during phase 2.  The aim of this phase of the research was to investigate how personal infor-
mation could be used for legitimate secondary purposes. This study was also an opportunity 
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to identify the major stakeholders and the effect of trust and privacy concerns on effective 
uses of IdMS. Phase 3, data validations exercise, entailed the use of interviews, focus groups 
and a follow-up stakeholder workshop. The objective was to develop a guideline for crafting a 
trusted identity ecosystem. Thus I needed participants’ account of their experiences in using 
the various credentials and how it has affected their lives and interactions and business trans-
actions. I employed Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Creswell, 2007a; J. A. 
Smith, 2004; Thorpe & Holt, 2007) as a means of forming and attaching meanings to what 
participants said. A detailed account of this interpretation approach is in chapter 4. Figure 4 
provides a snapshot of the philosophical paradigm and the methods adopted in this study.  
 
Figure 4 Research Paradigm & Methods. Adapted from (Crotty, 1998). 
1.5. Summary of Findings 
The findings of this thesis are already published in three peer-reviewed academic conference 
and three peer reviewed academic journal papers. Table 1 summaries the various research 
questions, objectives, and the findings of each of the six papers published during the course of 
the study. The table also indicates names of co-authors where there was a joint publication 
and the nature of the co-author contributions. 
Paper Author Title Research Objectives Research Question 
Addressed 
Summary of Find-
ings 
1 Adjei & 
Tobbin 
Identification 
Systems in Afri-
ca; The Case of 
Ghana 
Explore the factors 
IDMS uses in devel-
oping countries  
What underlying 
factors motivate or 
inhibit IDMS im-
plementations 
Connectivity, taxation 
and political motives 
are  key factors that 
can affect effective 
uses of IDMS 
 
Epistemology 
Methodology 
Methods                         
Sources of Evidence 
Theoretical Perspectives 
(Ontology) 
Constructivism 
Quasi-Statistics 
Interview 
Focus Group 
Stakeholder workshop 
Qualitative 
Case Study 
Interpretivism 
Phenomenology 
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Paper Author Title Research Objectives Research Question 
Addressed 
Summary of Find-
ings 
2 Adjei & 
Olesen 
Analysis of Pri-
vacy-Enhancing 
Identity Man-
agement Systems 
To understand the 
relationship between 
individuals’ intentions 
to disclose personal 
information, their 
actual personal infor-
mation disclosure 
behaviours. 
What are the major 
issues involved in 
the design of  priva-
cy-enhancing IDMS. 
What design princi-
ples must be ob-
served? 
- Perceptions of pri-
vacy and trust are 
major factors that 
affect acceptance of 
IDMS. 
-Country specific 
nature of privacy 
laws limits their abil-
ity to address digital 
identity issues giving 
the ubiquity of the 
internet. 
3 Adjei & 
Olesen 
Keeping Identity 
Private; Estab-
lishing Trust in 
the Physical and 
Digital World for 
Identity Man-
agement Systems 
To understand the 
major issues involved 
in the design of priva-
cy-enhancing IDMS 
and contribute to 
improved framework 
and design principles. 
What design princi-
ples must be ob-
served in the design 
of  privacy-
enhancing IDMS? 
Many of the privacy 
initiatives does not 
address privacy issues 
in face to face trans-
actions which is a 
major focus IDMSs 
in developing coun-
tries. 
4 Adjei & 
Olesen 
Secondary Uses 
of Personal Iden-
tity Information: 
Policies, Tech-
nologies and 
Regulatory 
Framework 
To provide a means of 
communicating iden-
tity-related concepts 
to policy-makers, 
users and technolo-
gists.  
 
What constitute 
personal information 
and what are the 
major user concerns 
in relation to sec-
ondary uses of per-
sonal information? 
Efficient civic regis-
tration system, user 
collaboration and 
regulatory framework 
encourage effective 
secondary uses.  
5 Adjei & 
Olesen 
Building Trusted 
National Identity 
Management 
Systems – Pre-
senting Privacy-
Concern Trust 
Curve 
To understand the key 
stakeholder concerns 
regarding the collec-
tion, storage and use 
of personal infor-
mation and how such 
concerns should be 
addressed to ensure 
trusted identities. 
How should stake-
holder concerns be 
addressed in a trust-
ed identity manage-
ment system? 
To ensure trusted 
identity ecosystem 
governments must 
strenghten civil regis-
trations which is the 
key source document 
for identity for-
mation. Policy mak-
ers must also strive to 
attain the trust 
threshold. 
6 Joseph 
K. 
Adjei 
Towards a Trust-
ed National Iden-
tities Framework 
To identify the key 
requirements for 
crafting a trusted 
identities ecosystem 
What are the key 
requirements for 
crafting a trusted 
identities ecosystem? 
Institutional coopera-
tion and user empow-
erment are critical in 
a trusted identities 
environment 
Table 1  Summary of Findings 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis has been logically categorised into four sections as follows; 1) Introduction and 
Research Context; and it is followed by 2) Theoretical Framework and Research Methodolo-
gy; 3) Findings, Discussion and Conclusions further work; and 4) Appendixes, showing the 
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paper publications during the study. An outline of the various chapters of the thesis are as 
follows: 
– Chapter 1 – Introduction. This chapter provides a background to the study and the theoreti-
cal rationale. An outline of the phenomenon of interest is provided in addition to the research 
question, the objectives, a summary of the research methodology and findings. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the structure of the thesis. 
– Chapter 2 – The research context and the state-of-the-art: This chapter provides an overview 
of the concepts necessary to the understanding of user-centric identity management systems, 
the contextual issues in Ghana and the Danish civil registration system. An overview of exist-
ing IdMS technologies, and the concepts of trust and information privacy are presented in this 
chapter. 
– Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework: this chapter begins with a discussion of IS success and 
then introduces the various theories in relation to success and effectiveness. An overview of 
the DeLone and McLean IS success model is presented in addition to the implications of its 
application in the measurement of IDMS success. 
– Chapter 4 – Research Approach and Methodology: This chapter explains the philosophical 
paradigms, research philosophy and the methodological considerations of the study. The re-
search design, sources of evidence and data interpretation principles are also presented in this 
chapter. 
– Chapter 5 – Findings and Contributions: This chapter is an integrative summary of the find-
ings, contributions and the lessons learnt from each of the papers written in the course of the 
study. The chapter also explains the research contributions organised according to the selected 
publications. 
– Chapter 6 – Discussion and Research Limitations: A reflection on the work presented in the 
thesis is presented. We discuss the most important contributions and the main problems en-
countered in the course of the thesis. Furthermore, we present some challenges and problems 
in the area of user-centric service composition and delivery. Following the discussions is a list 
of papers published in the course of the PhD study. 
– Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Research Limitations: This chapter presents the conclusions  
drawn from the study and the research limitations. Copies of the publications are in the ap-
pendix. 
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Chapter 2: State-of-the-Art and Research Context 
Webster and Watson (2002) have posited that an effective literature review creates a solid 
foundation for advancing knowledge and also uncovering those areas in need of more re-
search (Webster & Watson, 2002). This Chapter and Chapter 3 provide such a review and, 
thus, offer a theoretical basis for the research. The chapter begins with an analysis of the con-
cepts of identity, digital identity, and identity management, and their implication on personal 
information exchanges in citizens interactions and transactions. It continues with a review of 
literature on trust and privacy and the developments in OECD in that regard. An overview of 
the civil registration system in Denmark and the existing identity management situation in 
Ghana then follows.  
2.1 Identity, Identification and Identity Management 
2.1.1 Identity 
Identity and identification have been used interchangeably by researchers and in conversa-
tions, but recognising the distinctions is of relevance to the study of identity management. 
The concept of identity has over the years been discussed from the perspective of technical 
scientists, psychologists, sociologists, etc. From a mathematical perspective, Leibnitz defined 
identity on the basis of whether two things can be distinguished from each other (Feldman, 
1970; Wilton, 2008a). Thus, two objects sharing similar characteristics like shape, extent, 
position in time and space, could be deemed to have or share the relationship of identity 
(Feldman, 1970). Similarly, in his narrative of identity, Ricoeur (1991), described the the no-
tion of “identity” as involving two opposing realities (Ricoeur, 1991) – the identity “self-
hood” (in Latin ipse), which refers to those attributes that makes a person unique; and the 
identity sameness (in Latin idem) referring to the attributes that will persist and thus keep a 
person the same. Crompton (2004), simplified such descriptions by positing that, identity is 
the relationship between something and itself (Crompton, 2004).   
In relationships, people usually resort to either self identity or sameness as a means of recog-
nizing people or differentiating them from others. This notion of  identity is vital in the for-
mation of better knowledge of people which is essential in building trust, a necessary founda-
tion in governance, commerce and social interactions. A person's identity is regarded as a 
reflection of those things, which are generally known about them by the people with whom 
they interact (Wilton, 2008a). Identity in information systems therefore consists of traits, at-
tributes, and preferences, based on which an individual may receive personalized services 
either online, on mobile devices, at work, or in many other places (Liberty, 2004). In essence, 
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identity is the chain of events from enrolment and credential issue through to credential 
presentation and thus, information about an entity that is sufficient to identify that entity in a 
particular context (Bertino, 2012). 
 
2.1.2 Digital Identity 
In our day-to-day physical interactions and on the Internet, we leave our footprints in the form 
of pieces of information about ourselves, which accrete in various ways over a period of time. 
These footprints (also referred to as Partial identity as illustrated in Figure 6) are the trails 
from e-mails, visiting websites, purchasing items on the internet, postings and comments on 
Facebook and other social networks, text messages, our information in various databases. 
Such a phenomenon implies that, a person or an entity can have many different personas16 
depending on the context, which fundamentally redefine the notion of identity. 
Digital identity is therefore a set of claims made by one digital subject about itself or another 
digital subject. In the the words of Turkle, digital identity refers to “the sameness between an 
entity and its persona” (Turkle, 1997). It is also the essential and unique characteristics of an 
entity that is used to identify it (Abelson & Lessig, 1998). Thus, Digital identity is the digital 
                                                 
 
16
 Persona is a model of an individual's public personality based on data and maintained by transactions, and 
intended for use as a proxy for the individual (Roger Clarke, 1994)  
 
Figure 5  Entity, Identity, Identifiers and Attributes 
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representation of the information known about a specific individual, group or organization. 
Such information encompasses not only the attributive information (i.e. social security num-
ber, date of birth, and country of origin), but also biometrics data (i.e. iris or fingerprint fea-
tures), and information about user activities, including Web searches and e-shopping transac-
tions. Such definitions have widened the concept of identity to include identifiers (Figure 5) 
such as login names and pseudonyms. Hence, the specific sets of identity attributes and iden-
tifiers used to carry on a specific transaction in cyberspace can vary considerably and there-
fore digital or electronic identity is now seen as an electronic representation of a real world 
entity or, an online equivalent of an individual (Roussos, Peterson, & Patel, 2003). 
Digital identity thus removes the requirement for parties to be present during transactions and 
interactions. This is what Rahaman & Sasse, (2011) refer to as disembodiment of identifica-
tion processes (Rahaman & Sasse, 2010). Digital identity in effect, ensures a lack of confine-
ment to a particular location or network and thus ensuring wider, distribution of personal in-
formation (Camp, 2003). It is therefore important that such factors are also addressed in iden-
tity policy to cater for the resultant differences between digital and physical identity (Taylor 
& Lips, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 6 Digital Identity. 
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2.1.3 Identification 
Due to the complexity of modern business transactions and social interactions, each party 
would like to ascertain, with a certain degree of confidence, the assurance of the credibility of 
the people with whom they are dealing. Such a desire for a more sophisticated knowledge of 
transacting parties has increasingly become necessary given that the Internet was built 
without a way to know who and what one is connecting to (Kim Cameron, 2005). 
Interestingly, this concern was as captured in a 1993 cartoon as in Figure 7, which appeared 
in a New Yorker magazine as; “on the internet nobody knows that you are a dog” (Steiner, 
1993). 
Identification is therefore a process of establishing the identity of; or recognizing or treating a 
thing as identical with another; or establishing as being a particular person or entity (Concise 
Oxford Dictionary). It is also the act of making, representing to be, or regarding or treating a 
thing or entity as the same or identical. Thus human identification is the association of data 
with a particular human being (R. Clarke, 1994), the process of linking information with a 
particular person, or action of being identified (Crompton, 2004). In effect, identifying an 
individual requires a clear focus on the distinctive characteristics or attributes of the individu-
al (i.e. Names, date of birth, address and identifiers like driver’s license number). The person 
must be able to demonstrate knowledge of something (something you know – e.g. a pass-
word); possession of a token or credential (something you have – e.g. driver’s license); or by 
means of physiological characteristics or features (something you are – e.g. gender, facial 
features, signature, fingerprint) (Crompton, 2004).  
If identification is a process, then the integrity of the identification process and its usefulness 
will depend on: the reliability of the registration or enrolment processes, how difficult it is to 
duplicate or alter credentials; and the ease of verification of the link between the issued cre-
dentials themselves and the person presenting it. An efficient identification must observe the 
following:  
• The issuer of assertion must be unequivocally identifiable from the token.  
• The data subject of an assertion should be also unmistakably identifiable. Thus, it 
should be difficult for someone to reuse stolen tokens.  
• Tokens must be tamper resistant, or difficult to forge or vary after it is made or issued. 
To meet such identification criteria, an efficient system for managing identities will be neces-
sary.  
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Developing the identity metasystem concepts as an integrated framework to support different 
identification technologies and identity platforms in a standardised manner Cameron, (2005) 
proposed what he called the laws of identity which is seen as a very good foundation for con-
structing the identity layer. An outline of the laws of identity are summarised in Table 2. 
PRINCIPLE BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
User Control and 
Consent 
Technical identity systems must only reveal information identifying a 
user with the user's consent 
Minimal Disclo-
sure for a Con-
strained Use 
The solution that discloses the least amount of identifying information 
and best limits its use is the most stable long-term solution Digital iden-
tity systems must be designed so the disclosure of identifying infor-
mation is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a 
given identity relationship. 
Justifiable Parties Digital identity systems must be designed so the disclosure of identify-
ing information is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable 
place in a given identity relationship. 
Directed Identity A universal identity system must support both "omni-directional" iden-
tifiers for use by public entities and "unidirectional" identifiers for use 
by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while preventing unnec-
essary release of correlation handles 
Pluralism of Op-
erators and 
A universal identity system must channel and enable the inter-working 
of multiple identity technologies run by multiple identity providers17. 
                                                 
 
17
 Identity provider is an organisation responsible for the process of enroling and issuance of credentials to indi-
viduals which can be used as proof of identity. 
 
Figure 7   On the internet nobody knows you are a dog. 
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PRINCIPLE BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
Technologies 
Human Integra-
tion 
The universal identity metasystem must define the human user to be a 
component of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous 
human-machine communication mechanisms offering protection 
against identity attacks 
Consistent Expe-
rience Across 
Contexts 
The unifying identity metasystem must guarantee its users a simple, 
consistent experience while enabling separation of contexts through 
multiple operators and technologies. 
Table 2     The Laws of Identity (Kim Cameron, 2005) . 
The aim of these identity management design principles is to give users control and allow 
them to make decisions that reflect their preferences such as being able to understand and 
agree to the uses that the organisation makes of their personal information. It does not howev-
er, consider the reasons why an individual might be reluctant to provide certain information to 
certain parties. 
2.1.4 Identity Management Systems  
Regardless of who makes the identity claim, it is important that the claims are packaged in a 
transportable token such that the data subject or the identity service provider will not always 
need to be available in real time. An efficient system is therefore needed to manage such re-
quirements. Throughout history, different variations of Identity management systems were 
used to establish the basis for trade and governance by means of tokens and technologies, 
seals, coded messages, signatures, jewellery, etc. (3G_Americas, 2009).  
Due to increased modernization and trend in technological development towards online trans-
actions and interactions and via single sign-on (SSO) (G. Aichholzer & Strauß, 2009), the 
need for efficient and effective user identity management systems have become imperative. 
Digital identity management aims at transcribing to the digital world, models  of interaction 
which have been used for centuries in direct face-to-face communication schemes in order to 
enable trusted remote interactions. 
Van Thuan (2007), described electronic identity management as “the processes, policies and 
technologies used to manage the complete Lifecycle of user identities across a system and to 
control user access to the system resources by associating their rights and restrictions”. In 
effect, Identity management systems, consist of the processes and all underlying technologies 
for the creation, management and usage of identities and their attributes. Invariably, the ob-
jective of electronic IdM is to ensure consistent business rules and practices; tightening of 
control over user-to-applications; automation of business processes in order to minimize op-
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erational costs; enhanced security; improved productivity. (Lips & Pang, 2011) have therefore 
suggested a shift in focus towards analyses of the wider societal implications of IdMS and 
related social design issues. 
Figure 8  illustrates identity formation process and a summary of which is as follows: 
i) Enrolment or Registration - Individuals must go through an initial registration or 
enrolment processes where their biographical footprint, biometric footprint or a 
combination of both are captured into the system. The outcome of the enrolment 
process is the issue of credentials or identifiers to those registered. In effect, en-
rolment is the process by which an individual is brought within the identity policy 
and the resulting systems and the eventual issue of credentials and identifiers. The 
birth of a child or the arrival of a qualified foreign national will usually trigger the 
enrolment process in a national IDMS. 
ii) Authorisation – upon registration, permission and privileges to access the re-
sources and services are assigned to an individual based on a predefined identifica-
tion policy. 
iii) Authentication – This is the process of establishing with a certain degree of confi-
dence in the user’s identity  or a process that results in a person being accepted as 
authorized to engage in or perform some activity (E. A. Whitley, 2009). Thus, au-
thentication is the process of verifying that a user is who he/she claims to be. To 
gain access to services and resources, the individual makes a verifiable identity 
claim by either logging into a system with a given credential, knowledge of certain 
information, or based on biometric data. There are many authentication methods 
with different levels of assurances, also referred to as authentication factors, such 
as: something the user knows (i.e. Password); something the user has (i.e. Smart 
card or passport) and or something the user is (i.e. Biometrics) (van Thuan, 2007). 
iv) Access Control – Authentication process results in the access control process in 
which a check is made by the system to see if an individual has a valid authorisa-
tion to access the resource; 
v) Revocation – on the expiry of individuals' rights or when a person is no more as-
sociated with the system, a revocation process is triggered resulting in the creden-
tials and associated rights being rescinded. Such circumstances include the death 
of a citizen, completion of school or travelling outside a country for more than a 
specified period. 
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2.1.5 Identity Verification 
Verification is the means by which an identity credential presented by an individual is 
checked by either identity issuers or relying parties. At its simplest, this might simply involve 
looking at a card and accepting it if it appears genuine. Alternatively, various checks on the 
validity of the credential may be undertaken. These can include a consideration of specialised 
security markings on the credential or contacting an identity assurance agency to check that 
the credential is still valid and not listed as stolen or expired. In some cases, the verification 
process may be against information held on the credential; in other cases, the check may be 
against data held by the identity service provider. The verification process require efficient 
and effective user identification and authentication, making IdM a crucial challenge in e-
government.  
2.1.6 Biometric Authentication  
Biometrics are measurable physiological and behavioural characteristics which can be used 
for identity authentication and verification. Various forms of biometrics can be digitised and 
used to automate human recognition. However, due to privacy,  technical, legal and many 
other challenges, certain biometrics are not commonly used. For instance, Jain et al., (1999) 
identified universality, uniqueness, measurability, performance, acceptability and circumven-
tion as the key factors in assessing the suitability of any trait of characteristics to be used for 
 
Figure 8 Identity Management Life Cycle. 
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biometric authentication (A. Jain & Aggarwal, 2012; A. K. Jain, Bolle, & Pankanti, 1999; 
Wayman, Jain, Maltoni, & Maio, 2005).  
Biometrics which are commonly used in practice for IdM purposes include fingerprint, voice 
recognition, facial recognition, finger and palm veins (Gutwirth, 2012). Biometrics authenti-
cation usually does not depend on the possession of a physical credentials or tokens, and 
memorisation of certain identifiers (i.e. user names and password), and thus offer attractive 
options for strong authentications.  
However, it can be vulnerable if the threshold is not set properly. Such vulnerability can be 
avoided when biometrics are used in conjunction with other credentials, including additional 
types of biometric or multiple biometrics. Thus the strength of biometrics is increased when it 
is augmented with multiple factors (van Thuan, 2007).  
Given the sensitivity of biometric data, its frequent use online requires a consideration of the 
rights of individuals, the identity providers and relying parties and the responsibilities of law 
enforcement agencies. On the part of data subjects, maximum control could permeate from 
limiting uses of biometrics to situations where the data subjects is in control, such as storage 
of encrypted format of the biometric on devices in the possession of data subjects. 
Biometric systems can be applied in either a verification mode or an identification mode de-
pending on the context. The application of biometric systems in a verification mode implies 
that, the system will validate the identity of a person by comparing the captured biometric 
data with an already stored biometric template of the person (A. K. Jain, Flynn, & Ross, 2010; 
Li & Jain, 2011).  
Its application in identification mode on the other hand is where the system attempts to recog-
nise an individual by conducting a one-to-many search and comparisons through the tem-
plates of all the users who are registered in the database for a matching template. The objec-
tive of identification mode of biometric application is to establish a person’s identity and thus 
preventing her from using multiple identities. A failure of the system to match implies that, 
the data subject has been registered. Such a condition is very critical in negative recognition 
situations, where there is the need to establish whether a person is who he/she (implicitly or 
explicitly) denies to be (A. K. Jain et al., 2010; Li & Jain, 2011). 
Figure 9 is a biometric block diagram illustrating a biometric authentication system in both 
verification and identification modes. In the verification mode, the system performs a one-to-
one comparison of captured biometric data with a specific template that is stored in a bio-
metric database in order to verify an individual is who he/she claims to be. The following 
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three steps are observed; in the first place reference models, for all the users are generated and 
stored in the model database.  
Secondly, sample data is matched with the information in the reference model to generate the 
valid and invalid acceptance and rejection thresholds. The final stage, which is  the testing of 
validity using various forms of credentials and identifiers (i.e. smart card, user name, identifi-
cation number, etc.), to indicate the template to be used for comparison.  
In the identification mode, a person is first enrolled in the biometric system where biometric 
data is captured and stored. Subsequently, biometric information is detected when the person 
attempts  to use the system and the data is compared with the information stored during en-
rolment.  
In Figure 9 the sensor which is usually an image acquisition system is the interface between 
the real world and the system, the next block, performs all pre-processing activities like re-
moval of background noise in order to obtain a normalized data. In the third block, necessary 
features are extracted. Feature extractor is the stage where correct features are extracted in an 
optimal manner in order to create a template. A template is a synthesis of the relevant charac-
teristics extracted from the source. Elements of the biometric measurement that are not used 
in the comparison algorithm are discarded in the template to reduce the file size and to protect 
the identity of the person. During enrolment, the template or a card is stored in a database and 
is used as the benchmark for matching by parsing the template to the matcher for comparison 
based on the predefined algorithim. 
Biometrics are very useful in the identification and removal of duplicate names and attributes 
from an existing IdM database. 
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2.2 Models of Identity Management Systems 
Various forms of digital identity management systems have been implemented using various 
technical and architectural model. This section discusses some of the popular identity man-
agement models – silos, centralised, federated and user-centric identity management models. 
2.2.1 Silo Identity Systems 
The soiled identity management system is an IdMS model, that is usually designed and oper-
ated independently by an organisation, mainly to fulfil its primary objectives, such as active 
directory. Such an IdMS usually does not allow connections with other IdMSs and thus the 
identity provider also takes the role of service provider (SP), such that it manages the name 
space and authentication tokens for all its users. The SP also authenticates users based on 
their identifier-token pairs during service access. Users can be allowed to define their own 
identifiers, as long as they are unique within the name space. A major benefit of the silo mod-
el is unlinkability. Given that the system is not connected to any other system, user attributes 
in one system cannot be easily linked to different identifiers of the same users in other do-
mains (Donohue & Carblanc, 2008).  
Additionally, a security breach in one silo does not compromise security in other systems.  
Silo systems are however very rigid in that they do not afford users the convenience of linka-
bility where necessary, resulting in the use of a multiplicity of credentials and identifiers de-
pending on the context. Such multiple user accounts, identifiers and credentials are usually 
very difficult to manage and thus users resort to the use of similar identifiers across different 
silos with its propensity to vulnerability of the systems. Another disadvantage of the Silo 
 
Figure 9 Biometric System. 
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model is waste of resources, because of resource and effort duplication. For instance, a per-
son’s details are stored in each of the identity silos although this could be avoided if infor-
mation were to be shared. 
Although there may be genuine reasons for keeping identity information in silos, the organi-
sation in any sense, wastes resources and duplicate efforts in trying to separate user profiles 
(Donohue & Carblanc, 2008).  
 
2.2.2 Centralised identity systems 
The centralized IdMS model is an early attempt to rectify the inherent limitations of silo sys-
tems by centralising the independent databases into a single system. Thus in the centralised 
model, user data are kept independent of the various application silos, and data are made 
available to service providers from the central database. Due to the centralised nature of the 
systems, each user can use the same credentials and identifiers to access different services, 
whilst all the providers authenticate the client through the same certificate before granting 
access to their services. Centralised IdMS have evolved with time, given the increasing need 
to share and reuse identity information. Centralized IdMS is a very common model for storing 
and managing digital identities (Donohue & Carblanc, 2008). 
 
Figure 10 Silo Identity Management Model. 
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2.2.3 Federated Identity Systems 
Federated identity management model seeks to simplify the account management problems 
pertaining to silo model. Instead, service providers do not aggregate their account information 
as in the case of centralised models. Rather, service providers establish a central “identity 
provider” which manages user identifiers by linking identifiers based on sets of predefined 
rules of engagement among federation of SPs who were previously unlinked. 
Federated IdMS started as a response to trust and privacy issues of the centralised IdMS 
(Donohue & Carblanc, 2008). Users belonging to identity federation can access services by 
authenticating to the central identity provider, by allowing a user to obtain seamless access to 
services from all the service providers belonging to the federation. Thus in federated IdMS 
model, the identity provider could also be a service provider. 
In a federated IdMS environment, users do not need to exhibit various identifiers and remem-
ber different user names and passwords, because a single authentication event at the primary 
account also gives them access to multiple service providers. Similarly, members of a federa-
tion do not need to create multiple accounts for users prior to offering services. The identity 
provider is able to facilitate seamless data sharing between two or more accounts of the same 
user because it knows which identifiers correspond to the same user, and thus making the 
identity provider a trusted third party. 
Federation can be more convenient for users and efficient for the organisations managing the 
accounts, but it also gives rise to new challenges. For example, it may not be easy to enable 
information sharing between organisations that do not have a pre-established relationship, but 
from whom an individual would like coordinated service delivery. This problem has recently 
 
Figure 11 Centralised IDMS Model. 
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been addressed using contractual and policy models to supplement the technology in order to 
help mediate relationships between unknown parties.  
However, if the identity provider chooses not to establish a federation relationship with users’ 
preferred service providers, users may be unable to use their federated accounts to access 
those service providers. Another challenge relates to the problem of determining liability for 
these complex business relationships and protection against theft and errors. The main vulner-
abilities stem from the fact that the identity provider knows which identifiers correspond to a 
given user. Thus, such knowledge places the identity provider in a position where it could 
impersonate the user or enable others to do so. 
Some of the popular browser-based federated identity initiatives focusing on single sign-on18 
(SSO) include: the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 (OASIS, 2012), 
the Liberty Alliance project (OASIS, 2004), Microsoft_ Passport or windows Live ID (Mi-
crosoft, 2013; Westfall, 2011), the Shibboleth Initiative (Shibboleth, 2013), and OpenID (El-
don, 2009). 
 
                                                 
 
18
 Single Sign-on is a federated identity solution that allow clients to perform a single log in operation to an 
identity provider, and are yet able to access resources offered by a variety of service providers (Armando et al., 
2012). 
 
Figure 12 Federated IDMS Model. 
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2.2.4 User-centric identity systems 
User-centric identity system is an attempt to give users maximum control over their personal 
information (Kim Cameron, 2005; Cavoukian, 2012). Thus, User-centric IDMS seek to offer 
users the flexibility to choose identity providers independent of service providers, and do not 
necessarily need to provide personal information to potential service providers in order to 
obtain access to services and resources. In such a model, the roles of Identity providers is that 
of a trusted third party who store user account and profile information and authenticate users, 
and service providers accept assertions or claims about users from the identity providers. 
User-centric model are also designed to ensure that identity providers operate in the interest 
of the users rather than in the interest of the service providers. In a user centric model, service 
providers do not necessarily form part of an identity federation. Thus service providers mere-
ly become “relying parties” with users being able to choose what information to disclose 
when dealing with service providers in particular transaction.  
 
 
Similarly, although service providers require users’ personal information to process a transac-
tion, individuals use different identity providers,  and different identity attributes, and thus 
information is not stored in one location. The role of identity providers becomes that of a 
trusted third-party, since users will usually trust a broker they can control; whilst relying par-
ties will not trust a broker if the claims asserted are actually self-vouched by the user 
(Donohue & Carblanc, 2008; Jøsang & Pope, 2005).  
 
Figure 13 User-Centric Identity Management Model. 
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Various innovative user-centric IdMS solutions have been tested with appropriate steps to 
address the concerns of both the user and the service providers as described in section 2.2.5. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the key attributes of the IdMS models described in this section  
Process Silo Centralised Federated User-Centric Trusted Identity 
Ecosystem 
Method of 
Authentication 
Users must authenticate 
to identity providers 
who are also service 
providers in each 
transaction. 
Authentication is to a 
centralised account. 
Users authenticate 
to one identity 
provider and access 
services across the 
federation. 
Users authenticate 
to identity provid-
ers, and service 
providers have to 
rely on that authen-
tication  
Various authen-
titcation schemes 
available depending 
on the assurance 
required  
Location of 
Identity Infor-
mation 
Information is stored 
by each Identity Pro-
vider. 
Identity information is 
stored in a central 
Identity directory. 
Identity information 
held by each partic-
ipant of the federa-
tion with whom a 
user enrolled. 
Access to services is 
based on federa-
tion’s  agreements. 
Identity infor-
mation is stored by 
identity providers 
chosen by the user. 
Service providers 
rely on identity 
providers. 
Identity information 
is stored by users 
preferred identity 
providers including 
social networks  
The method of 
linking accounts/ 
learning if they 
belong to the 
same person 
Accounts are kept 
separate and are not 
linked.  
All identity attributes 
and detail of identifi-
ers stored in a central 
register.  Thus linking 
is not necessary 
Each identity pro-
vider determines 
which of user 
attributes and 
identifier should be 
linked to other 
federation mem-
bers’ accounts 
Uses of cryptog-
raphy can prevent 
linkages between a 
user’s different 
digital identities, 
leaving the user in 
control. 
User involvement 
in identity policy 
and uses of cryp-
tography to give 
users maximum 
control control over 
personal identity 
information. 
Trust / Privacy 
Implications. 
Nature of de-
pendency 
User relies on each  
service  provider to 
protect personal infor-
mation. Absence of 
information sharing is a 
privacy advantage. 
The user is reliant on 
the service provider to 
maintain the privacy 
and security of all of 
his or her data. 
Users have rights 
from contracts, but 
they may be unfa-
miliar with options. 
The federation has 
leverage as it is in 
possession of the 
user’s information. 
Users can keep 
accounts separate 
and still allow 
information to 
flow, but bear 
greater responsibil-
ity. 
Various trust 
frameworks and 
institutional coop-
eration schemes 
available  
Convenience Silo accounts are 
inconvenient for users 
and service providers 
due to multiple authen-
tications, redundant 
entry of information, 
and lack of data flow. 
This arrangement is 
easy for the user since 
he or she only has to 
deal with one creden-
tial to call up the 
account and since he 
or she has to authenti-
cate just once. 
Other members of 
the federation avoid 
the burden of cre-
dential manage-
ment. Businesses 
that provide ser-
vices to a user can 
coordinate service 
delivery. 
Users may be ill 
equipped  to man-
age their own data 
(also a vulnerabil-
ity) and may need 
training and 
awareness raising. 
Interoperability at 
all levels 
Vulnerabilities Silo systems offer the 
advantage of having 
limited data on hand, 
thus creating less of an 
incentive to attack. 
They also have a better 
defined and stronger 
security boundary to 
keep attackers out and 
limit exposure from 
failures. 
Risk of single point of 
failure as ID provision 
from a  central loca-
tion.  The the central 
register is susceptible 
to attack given that 
entire user profile is 
stored in one location 
and other entities are 
unable to check for 
validity.  
Users have little 
input into the busi-
ness-partner agree-
ments. Some service 
providers will set up 
federation systems 
to exploit users. 
Currently there is no 
way to safeguard 
data after it has 
been shared. 
Concentration in 
the market for 
identity providers 
could leave them 
with much power. 
Currently there is 
no way to safe-
guard data after it 
has been shared. 
Trust threshold 
ensures that certain 
level of privacy 
maintain at all 
times 
 
Table 3 Summary of IDM Models: Adapted from (Donohue & Carblanc, 2008). 
2.2.5 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
In a user-centric IDMS, the issue of distrust between the user and the relying party is ad-
dressed, because the identity provider acts as a trusted third-party broker. Individuals can 
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have several different identity providers, and for that matter, their information may not be 
stored in one place. 
U-Prove (Microsoft, 2011), IDEMIX (IBM, 2010), OpenID (Recordon & Reed, 2006) and 
OAuth (Hammer-Lahav, 2009) are some of the major user centric and privacy enhancing 
IdMS technologies and frameworks that seek to assist transacting and interacting parties to 
manage claims and attributes so that the relying parties are assured that the information is 
correct before engaging with the user, although the identity of the user might not be revealed. 
These approaches ensure  minimum disclosure of personal information and fine-grained dele-
gation of authorization between service providers. An overview of the technologies is provid-
ed in this section. 
U-Prove – Developed based on an advanced cryptographic technology and concepts, U-Prove 
is an attempt to overcome the age old dilemma between identity assurance and privacy as 
discussed in (Donohue & Carblanc, 2008; Microsoft, 2011). The dilemma is addressed by 
enabling minimal disclosure of identity information in electronic transactions and communi-
cations. U-prove is a technology that Microsoft, the developers,  believes could assist in their 
promotion of an open identity and access model for individuals, businesses, and governments 
agencies. Thus the concept of U-prove is rooted in the principles prescribed in the identity 
metasystem (K. Cameron & Jones, 2007; Kim Cameron, 2005). For instance to satisfy the 
minimum and selective disclosure principles, the U-Prove agent software acts as an interme-
diary between websites and thus, allowing users to share data in a manner that protects their 
privacy. U-Prove also provides the mechanism for separating the protocol for information 
retrieval from trusted third parties from the protocols guiding the release of this information 
to the destination site (J. Adjei & Olesen, 2011). Effectively, the issuer of the information is 
prevented from tracking the time and destination of information and its use and the destina-
tion site is equally prevented from linking users. 
Identity Mixer (idemix) – IDEMIX which was developed by IBM Research and its partners 
is an anonymous credential system that enables strong identity authentication and information 
privacy. IDEMIX seek to guarantee information privacy by solving the privacy dilemma and 
thus, facilitating effective secondary uses of personal identity information within the identity 
life cycle Figure 8 by identity service providers and relying parties without trust erosion. 
IDEMIX emulates the concepts of Privacy by Design (Cavoukian, 2012) due to its ability to 
ensure minimum disclosure and ensuring that sensitive information is not revealed. This at-
tributes of IDEMIX help in masking sensitive personal information in online transactions and 
thus fulfilling the principle of data minimization in the the seven laws of identity (Kim Cam-
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eron, 2005; Cavoukian & Carter, 2006). Although credentials are fundamental concepts in 
IDEMIX implementation, it seeks to address the lapses in traditional face to face presentation 
of Identity credentials such as passports and driving license which could result in the disclo-
sure of other vital information to third parties by virtue of such information being on the cre-
dential. IDEMIX in essence, focus on the object of credentials as providing a means to estab-
lish a claimed identity, roles, or attributes about an individual with an entity which is usually 
a critical part of access-control policies. IDEMIX based identity credentials thus provide a 
means of establishing the age or age predicate of a person without revealing the actual date of 
birth or age of that person. In essence such anonymous credentials, provides users the flexibil-
ity of selectively revealing on aspects of their identity attributes required in a transaction or a 
predicate of which making it possible to avoid wholesale disclosure of personal information. 
IDEMIX thus largely removes the possibility of linking users identity attributes by identity 
providers and relying parties. IDEMIX users initially obtain anonymous digital credential or 
voucher indicating the information the issuer is prepared to reveal from a trusted third party 
such as a bank, insurance company, or government agency. Subsequently users can authenti-
cate themselves with service providers by issuing a claim or a statement using IDEMIX to 
securely transform the issued credential. Such transformed credentials will only contain the 
subset of the attested information that the user is willing to disclose. Although IDEMIX users 
can apply this transformation on many instances, none of the credentials can linked. 
IDEMIX in effect, seeks to limit the need for undue disclosure of personal details in online 
transactions such as downloading music and movies or subscribing to online newsletters. In 
such transactions users leave traces and pieces of information such as size, frequency, and 
source of online purchases that can be traced back to the user. IDEMIX applications seeks to 
eliminate such trails with an artificial identity information, known as pseudonyms, making 
user online transactions anonymous. IDEMIX thus can allow users to transact without reveal-
ing their payment information which can easily be used in predicting users  spending habits or 
provide proof of age without disclosing users actual date of birth. IDEMIX based systems in 
effect provide the technology for protecting users privacy by sharing only pseudonyms, so 
that real identity information can never be intercepted or exposed (Camenisch, 2012; Came-
nisch et al., 2011). 
OpenID – OpenID is an open standard that describes the means by which users can achieve a 
decentralized authentication which eliminate the undue reliance on service providers for au-
thentication. Thus the application of OpenID allows users to consolidate their digital identities 
by creating accounts with their preferred OpenID identity providers, and then use those ac-
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counts as the basis for signing on to any website that OpenID authentications (Recordon & 
Reed, 2006). In effect OpenID standard provides a digital communication framework between 
the identity provider and the OpenID acceptor (the "relying party") to ensure privacy and in-
formation security OpenID Attribute Exchange provides a means of transferring user attrib-
utes, (i.e. Name and gender) from the OpenID identity provider to the relying party (Hardt, 
Bufu, & Hoyt, 2007; Recordon & Reed, 2006). This means that the OpenID protocol does not 
rely on a central authority to neither does it require a specific means by which to authenticate 
users. Thus, OpenID allows various forms of  authentications including passwords, smart 
cards and biometrics. Organisations such as Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, PayPal, BBC, AOL, 
MySpace, IBM, VeriSign, etc., provides various variations of OpenID authentication solu-
tions (Eldon, 2009). 
Open Authorisation (OAuth) – OAuth is an open standard for data authorization that make 
it possible for users to grant limited access (either in scope and in duration) to third-parties to 
access their resources without sharing their passwords (P. J. Connolly, 2010; Hammer-Lahav, 
2009; Mangiuc, 2012). In that way OAuth users are able to share their private resources (e.g., 
photos, videos, contact lists, bank accounts) stored on a particular location with another web-
site although their credentials like username and password are not disclosed. Effectively the 
underlining philosophy of OAuth is similar to the valet key metaphor of cars. Thus, third par-
ties can only have controlled or limited access to the car [40]. To make a scheme like the valet 
key metaphor possible, websites are given only the minimum information required to accom-
plish the task that user has requested. In effect it afford users the ability to to hand out to third 
parties tokens (instead of credentials) to their data hosted by a given service provider. Such 
tokens might include granting print access to photos without sharing username and password. 
OAuth 2.0 also provide specific authorization flows for internat and desktop applications, 
mobile phones, and internet of things (P. J. Connolly, 2010; Hammer-Lahav, 2009; Mangiuc, 
2012). 
Touch2id – Touch2id is a biometric and Near Field Communication (NFC) technology based 
identity verification technology which apply the concepts of minimum disclosure and data 
minimization principles in making the application user-centric and privacy-enhancing 
(Touch2ID, 2012). Touch2id is currently in use in certain parts of the United Kingdom to 
provide identity verification services, such as proof–of–age for young adults in public places 
using NFC service or mobile phone ‘sticker’. The application of data minimisation and mini-
mum disclosure principles implies that the identity verification technology does not need to 
store the personal information of users such as name, date–of–birth, gender or address. Thus, 
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the technology can function efficiently without the need for central database as is the case of 
many identity management systems. Similarly it does not capture and store a fingerprint at 
enrolment or during authentication since it uses fingerprint sensor instead of a picture to con-
firm the claim that a person is 18 or over. In essence, Touch2id provides a form of zero–
knowledge proof for the claim that an individual assert (i.e. I am over 18) since it does not 
reveal anything other than the veracity of that claim. Hence the relying party (i.e. a bar at-
tendant) can check the identity of a potential customer with sufficient level of assurance with-
out having (or needing) to know the individual’s personal information and without generating 
an archival record of who visited which bars when. Touch2ID technology achieve this feat by 
harnessing multi–spectral fingerprint sensors that is capable of reading various fingerprints 
thus addressing common performance failures due to dirty or damaged fingerprints) and the 
emerging use of contactless smart–card technology, and NFC–enabled smart phones. In effect 
the applications non reliance on database for storing unique code created from the fingerprint, 
using a process known as minutiae mapping where the fingerprint itself is never captured and 
the approach therefore minimises the risks of unrevokable biometrics (Ratha, Chikkerur, 
Connell, & Bolle, 2007; E. Whitley, 2013).  
The major features of the technology include: 
• No personally identifying information is released relying parties since no name, age or 
photo appears on (or is stored on) the card and hence users movements and transac-
tions cannot be easily profiled by merchants (Kim Cameron, 2010). 
• There is no central database assembled that contains the fingerprints of innocent peo-
ple whilst the fingerprint templates on the cards are digitally signed and can't be tam-
pered with 
• The fingerprint template remains the property of the person with the fingerprint – 
there is no privacy issue or security honeypot and thus credentials cannot be shared 
with friends and family since their finger would not match the fingerprint template. 
• Misplaced or stolen touch2id based credentials cannot be reused since it will not work 
any more thus able to eradicate fake Identity credentials. 
2.2.6 Identity Assurance 
Conducting efficient and effective commercial and government businesses thrives on the abil-
ity to demonstrate the identity of all transacting parties beyond their immediate circle of trust. 
Identity assurance is a user-centric concept that seeks to allow data subjects to prove or pro-
vide informational representation during a chain of events that can define who they are with-
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out the need for them being physically present (Crosby, 2008a). It aims at user satisfaction 
and thus focus on providing visibility into how risks associated with identity information are 
being managed. Such identity management solutions often deal with the storage, processing, 
disclosure and disposal of users’ identities, their profiles and related sensitive information.  
To ensure user satisfaction, identity assurance must be a key of an element of IdMS since it 
offers mutual benefits to identity providers and service providers, and to citizens. An identity 
assurance scheme can address issues such as the amount and type of data stored and the de-
gree to which this information is shared. In identity assurance systems, the context and the 
nature of events define what prove or informational representation will be necessary and the 
kind of entitlement. For instance, clients of health insurance agencies might need to prove 
their status as unemployed, retired, etc. 
Protection of personal data integrity is a major concern for all customers although, they may 
vary in their demand for privacy protection. Identity assurance schemes must therefore pro-
vide the options that will enable data subjects to make such informed choices. Identity  assur-
ance therefore differs from Identity management, in the sense that IdMs are primarily de-
signed in the interest of the identity provider whereas identity assurance focuses on bringing 
benefits to the data subject. Yet the technology employed to achieve Identity  assurance and 
management may be similar.  
Kantara Initiative, a collaborative research organization focuses on requirement gathering for 
the development and operation of Trust Frameworks as well as verification of actors within 
Trust Framework ecosystems aiming at identity assurance schemes. Error! Reference source 
not found. illustrates identity assurance protocol, the insurance and its client both have a bro-
ker they can trust. The identity of the client is also assured, given that they do not need to re-
veal sensitive information to the service provider.  
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Figure 14   Typical Trust Framework. 
2.3 Citizen19 (National) Identification Systems 
Governments in many countries implement IdMS as a means of establishing a reliable data-
base of citizens and residents of the country. An efficient citizens identification system should 
assist government agencies in the provision of targeted services, improving governance and 
collection of taxes. 
Technically, such citizen (national) identification systems follows the concept of trust man-
agement systems (Blaze et al. 2003) and might usually have a central database and ‘identity 
cards’ that are issued to citizens. The variations are usually in relation to the location and con-
tent of the databases, and the underlying technology (e.g. Smart card or biometrics), the 
communication architecture, etc. In such systems, credentials issued to citizens give them the 
right to access services. 
Thus the overarching objective of many citizen identification systems is to improve the assur-
ance of citizen’s identity in their dealings with government agencies (Cofta, 2008). In effect, 
national identification systems unduly focus on the credential issuer and thus have negative 
implications on citizens’ trust, due to its equation of secrecy to privacy protection. However, 
the undue focus on citizens' interactions with the state sometimes diminishes the benefits that 
                                                 
 
19
 The term ‘citizen’ refers to all individuals who can participate in the system, such as legal definition of citizens 
and all indivduals who have lawful residents status, refugees, etc. 
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could be derived from the system, and particularly discounting the rich experiences that citi-
zens already enjoy with their identities on the internet. For instance, many of such systems 
fail to cater for group identity or the identity of anyone other than the individual (Cofta, 
2008). 
Furthermore, many countries also differ in their ability to realize the potential social benefits 
of a citizen identification system, including  efficiency improvement in  service delivery, re-
duction in cost of doing business, effective border control and improved government to citi-
zen interaction, due to the risks associated with improper design or operation. Violation of 
citizens’ privacy and other personal rights is due to intentional information sharing by those 
in possession of such sensitive information or by direct attack on the system making such 
systems a risky proposition from an information security perspective (D. J. Solove, 2002). 
This is part of the objective of the study, by highlighting the key issues needed to be ad-
dressed in order to make such systems effective. 
2.4. Privacy and Personal identity information 
Personal information is has become central to the business models of the digital age; admnis-
tring government services and; and in citizens interactions. Various strategies are adopted by 
business organizations in personalising service delivery to customers, using customer prefer-
ences (Alatalo & Siponen, 2001; Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007; X. Wang & Xue, 2012). 
Although such practices offer customers convenience and personalized services, which can 
contribute to repeat purchases, it inherently requires collection of pieces of customers' person-
al data or attributes. Thus, the need for a critical look at what constitutes personal identity 
information (Andrade, Kaltcheva, & Weitz, 2002).  
Any information that can specifically identify an individual (e.g. name, telephone number, e-
mail address, or account number) is described as personal identity information. It can also 
include a person’s location or activities like accessing a website. In his Onion Model (Wilton, 
2008a), Wilton has illustrated this using his the layers of an onion to categorise personal in-
formation into three layers. These include  the core, inner layer and the outer layer. Thus, in-
formation that can uniquely identify an individual and does not change over time, (e.g. Name, 
date of birth) was placed at the core. Information at the core is known as a Basic Identifier Set 
(Wilton, 2008a). The inner layer consists of information that is capable of being used for 
identification but susceptible to change over time, such as address, height, etc. The outer layer 
consists of information that cannot uniquely identify a person, except when combined with 
any other information or aggregated over time, such as a person's transaction history and sec-
tor specific information like blood group and health status. In effect, personal information is 
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any information describing a natural person or information that describes an identifiable indi-
vidual (Trubow, 1992). 
2.4.1. Secondary uses of Personal Information 
Information must generally be used for the purpose of protecting, promoting, or meeting the 
physical needs of an individual or to enable that individual to participate in social interactions 
or benefit from services. Such information usages are regarded as the primary purposes of 
collecting personal information. For instance, the primary purpose of a Voter ID card is for an 
individual to vote in an election and that of a passport is to facilitate border control. Many of 
the data protection regulations mandate that personal information gathered for one purpose 
may not be used for any other purpose without the specific, informed consent of the data sub-
ject (Trubow, 1992). However, in order to conduct business such as opening a bank account, 
banks sometimes require tokens like a passport as a proof of identity. Such a requirement by 
the bank is secondary to the original intention of passports and voter IDs. 
Secondary uses of personal information was conceptualised in Culnan (1993) as having two 
dimensions: (1) The information processing activity (acquisition, use, or transfer), and (2) The 
relationship between the consumer and the firm utilizing the information (existing customer 
or prospect) (M. J. Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; M. Culnan, 1993). Thus, secondary uses of 
personal information refers to the collection and storage of information for purposes other 
than originally intended by the issuer of the credential, whether legitimate or otherwise. Ob-
taining access to and enventual uses of personal information in principle results in a number 
of complex challenges. In essence, the legitimacy of secondary use of personal information 
hinges on an "implied social contract" (tacit or explicit consent by service providers to protect 
the interest of data subjects) between service providers and users (Milne & Gordon, 1993). 
Perceptions of abuses of personal identity information perception results in issues of privacy 
and confidentiality, with it attendant effect on the trusting relationship that should exist be-
tween service providers and data subjects (D. Solove, 2006, 2013). Such perceptions and their 
effects are amplified by that technologies that make such abuses and breaches difficult to no-
tice, and thus posing technological, policy and regulatory concerns in relation with the ability 
to collect, store, aggregate, link, and transmit personal information for legitimate purposes. 
Such challenges have generally been researched in information systems under information 
privacy. 
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2.4.2 Information Privacy Concerns 
The concept of privacy has been studied in many different ways, given that it has many di-
mensions (H. J. Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011; H. J. Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). Privacy has 
been described as a condition or a state in which an individual can be more or less inaccessi-
ble to others, either in the spatial, psychological or informational plane (E. Whitley & Kanel-
lopoulou, 2010a). In psychology literature privacy is described as the ability of individuals to 
control the terms under which personal information is acquired and used (Westin, 1967). Sim-
ilarly privacy has been described in sociology literature as individuals' ability to independent-
ly dispose of their roles according to their right of self-determination, and then to have confi-
dence that third parties respect the intended separation of their roles (Biskup & Brüggeman, 
1988).  
Clarke (1999) on the otherhand defined privacy as individual's personal space, and provided a 
four dimensional categorization of individuals’ personal space as; privacy of the person (con-
cerned with the integrity of the Individual's body), privacy of personal behaviour, personal 
communications, and privacy of personal data (R. Clarke, 1999; Roger Clarke, 1999).  
Contemporary research have merged personal communication and data privacy into what is 
now referred to as information privacy, given the the increased digitalization of information 
and communications (France Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Pavlou, 2011a). Hence, information 
privacy refers to the claims of individuals that their personal data should generally not be 
available to others, and that, where data are possessed by another party, the individual must 
be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over the data and their use (France Bélanger 
& Crossler, 2011) 
Information privacy concerns are related to factors affecting a person's willingness to render 
personal information (Dinev, Xu, Smith, & Hart, 2012), engage in online transaction activity 
(Pavlou, Liang, & Xue, 2007), and the attitude towards government regulation (Milberg, 
Smith, & Burke, 2000). Although individuals express privacy concerns, many are willing to 
trade-in their privacy for convenience. This so-called privacy paradox (J. Adjei & Olesen, 
2011; Norberg et al., 2007; D. Solove, 2013; Zallone, 2010) also reaffirms the need for a 
more measured treatment of personal information. 
Thus, information privacy is not about secrecy, which is an intentional concealment of infor-
mation and (or) a disposition towards the sharing of potentially inaccurate information 
(Trubow, 1992). OECD guidelines (OECD, 1980), and other national data protection laws 
address various aspects of information privacy concerns, such as; (1) The existence of record 
systems cannot be kept secret; (2) an individual must be able to "find out what information 
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about him is in a record and how it is used"; and (3) an individual must be able to "correct or 
amend a record of personally identifiable information (D. Solove, 2006). 
(France Bélanger & Crossler, 2011) observed that development of privacy tools and technol-
ogies is usually done in isolation of the actual users and for that matter, their input is not re-
flected in the systems design. The research approach adopted in this study is to address such 
concerns and to ensure active user involvement in secondary uses of their personal infor-
mation. 
 
Figure 15  Dimensions of Privacy 
Figure 15 outlines the dimensions of privacy. Information privacy concerns issues of personal 
communication privacy and data privacy. Such concerns emanates from and are associated 
with data collection, data processing and data dissemination. Information privacy concerns 
therefore can influence and affect individuals' willingness to provide information, their trans-
action activities and responses to the identity policies of government agencies. 
2.5 The Concept of Trust 
  Three things are needed for government: weapons, food, and trust. If a ruler can’t hold on to all three, he 
should give up weapons and food and hold on to trust: “without trust we cannot stand”  Confucius. 
 
Historically, human beings have lived in smaller communities and close-knit societies and 
have had the confidence assurance that the name of a member identifies him in the communi-
ty. In such communities there were not many information secrecy and thus, a person’s name 
carried a great deal of information. Interestingly, in contemporary society, we interact with 
people (entities) that we barely know and sometimes might never meet. Such a phenomenon 
has brought the concept of trust to its current pole position in identity management discus-
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sions. Thus, failure to do such due diligence can result in serious business and social implica-
tions.  
The concept of trust has been studied from different perspectives such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, economics and political sciences but a willingness to take risks may be one of the few 
characteristics common to all trust situations (Heavey & Murphy, 2012; Johnson-George & 
Swap, 1982; R. C. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).  In the context of personal identity 
information use, parties are expected to act and react willingly. In essence, trust is a firm be-
lief in a firm belief in the reliability, honesty, veracity, justice, good faith, in the intent of an-
other party to conduct a deal, transaction, pledge, contract, etc. in accordance with agreed 
principles, rules, laws, expectations, undertakings, etc (Slone, 2004). 
Trust is not transitive (cannot be passed from person to person); distributive (cannot be 
shared); associative (cannot be linked to another trust or added together); symmetric (I trust 
‘you’ does not equal ‘you trust me’); self-declared (trust me – why?) 
This is in line with the definition of trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party, based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular ac-
tion important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(R. C. Mayer et al., 1995). This presupposes that in the identity management process, data 
subjects are perceived to be in a vulnerable position and trust is what will induce parties to 
engage in transactions irrespective of the vulnerability levels. Thus, trust is the probability 
that a party to a transaction will act in a way that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to the 
interest of the other party for the latter to cooperate (Gambetta, 2000). The above definitions 
make the differences between predictability and trust unclear and hence the need to situate 
trust in its proper context. Although the two are a means of reducing uncertainty, trust goes 
beyond predictability and hence reduction of uncertainties. Otherwise, those who can consist-
ently ignore the desires and intentions of trustors and act in their own self-interest can be 
deemed to be trusted, because of their predictability (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995). 
 2.5.1 Trustworthiness 
The relationships between the actors in trusting in trusting relationships is a major source of 
reference in explaining the concept of Trustworthiness. The key actors in trusting relation-
ships include the; trustor, trustee and context (Kramer, 1999). Trustors in the context of this 
study includes citizens (or virtual citizens, since trust can also be a matter between virtual 
persons (Cofta, 2008). On the otherhand trustees are the credential issuers and relying parties 
and the context is the identification scheme. Trustworthiness is based on the attributes exhib-
ited by the trustees within the context. Mayer et al, (1995) identified three important charac-
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teristics that help in building the foundation for the development of a trust framework (R. C. 
Mayer et al., 1995). Ability, integrity and benevolence have been identified as the key charac-
teristics of trustees in the trust development process. Ability signifies competences, perceived 
expertise, business acumen and judgement that enable the trustee to have influence within a 
particular domain. Benevolence on the other hand connotes the extent to which the trustee can 
be assured of going beyond the profit motive to serve the interest of the trustor.  
Essentially, benevolence suggests that the trustee will behave in a desirable manner towards a 
set objective, irrespective of their personal preferences (Rosen & Jerdee, 1977). Integrity is 
premised on the trustor having a positive perception that the trustee will adhere to a set of 
acceptable principles. Thus adherence to a set of moral principles accepted by the trustor de-
fines personal integrity. The concept of trust and trustworthiness thus has multidimensional 
constructs of ability, integrity and benevolence. Ability is characterised by competence or 
perceived expertise; integrity signifying consistency, fairness and reliability; whereas loyalty, 
openness and availability describe benevolence (J. Adjei & Olesen, 2011; R. C. Mayer et al., 
1995). Therefore a trust relationship can be negatively affected when the trustee consistently 
provides wrong information, refuses to provide or delays in the delivery of personal infor-
mation to a legitimate recipient, or provides legitimate information to the wrong persons. 
Hence, users’ perception of trust towards an identity management system (IdMS) is an im-
portant determinant of its success as they can affect the usage behaviour of the systems. 
2.5.2 Dimensions of Citizens’ Trust 
Using Hattori & Lapidus (2004) concepts of trust relationships, Srivastava & Teo, (2008) 
created a trust grid to model the level of citizens’ trust in e-government technology (Hattori & 
Lapidus, 2004; Teo, Srivastava, & Jiang, 2008). We have adapted the framework for access-
ing the role of trust in IdMS success. Perception of trust can be either due to the technology or 
the institutions (S. C. Srivastava & Teo, 2009; Teo et al., 2008). A low citizens’ trust in cre-
dential issuers and a low citizen’s trust in IdMS will be a major disincentive to accept the 
IdMS since there is a lack of identity assurance (Crosby, 2008a). Such lack of trust on both 
dimensions can lead to unfavourable outcomes which are not suitable for the success of the 
IdMS. Likewise, a low trust in credential issuers coupled with a high trust in the technology 
leads to a situation where citizens might use technology as a competitive tool against the un-
predictable and sporadic results. In such a scenario, the IdMS will be viewed with suspicion 
and cynicism by the citizens (S. C. Srivastava & Teo, 2009; Teo et al., 2008). 
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A low level of citizens’ trust in IdMS, coupled with a low level of trust in credential issuers 
could breed distrust in the identity ecosystem leading to suspicion and cynicism. Similarly, a 
low level of trust in credential issuers and a high level of trust in IdMS can lead to a situation 
where the patronage of the IdMS is merely a means of positive defiance.  
When the identity issuer is trustworthy, citizens begin to cooperate even when trust in IdMS 
is low. A high level of trust in credential issuer coupled with a high level of trust in IdMS will 
result in synergy between the government agency and citizens. Citizens begin to feel that their 
identity is assured in transactions involving exchange of personal information. It also encour-
ages institutional cooperation, effective secondary uses of personal identity information, in-
teroperability. This is the desired conditions for trusted identity ecosystem. 
2.6. The Identity Ecosystem in Ghana 
An Identity Ecosystem is an environment where individuals, businesses, and other organiza-
tions enjoy greater trust, privacy and security, as they conduct sensitive transactions and in-
teractions (Grant, 2011a). It is thus a user-centric identity environment governed by a set of 
technologies, policies, and agreed upon standards that securely supports transactions ranging 
from anonymous to fully authenticated and from low to high value transactions (Bertino, 
2012; Grant, 2011a).  
In Ghana, several IDMS have been implemented with various forms of credentials issued to 
citizens. The major credential issuers as in Figure 17 include; National Identification Cards, 
Birth Certificates, National Health Insurance Cards, Biometric Passports, Biometric Driver's 
Licenses, Biometric Voter's Identity Cards and Tax Identification Numbers (TIN) are some of 
 
Figure 16 Dimensions of Trust  (Hattori & Lapidus, 2004; Teo, Srivastava, & Jiang, 2008a). 
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the widely used credentials. The birth certificate which should be the primary source docu-
ment for acquiring identity credentials has many challenges. Currently, the civil registration 
coverage in Ghana is 71% based on UNICEF 2012 statistics (UNICEF, 2012) implying that 
out of  the population of 24.66 million (UNICEF, 2012), 29%  (7.15 million) are not regis-
tered. Besides, there are other challenges with respect to the registration system, ranging from 
multiple registration, multiple name changes, etc.  
Existing IDMSs are all in silos and each of the existing IdMS are primarily used by the cre-
dential issuers as a means of fulfilling their functions. Many of the citizens’ registrations are 
unduly influenced politically, resulting in the recruitment of unqualified personnel and its 
effect on trust.  
The technology being used to manage identity comprises of manual systems, computerised 
systems and different variations of biometric technology. All the identification systems are for 
face to face verification and thus Internet applications of IdMSs are not given the requisite 
attention. Many of the commercial banks in Ghana issues various customised cards and visa 
cards to their customers that is used for ATM withdrawals and various forms of electronic 
banking transactions. Currently, none of such credentials can be used for proof of identity, 
although customers have a comparatively high level trust in the financial institutions. 
 
Page | 47 
 
Changes to citizens’ personal data is handled by each of the credential issuers independently. 
Thus, service providers have no legal process of verifying and authenticating credentials in 
real-time via the internet or mobile platforms. This hinders the effective uses of the systems 
beyond the primary purposes. In spite of its use being lower than expected, identity manage-
ment can play a central role, if the factors that affect its takeoff are properly addressed as is 
evidenced in recent statistics in Europe.  
This next section provides an overview of civil registration system, voter identification sys-
tem and the National Identification Card. Passports, drivers’ license, and other credentials 
issued by government agencies and private institutions are not discussed in detail. In the case 
of passports and drivers’ licenses, although they are some of the generally accepted creden-
tials for proofs of identity, the information in Table 4 indicates their limited circulation, given 
that majority of Ghanaian residents do have drivers license and passports. Similarly, tax iden-
tification number (TIN) and social security cards are not commonly used for either authenti-
cation or identity verifications beside their primary use.  
 
 
 
Figure 17 Institutions that Issue Credentials in Ghana. 
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TYPE OF IDMS/CREDENTIAL NATURE OF CREDENTIAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
National Health Insurance Card  Plastic Card, valid for 5 years and renewable every year. Accepted for 
proof of identity 
Optional  
Voters Identity Card Biometric database and laminated paper card. Accepted for proof of 
identity 
Mandatory for all voters.  
Passport Biometric based passport. Accepted for proof of identity. Mandatory for international 
travel 
Drivers License Biometric database and a Plastic Card, valid for 6 years and renewable 
every 2 years. Accepted for proof of identity 
Mandatory for all drivers 
National Identity Card Biometric database. Plastic card based on 2 dimensional bar code. 
Many of the cards not yet issued 
Mandatory for all citizens and 
residents 
Social Security Card Laminated paper card. Not accepted for proof of identity Mandatory for all employees 
Tax Identification Number (TIN)  The TIN is issued by the Ghana Revenue Authority to registered 
businesses and employees. No credential is issued. 
Mandatory for businesses and 
the employed  
Birth Certificates Paper based form. Used as proof of identity for acquisition of other 
credentials. 
Issued at birth or when a person 
registers 
Baptismal Certificates Paper based card issued by churches. Sometimes used for proof of 
identity for acquisition of other credentials. 
Optional 
Credentials Issued by banks and educa-
tional institutions 
Visa/Master/proprietary cards (e.g. Students identity card). Not ac-
cepted for proofs of identity 
Optional 
Table 4 Types of Credentials in Ghana. 
2.6.1. Civil Registration in Ghana 
Vital registration in Ghana began in 1888 when the earliest known vital registration law, the 
cemetery ordinance was passed. This law was then limited to the registration of deaths, most-
ly expatriate workers of the then colonial government. It was not until 1912 that the registra-
tion of births was introduced. The civil registration system has gone through a series of trans-
formation with the aim of improving the system and widening the coverage. For instance, the 
cemetery ordinance of 1888, was then amended in 1891 and in 1912, at which time it became 
Births, Deaths and Burials Ordinance. The law was amended again in 1926 until it was finally 
replaced with the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 301 of 1965, which is the legislation 
currently in force.  
The Births and Deaths Registry is under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Devel-
opment, and is responsible for developing and managing the births and deaths registration 
system in Ghana. Its operations are co-ordinated from the Central Registry Office, in Accra, 
the capital of Ghana and operates in all local administrative districts each of which is manned 
by a District Registration Officer and a Registration Assistant.  
The Registration Assistant submits monthly, all registration forms, numbered serially to the 
District Registration Office, which in turn forwards them to the Regional Office for further 
processing and onward transmission to the Central Registry Office, where national data is 
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compiled. Statistics of registered events are kept at all three levels. Presently, information in 
the CRS databases is not used by any of the other credential issuers for their operations. 
2.6.2. Voter Identification Card 
The Electoral Commission (EC) is the institution responsible for the management of elections 
in Ghana (GNA, 2003). The existing commission was established in 1993 by Act 451. It was 
set up purposely to manage the conduct of all public elections and to handle all matters direct-
ly relating to the conduct of elections in the country. Its functions include supervision of all 
public elections and referenda, compilation and revision of voter register; demarcation of 
electoral boundaries and provision of civic education concerning the electoral process.  
Elections in Ghana are conducted using a manual system, whereby voting, counting and colla-
tion are all done manually. In the year 2012, the EC decided to implement biometric systems 
for voter registrations and identity verification during elections. A new voter register was 
compiled by capturing ten fingerprints and photos of all applicants resulting in the issue of a 
laminated paper based voter identity card. 
Biometric verification devices were also procured for all the 25,000 polling centres across the 
country to be used on the Election Day. According to the chairman of the EC, the voting sys-
tem remains manual and the biometric verification devices were only meant to check the 
identity of the voter by their fingerprint (Afari Gyan, 2012).  
Although the nation invested USD82,326,497 on the biometric based registration (Table 5), it 
could not prevent the perennial issue of election disputes. Rather, it compounded the problem 
since for the first time in history of the existing dispensation, the first round of voting took 
two days. The main opposition did not accept the results of the presidential election and thus 
proceeded to the supreme court citing; multiple voting; over voting were 620,443; voting 
without verification 456,933; same serial numbers for different stations with total irregulari-
ties of 1,340,018 votes.  
Such issues which are common phenomena in African elections (Bratton, 1998; Evrensel, 
2010; GhanaReporters, 2012; McDermott, 2012) are indications of the growing perception of 
lack of trust in the institutions and also clear manifestations of the need to address the funda-
mental issues in citizen identity identification. Hence in developing countries, solution to 
identification issues does not lie in the acquisition of sophisticated technology since biometric 
voter registration (as is the case of many IT applications) only counters the symptoms without 
addressing the causes which is in this case electoral irregularities (Bhalla, 2012) 
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 Year Type of registration Cost in US$ No of Appli-
cants 
Cost per Applicant 
in US$ 
2002 Revision 918,000 480,000 1.91 
2004  Full registration 12,437,000 10,355,000 1.20 
2006 Revision 2,430,000 632,000 3.85 
2008 Revision 19,792,000 1,835,000 10.79 
2012 Full Biometric Registra-
tion20 
82,326,497.00 14,031,793 5.86 
Table 5  Voter Registration Statistics. 
2.6.3. National Identity Card (Ghana Card) 
Citizens identification in Ghana began in 1972 during the administration of the second prime 
Minister through the implementation of the identity cards decree (NRCD129). This law re-
quired Ghanaian citizens aged sixteen years and above to be issued with identity cards which 
were to be accepted as evidence of the identity of the holder in cases where the identity of the 
holder is in dispute. Recruitment for all kinds of employment were to be based on  the ability 
of the applicant to produce an identity card as evidence eligibility. Public and private employ-
ers would be required to enter the identity card number of each employee in the personal rec-
ords of that employee, and each person responsible for social security scheme was to use the 
allocated identity number instead of the scheme number. In 1973, national identity cards were 
issued to citizens in five border regions of the country. The project was however discontinued 
three years later, due to lack of financial and logistical support.  
In 1987, the government, through the then National Commission for Democracy, established 
a technical implementation committee, to examine and propose a unique numbering system, 
an appropriate computerised system, the cost involved, and the possible sources of funding. 
This project was again put on hold. 
The government again decided in the year 2001 to develop a comprehensive biometric based 
national identification system. Act 655 was enacted to amend a section of the Electoral Com-
mission Act of 1993 (Act 451) and to repeal the law that gave the commission the right to 
issue civil identities (GNA, 2003). This was replaced by the NIA law, ACT 707 to reflect the 
                                                 
 
20
 The actual cost of the biometric registration and provisional exhibition was GH¢156,420,344.00, which was 
converted to US dollars at an exchange rate of US$1.90 
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real position on the issuance of a national all-purpose identity card. It also generated a major 
debate in parliament on the necessity of setting up a new institution instead of allowing the 
Electoral commission to issue National Identity cards. The major contention was whether it 
was prudent in spending the budgeted 400 billion old cedis on a new institution or give the  
Electoral Commission the needed 100 billion old cedis for a new voter's registration. The EC 
was seen as an organisation with a secure tenure and credibility. The then government decid-
ed to establish a new organisation to undertake such an exercise whilst the Electoral Commis-
sion concentrated on elections. When the legislation enabling the compulsory gathering and 
storage of biometric data was finally pushed through Parliament in 2006, the decision was 
unanimous, with the government and the main opposition lauding the identity project as an 
‘important step forward’ and ‘crucial tool’ of national development. 
The decision was to give the contract to a company with the requisite experience and capacity 
to implement and then transfer a national infrastructure for identity registration to the gov-
ernment as a two-year project. The project entailed the design and development of a large 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) that will store fingerprint details submit-
ted for authentication purposes. Citizens and residents’ enrollment program were to be em-
barked on nationwide using a thousand mobile registration stations, a fingerprint and bio-
graphical data capturing equipment. Each participant was to be issued a card to be manufac-
tured by a card manufacturing company in Ghana. The issued plastic cards would store en-
crypted fingerprint details of holders using two dimensional barcode. 
The contract was awarded to Sagem, following a tendering process that saw Sagem, Hewlett-
Packard/Printrak, NIKUV from Israel, Marpless a consortium from South Africa. After 
Sagem had been granted the tender, the officials at the National Identification Agency began 
to discuss the implementation of the new system with government departments and political 
constituencies. A major issue that confronted the officials was the state of the Births and 
Deaths Registry, the division responsible for producing the documents that Ghanaians need to 
prove their identities. The identity card campaign in collaboration with UNICEF, injected 
new urgency and significance into the infrastructure of vital registration in Ghana in 2004, 
resulting in an increase in civil registration coverage of from less than 30 to nearly 50 per cent 
of estimated births. 
Another problem is in relation to the boundary line around their population: a workable test of 
citizenship in the context of fluid boundaries and centuries of migration. In Ghana’s case, the 
issues were compounded by the large numbers of foreign nationals claiming dual citizenship. 
NIA’s initial discussions with Births and Deaths Registry officials revealed that only a small 
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percentage of Ghanaian citizens had birth certificates that could be used to prove their citizen-
ship. Thus, the need for alternative arrangements involving lawyers and political scientists to 
outline a clear definition of who a Ghanaian is. 
In the end, the government relied on relatives and opinion leaders to vouch for those whose 
identity was in doubt (NIA, 2007). This resulted in long queues during the enrolment process-
es and thus, stringent checks were not carried out in many registration centres. In the national 
political debate about the introduction of the identity card, there was warm consensus be-
tween the two main political parties about the development and political benefits that would 
follow from the introduction of identity cards. Currently, the project has stalled again due to 
funding with many of the credentials not being issued to citizens.  
Ghana Health Insurance Systems 
In the year 2000, the then President Kuffour government set-up a ministerial health financing 
task force to design a national health insurance scheme. The work of the task force resulted in  
a legislation that was submitted to parliament for approval into law. After a lengthy debate, 
the then government had its way and the ensuing law, ACT (650) establishing Ghana’s Na-
tional Health Insurance Scheme was passed. A governing body, the National Health Insurance 
Authority was set up and tasked with the responsibility of implementing the national health 
insurance scheme. Three types of schemes were provided for; the District wide Mutual Health 
Insurance Scheme (DMHIS); the Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (PMHIS) and the 
Private Commercial Health Insurance Scheme (PCHIS). The DMHIS is a state-issued or 
sponsored health insurance program and receives subsidies from the government for payment 
of claims and reinsurance in case of distress. The major sources of funding include 2.5% VAT 
on goods and services or the health insurance levy; 2.5% SSNIT contribution of formal sector 
workers; the premium for informal sector workers, investments, donations, budgetary alloca-
tions, and other funding from donor partners. Every person residing in Ghana other than the 
Armed Forces of Ghana and the Ghana Police Service are required to register with a recog-
nized health insurance scheme.  
The cards issued to registered members are magnetic stripe cards carrying a unique serial 
number which in future could be verified by the system during user authentication. The cards 
have the following security features; NHIS hologram, Picture-in-picture; and a watermark of 
NHIS logo and Ghana Coat of Arms. It also shows the picture of the bearer on a white back-
ground. 
Membership is subject to yearly renewal according to the dates at the back of the card. A se-
curity sticker is affixed onto the appropriate slot each year when membership is renewed. A 
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card can be replaced before the five (5) year validity period if lost or damaged, at a fee. Cur-
rently, there are 13,943,414 card bearing members, representing 59.50% of the country’s  
population (NHIS, 2010). 
2.7. The Danish Civil Registration System 
Denmark is rated among the front-runners Information Society development and has been 
ranked among the top 10 members of OECD country performance statistics in internet pene-
tration and standard of living. Nationwide registration of people residing in Denmark started 
in 1924 with the manual registration on index cards information concerning members of each 
Danish family. This was followed by regular continuous update of the index cards database 
by local and municipal registration offices commonly referred to as Borger Service. The 
manual database was replaced in 1968 with an electronic version called Danish Civil Regis-
tration System (CRS). A detailed description of CRS has been published previously (C. B. 
Pedersen, Gøtzsche, Møller, & Mortensen, 2006; C. B. Pedersen, 2011). Individuals living in 
Denmark were registered for administrative purposes like collection of taxes and filing of tax 
returns by Danish residents. All newborn babies and those who have been given permanent 
residential status were also registered. The civil registration was extended to include those 
living in Greenland in 1972. The Danish civil registration system contains about 8,284,477 of 
which 65.8% of the population are estimated to be living in Denmark and 26.6% not alive. (C. 
B. Pedersen et al., 2006; C. B. Pedersen, 2011). The systems also give clear indication of all 
Danish residents living abroad. Thus due to the continuous update of the register, there is a 
clear indication of persons alive and resident in Denmark, (including Greenland), and those 
who are dead and the dates of their occurence. Those whose residence status is in doubt are 
also known to the Danish authorities. 
In Denmark, all registered persons in the central registration system are assigned a “Centrale 
Person Register” (CPR) number which is a unique personal identification number. The CPR 
number is used in all interactions with government agencies and many business transactions 
and thus allows accurate linkage between all national registers. The Danish CPR-number is 
made up of 10 digit code with a logic built into it. For instance, a person’s date of birth is 
used as the first six characters or digits presented in day of birth, month and year of birth (i.e. 
DDMMYY). The following three characters (character positions 7,8,9) are serial number to 
distinguish between persons born on the same day (Malig, 1996; C. B. Pedersen, 2011). The 
last four characters is also an indication of the century within which a person is born. For in-
stance the 7th to 10th digit is less than 5000, it means the person was born in this century, else 
the person was born in the previous century (Malig, 1996). The tenth digit indicates the gen-
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der of the person, with odd numbers indicating a male and an even number indicating a fe-
male. The tenth number is also used as a control check to minimise recording errors (Malig, 
1996; C. B. Pedersen, 2011).  
Thus, a female born on 16th June 1971 will have a CPR number similar to 160671-4362. The 
same principles are followed in the case of persons who were not born in Denmark, but ar-
rived from another country. Every new entrant from other countries must register at central 
registry or the Borger Service and are issued with a CPR number following the same logic. 
On few occasions where individuals have been assigned an incorrect number (i.e. wrong date 
of birth or gender), a new CPR number is issued to the person and the previous number is 
never reassigned. Another interesting aspect of the Danish CRS is its ability to clearly estab-
lish a clear parental linkage of a person based on the legal relationship. In the Danish CRS 
systems, there is no ambiguity about the identity of a person and thus no possibility for confu-
sion where two or more people share a similar identity attributes, making it possible for pub-
lic authorities to administer precise rules concerning citizens. This includes payment of the 
right amount of social security benefits, etc., to the right person and likewise collection of the 
right amount of taxes. This level of accuracy makes the CRS vital to government to citizens 
interactions once the major privacy concerns are addressed (Blume, 1989; Malig, 1996; C. B. 
Pedersen, 2011).  
Single identification number 
In Denmark, all residents have a single identification number. The CPR number is issued by 
the Danish Ministry of the Interior to every Danish citizen, and other ordinary residents who 
have the right to remain in the country. All public authorities and organisations can use the 
system for unequivocal identification of a person or as a file number, which is a common  
practice. 
However, information on the CPR may be passed on to another public authority only if it is 
allowed under the Danish Processing of Personal Data Act. Private persons may use the num-
ber mainly if they are entitled by law or by regulations laid down by law, with the consent of 
the registered person or if it is to be used solely for scientific or statistical purposes.  
The CPR number also takes precedent over all other document numbers and thus many of the 
important credentials also bears the holder’s CPR number. The National identity cards, Pass-
ports, Social security or health insurance cards, Driving licenses, Tax statements and notifica-
tions, documents for enrolling children in school or at the university, Bank Accounts, etc., are 
all official credentials and documents bearing the CPR number as shown in Figure 18. 
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Compared to Sweden and Finland, two other Scandinavian countries, the Danish CPR num-
bers are widely used. In Ghana however, none of the official documents display the birth cer-
tificate number. 
 
 
Figure 18   Documents Bearing the Unique Identification Number. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Perspectives 
An overview of identity, identification, the state-of-the-art on IdM and of trust, privacy and 
information privacy was presented in Chapter 2. The contextual issues were also presented in 
Chapter 2 by highlighting the existing IdM issues. It is this background that set the stage for 
analysis of related literature that predict, describe or explain cutting-edge privacy-enhancing 
IDMS proposals. Thus it seems appropriate in this chapter, to examine the theories and re-
search perspectives in relation to successful implementation of trusted identity management 
systems. The selection of literature was based on the materials’ usefulness to understanding of 
or critique of existing beliefs, central to shaping knowledge of the phenomena, the research 
objective and the related research questions as defined in various sections in Chapter 1. Such 
initial understanding fomented an intentionally constructed theoretical basis of the research 
phenomenon, and also acted as a frame of reference for my research methodology.  
3.1 The Streams of Research 
The theoretical underpinning of this study draws from multivariate sources, given that the 
concepts of identity and identity management have different domains of relevance. The selec-
tion of relevant scholarly literatures was based on its orientations towards information sys-
tems success, and stakeholder analysis. This crosscutting perspective seems natural in a na-
tional identity management research and it is also in line with Weiser’s concept of  “cycle of 
cross-disciplinary fertilisation and learning21” (Weiser, 1993).  
This study takes the position that although some measures of system's effectiveness (ease of 
use, usefulness, relative advantage, etc.) are commonly used, it is important to recognise the 
contextual factors. This view is in line with Sarker and Wells, (2003) position that merely 
instantiating existing theories in a new context, could potentially ignore unique issues associ-
ated with the context  (Sarker & Wells, 2003). We therefore offer a framework that seeks to 
integrate the contextual issues associated with trusted identities environment especially in 
developing countries.   
                                                 
 
21
 We can make much progress both in evaluating our technologies and in choosing our next steps. A key part of 
this evaluation is using the analysis of psychologist, antropolisgist, application writers, artist, marketers and 
customers. We believe they will find some features work well and know they will find some features do not 
work. Thus we will begin again in the cycle of cross disciplinary fertilization and learning. 
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3.1.1 IS Success in Context 
Information Systems have significantly changed governance and the cost of doing business 
since the inception of commercial computers in the early 1950’s. Such developments have 
been  attributed to the increasing power of computer systems and the comparable reduction in 
cost due to the Moore’s Law effect (Schaller, 1997). Such growing complexity of information 
systems can also be seen in the growing complexity of the evaluation of its effectiveness or 
success (Petter et al., 2012). Perhaps there is the need to draw from information systems, suc-
cess literature to find answers to such questions. Several quantitative and financial based 
models for measuring Information Systems (IS) success has been proposed (Delone & 
McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008). Other non-financial factors are also known to contribute to 
IS success (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988). Petter et al. (Petter et al., 2008, 2012) qualitatively 
examined IS success at both individual and organizational levels of analysis and found the 
D&M IS success model a useful instrument for measuring IS success both at the individual 
and organizational levels of analysis. They however posited that some of the dimensions may 
no longer be relevant or may need to be measured differently from other types of IS. In their 
analysis, they also observed that IS success or performance measurement has seen little im-
provement over the past decade with the tendency of researchers focusing on single dimen-
sions of IS success instead of showing the overall picture. They further contended that valid 
and reliable measures have yet to be developed, although they admitted that the model is still 
relevant to contemporary IS success measurement. However, researchers must take a step 
further and apply rigorous success measurement methods to create comprehensive, replicable, 
and informative measures of IS success. 
 
 
Figure 19 Summary of Theoretical Perspectives. 
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3.1.2 Technology Acceptance Model 
Factors affecting technology adoption have been extensively studied in Information Systems 
literature. Technology adoption models have traditionally attempted to predict technology 
usage. (Morris & Dillon, 1997) posits that user acceptance is “the demonstrable willingness 
within a user group to employ information technology for the tasks it is designed to support”. 
Notable research on adoption and diffusion of technology includes Innovation Diffusion The-
ory (Rogers, 1983), TAM (F. D. Davis, 1989) and the unified theory of acceptance and use of 
technology (UTAUT) (Viswanath Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). In (F. D. Davis, 
1989), perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use were theorized to be fundamental de-
terminants of behavioural intentions to accept or reject information technology. Perceived 
usefulness essentially describes the degree to which a person believes that an innovation will 
boost their performance (F. D. Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) Perceived ease of use on 
the other hand describes the degree to which a person believes that adopting an innovation 
will be free of effort. In effect, users are more likely to adopt systems, which are easier to use 
and offer some benefits, since these two factors can affect the behavioural intention to consid-
er using it and actually using the innovation. This theory is therefore relevant to the study of 
trusted IDMS. 
3.1.3 User Involvement in IS Success (Blake Ives & Olson, 1984) 
User involvement and user participation have  often  been  used  interchangeably, although 
the two terms do not have the same meaning and that the two should be clearly  distinguished. 
Ives and Olson (Blake Ives & Olson, 1984) performed a five year review of IS success litera-
ture on the importance of user involvement in the development of information systems. Three 
levels of user involvements were identified; primary users of the system, secondary users and 
top management. Barki & Hartwick, (1989) have defined user participation as "a set of  op-
erations and  activities  performed  by users"  during system development  and  reserve  the  
term user involvement for a "subjective psychological state" which influences user  percep-
tions  of  the  system  and thus  affects system success (H. Barki & Hartwick, 1989; Henri 
Barki & Hartwick, 1994). The working definition of user involvement in this study was "the 
participation in the systems development process by representatives of the target user group". 
They also observed that studies on user involvement draw from research on organisational 
behavior, in which participatory decision is used extensively. Thus that active user involve-
ment develops realistic expectations of the system, provides grounds for conflict resolution 
between the development team and the users, decreases user resistance, and increases system 
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ownership by the users, which, in turn, commits users to the system (Blake Ives & Olson, 
1984). User participation in decision making in effect; 
• Provides accurate requirements analysis (Cavaye, 1995; McKeen & Guimaraes, 1997; 
Robey & Farrow, 1982);  
• Avoids unacceptable or unimportant features (McKeen & Guimaraes, 1997; Robey & 
Farrow, 1982); 
• Improves user understanding and increases the tendency for users to own the system 
(Lucas Jr, 1974). 
REFERENCES EXISTING SUCCESS MEARSURES 
(Blake Ives & Olson, 1984) User performance, User satisfaction 
(DeLone & McLean, 1992) System quality, Information quality, System use, Individual 
impact, Organisational impact. 
(Delone & McLean, 2003) System Quality, Information quality, Service Quality, Inten-
tion to use, Use, User satisfaction, Net Benefits. 
(Sabherwal, Jeyaraj, & 
Chowa, 2006) 
Context: Senior management support, IS facilitating condi-
tions, Quality of IS team 
User related factors: User IS experienced. User attitude, Us-
er participation 
System success: System quality, Perceived usefulness, User 
satisfaction, System usage 
Table 6: Classifications of IS Success Measures. 
3.1.4 DeLone & McLean IS Success Model (DeLone & McLean, 1992) 
A number of models have been applied in the past to explain what constitute IS success. For 
instance Davis’s (1989) Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (F. D. Davis, 1989), the The-
ory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991)  have sought to explain the factors that make users accept 
Information systems. However in the study of the information system success, it has been  
established that technology acceptance is not equivalent to technology success or effective-
ness, although it can be a necessary precondition to information systems success (Petter et al., 
2008). Due to its complexity, and multi-dimensional nature of IS success, there were no pre-
cisely defined IS success constructs in the past. The original Delone & McLean IS Success 
Model was a major attempt to synthesize previous IS success literature into a more coherent 
body of knowledge that will serve as a guide for future research (DeLone & McLean, 1992).  
Basically, the model proposes that System Quality and Information Quality individually and 
in tandem affect both System Use and User Satisfaction.  
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Moreover, the degree and quantum of System Use can also positively or negatively affect the 
degree of User Satisfaction. The degree of User Satisfaction also affects System Use, whilst 
System Use and User Satisfaction are direct antecedents of Individual Impact. The impact on 
individual performance should eventually have some impact on the organizational perfor-
mance. The model drew extensively from information influence theory (Mason, 1986), math-
ematical theory of information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), published IS success research 
literature from 1981 to 1987 (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Petter et al., 2008). The original 
model was made of six interdependent variables: system quality, information quality, use, 
user satisfaction, individual impact, and organizational impact (DeLone & McLean, 1992). 
The model attracted various reviews and criticism resulting in several recommendations by IS 
researchers for modifications of the constructs and the relationships (Rai, Lang, & Welker, 
2002; Seddon, Staples, Patnayakuni, & Bowtell, 1999; Seddon, 1997). 
 
Figure 20   Delone & McLean IS Success Model (DeLone & McLean, 1992). 
3.1.5 Seddon’s Critique of Delone & McLean IS Success Model 
Among the various critiques of the original IS success model was Seddon, (Seddon et al., 
1999; Seddon, 1997). Seddon observed that, the Use constructs is most suitable for voluntary 
systems, whereas usefulness is a better measure of IS success in  a situation where usage of a 
system is mandatory (Seddon, 1997). Hence they suggested more focus on usefulness, as in 
TAM (F. D. Davis, 1989). He posited that “the underlying success construct that researchers 
have been trying to tap is Usefulness rather than Use” as it is in the original model because of 
the ambiguity of the concept of use (Petter et al., 2008; Seddon, 1997). To prove that asser-
tion, three different potential meanings of the use construct were derived. Seddon’s sugges-
tions for further modifications would however, have made the IS success model complicated, 
given that the D&M IS success model was intended to be complete and parsimonious. 
System Qual-
ity 
Information 
Quality 
Individual 
Impact 
User Satis-
faction 
Use 
Organisation-
al Impact 
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3.1.6 The updated DeLone & McLean IS Success Model 
The original DeLone & McLean IS success model has been widely applied by various IS re-
searchers to the understanding and measurement of the IS success dimensions. The updated 
DeLone & McLean IS success model was presented as a response to the calls for revision and 
validation of the model by researchers and also offer a framework for organizing IS success 
measurements (Delone & McLean, 2003). After about ten years of review and constructive 
criticisms, DeLone and McLean evaluated the debates, challenged some of the criticisms, and 
introduced what they termed, an updated D&M IS success model. For instance on the issue of 
replacing use versus usefulness, as suggested by Seddon (Seddon et al., 1999; Seddon, 1997), 
DeLone and McLean, (2003) posited that “even in mandatory systems, there can still be con-
siderable variability of use and therefore Use as a variable must be retained”(Delone & 
McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008).  
In effect, the clarification of the use constructs in the updated model has further enhanced the 
model. The authors offered the following explanations with respect to “use” and “usefulness”:  
“Use must precede ‘‘user satisfaction’’ in a process sense, but positive experience with 
‘‘Use’’ will lead to greater ‘‘user satisfaction’’ in a causal sense” and “increased user satis-
faction will lead to a higher intention to use, which will subsequently affect Use” (Delone & 
McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008; Sabherwal et al., 2006; Urbach & Müller, 2012). The up-
dated model also introduces Service Quality as a new dimension following suggestions from 
researchers with e-commerce orientation and adopted SERVQUAL, an instrument used most-
ly in marketing, as an instrument for service quality measurement (Jiang, Klein, & Discenza, 
2002; Petter et al., 2008; Pitt, Watson, & Kavan, 1995). Another well-known modification to 
the D&M model is the changes offered by (Seddon, 1997). Again the model  also clarified 
Seddon, (1997) argument that the D&M model in its original form was confusing, because 
both process and variance models were combined within the same framework and hence, a 
shortcoming of the model. They responded with a claim that it was rather one of its strengths, 
since the insights provided respectively, by the process and variance models was richer (De-
lone & McLean, 2003). In addressing the criticism that an information system can affect lev-
els other than individual and organizational levels since IS success affects work-groups, in-
dustries, and even societies (Myers, 1997); Seddon et al., 1999), D&M replaced the variables, 
individual impact and organizational impact, with net benefits, thereby accounting for bene-
fits at multiple levels of analysis (Delone & McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008; Urbach & 
Müller, 2012). In effect the revised model now makes it possible for it to be applied in various 
levels of analysis that are appropriate to the researcher. The table below provides a brief de-
scription of the six dimensions of the updated IS success model:  
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System quality The desirable characteristics of an information system (F. D. Davis, 
1989; Delone & McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008). Key measures of 
system quality construct include: ease of use, system flexibility, system 
reliability, and ease of learning, as well as system features of intuitive-
ness, sophistication, flexibility, and response times.  
Information 
quality 
The desirable characteristics of the system outputs such as; management 
reports and credentials, etc. (Delone & McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008); 
Key measures of system quality construct include: relevance, understanda-
bility, accuracy, conciseness, completeness, currency, timeliness, and usa-
bility. 
Service quality The quality of support that the users of the system receive. For example: 
responsiveness, accuracy, reliability, technical competence, and empathy of 
the personnel staff. SERVQUAL measures the service quality of IT de-
partments, as opposed to individual IT applications, by measuring and 
comparing user expectations and their perceptions of the IT department. 
Pitt et al. (1995) evaluated the instrument from an IS perspective and sug-
gested that the construct of service quality be added to the D&M model 
(Petter et al., 2012; Pitt et al., 1995). 
System use The degree and manner at which customers utilize the capabilities of an 
information system (Delone & McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008). Some of 
the measures of use construct include: amount of use, frequency of use, 
nature of use, appropriateness of use, extent of use, and purpose of use. 
User satisfac-
tion 
Users’ level of satisfaction with the system's output (i.e. Reports, Web 
sites), and support services. Some of the measures of user satisfaction con-
struct include: adequacy, effectiveness and efficiency (Helail Almutairi & 
Subramanian, 2005; Blake Ives & Olson, 1984; Seddon et al., 1999), en-
joyment, system satisfaction, overall system satisfaction (H. Almutairi & 
Subramanian, 2005; Gable, Sedera, & Chan, 2008; Seddon et al., 1999; 
Urbach & Müller, 2012) the most widely used multi-attribute instrument 
for measuring user information satisfaction can be found in (Helail Almu-
tairi & Subramanian, 2005; Blake Ives & Olson, 1984; Seddon et al., 1999; 
Urbach & Müller, 2012). 
Net benefits The extent to which IS are contributing to the success of the different 
stakeholders (Urbach & Müller, 2012). Some of the measures of Net Bene-
fit include: improved decision-making, improved productivity, increased 
sales, cost reductions, improved profits, market efficiency, consumer wel-
fare, creation of jobs, and economic development (Petter et al., 2008; Ur-
bach & Müller, 2012). 
Table 7  Dimensions of Updated Delone and McLean IS Success Model. 
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Figure 21   Updated Delone & McLean IS Success Model (Delone & McLean, 2003; Petter et al., 2008). 
 
Petter et al. (2008) posited that the practical application of the D&M model naturally depends 
on organizational context. Thus researchers must have a clear understanding of the contextual 
details and the type of IS under study as an aid in the choice of measures. The selection of 
success dimensions and specific metrics also depend on the nature and purpose of the sys-
tem(s) being evaluated. Petter et al (2008) observed that information system that is managed 
by a vendor will measure the service quality of the vendor, rather than of the IS department. 
Similarly there might be a commonality in the metrics used for measuring the service quality 
of electronic business applications whilst different measures might be used depending on the 
contextual circumstances. Seddon et al. (1999) developed a context matrix that is a valuable 
reference for the selection of success measures based on stakeholders and level of analysis. 
Petter et al. (2008)  posited that the D&M model is applicable in a variety of contexts (Petter 
et al., 2008). This study adopts and adapts the updated D&M model in the context of trusted 
identities from a developing country perspective. 
3.2. IS Success and Trusted Identity Management Systems 
The conceptualization and measurement of IS success in a practical context remains complex 
(Gable et al., 2008). Petter et al., (2012) in their review of the past, present and the future of 
IS success (Petter et al., 2012) observed that defining and measuring “success” has been a 
challenge for the IS field, and chronicled the changes in the measures of IS success from both 
research and practice. In the study question, they posited that in evaluating the success of an 
information system, definition of the context based on the type of IS and its stakeholders are 
paramount (Petter et al., 2012).  
The D&M IS success model has been applied in the evaluation of various private sector IS 
projects both at the individual and organisational level analysis. Wang & Liao (2008) have 
empirically validated the D&M IS success model in the context of G2C e-Government sys-
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tems (Wang & Liao, 2008). Teo et al (2008) also studied the relationship between trust and e-
Government (Teo et al., 2008) whereas Connolly et al (2010) recently evaluated the impact of 
e-government Service Quality  and transparency (Bannister & Connolly, 2011a, 2011b; R. 
Connolly, Bannister, & Kearney, 2010). The goals of e-Government are to improve; the quali-
ty of service to citizens, efficiency of administrative processes, and to enable effective citi-
zens’ participation and engagement in the provision of government services (Grönlund & 
Horan, 2004; Helbig, Ramón Gil-García, & Ferro, 2009). Hence national identity manage-
ment initiatives are implemented under the broad themes of e-government (G. Aichholzer & 
Strauß, 2009; Georg Aichholzer & Strauß, 2009). The digital age of attribute based assertions 
has maximised the potential for individuals to receive personalised services, customised expe-
riences, and personalised services based on the ability to seamlessly recognise unique attrib-
utes. Thus, two different individuals, using the same keywords in Google, would receive dif-
ferent outcomes for their search results. Unfortunately, empirical studies and theories on the 
application of  IS success model for national digital identity management projects are almost 
indiscernible. Yet governments implement digital identity policies with the aim of improving 
citizens’ interactions, policy coordination, national security, etc. This complicates efficient 
measurement of system's effectiveness since systems must create value for all stakeholders 
concurrently, making effectiveness a relative concept. It is therefore imperative that scholarly 
encouragement to focus on developing models for evaluating and effective privacy enhancing 
trusted identity management systems. This will help in extending our understanding of the 
essential requirements for information system success which also address the issues of trust 
and privacy. 
3.2.2 Stakeholder Analysis 
Freeman, (1994) defined stakeholders as “any group or individuals who can be or are affected 
by, the achievement of an organizational goal” (Crane & Ruebottom, 2012; Freeman, Harri-
son, & Wicks, 2007; Freeman, 1994). Broadly, stakeholders could be subdivided into two:  
• The primary stakeholders – those with formal or official contractual relationships with the 
company, such as clients, suppliers, employees, shareholders, among others; 
• The secondary stakeholders – those without such contracts, such as government authori-
ties or the local community. 
Stakeholder theory has been discussed from three main perspectives – descriptive, normative, 
and instrumental approaches (Crane & Ruebottom, 2012; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones 
& Wicks, 1999). The descriptive stakeholder theory focuses on the characteristics and behav-
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iour of stakeholders and how an organization interacts with them (Crane & Ruebottom, 2012). 
This viewpoint has been criticized for its lack of clear objectives (Treviño & Weaver, 1999).  
The normative perspective on the other hand is rooted in business ethics and corporate social 
responsibility literature (Clarkson & others, 1998; Freeman et al., 2007), and focuses on prin-
ciples of fairness and of common good that organisations must observe, (Harrison, Bosse, & 
Phillips, 2009; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). The normative stakeholder theory has also 
received many criticisms from pro-business researchers on the basis that the responsibility of 
businesses is to increase its profits and that “the business of business is business and that 
businesses do not set social policy but rather look up to the government for social policy 
(Clarkson & others, 1998; Friedman & Miles, 2002, 2006).  
Lastly, proponents of the instrumental stakeholder theory assert that policies that are based on 
a comprehensive analysis of stakeholder priorities lead to broader consensus (Scott, Golden, 
& Hughes, 2004). Instrumental stakeholder analysts focus on organizational consequences 
considering the interest stakeholders in management decision making by examining the con-
nections between the practice of stakeholder management and the attainment of various cor-
porate governance goals (Clarkson & others, 1998). According to (Flak & Rose, 2005, p. 657) 
“clear understanding of stakeholders in e-government, combined with an understanding of e-
government’s potential effects, enables policymakers to develop e-government in ways that 
are likely to benefit the majority of stakeholders.” Digital identity policies are types of elec-
tronic governance, and for that matter, it is very important to involve all the interest groups to 
achieve the desired goals. Stakeholder theory is also beginning to gain acceptance in e-
government research (Chan & Pan, 2008; Esteves & Joseph, 2008). Democratic societies en-
join leaders to carry out the will of the people. For that matter, stakeholders with divergent 
views must be considered in e-government initiatives. Zhang et al. (2005) in their descriptive 
stakeholder study identified four subgroups of stakeholders in an e-government initiative: 
Government agencies, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private companies and 
suggested the need to reconcile their divergent/convergent opinions on the implementation of 
e-government initiatives. (A. O. Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008) detected a paucity of studies 
on stakeholder perspectives in addition to the methodological gaps worth addressing. For in-
stance, it was observed that qualitative methods have been underused, even though these 
methods offer an advantage for their “ability to seek clarifications and confirmation of evi-
dence by cross-validating data. Qualitative research is interesting and can provide memorable 
examples of important management issues and concepts that enrich the field” (A. Laplume, 
Sonpar, & Litz, 2008, p. 1175). 
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Stakeholder Approach Theoretical Under-
pinnings 
Main Criticism 
Descriptive: Understanding the 
relationship between an organi-
zation and its stakeholders 
Organisational behav-
iour 
Unfocused: aims of descrip-
tive stakeholder theory are 
unclear, what is it trying to 
prove or disprove? 
Normative: organizations should 
take all stakeholders into consid-
eration, as a moral responsibility 
Corporate social re-
sponsibility; 
Common good theory 
“Business of business is busi-
ness” businesses are not chari-
ties, but profit making entities. 
Instrumental: Organizations 
should take key stakeholders into 
consideration as this leads to suc-
cess and competitive advantage. 
Business and man-
agement 
Stakeholder involvement is 
not feasible and/or is not al-
ways linked to organizational 
success. 
Table 8 Summary of stakeholder theory. 
3.2.3 Adapted DeLone & McLean IS Success Model 
Petter et al., (2012) observed that the undue focus on the classic IS tripartite model, where 
there are only three primary actors or stakeholders (developers, users, and managers) tend to 
diminish the value of IS success literature to research with macro perspective. They therefore 
posited that “to be valuable, IS success measures must capture all of the stakeholders, and yet 
be reasonably parsimonious in order to be useful to the researcher and to the practition-
er”(Petter et al., 2012).  
The updated D&M IS success model is therefore adapted in this study from a societal per-
spective. This type of study is new to both IS success and identity management literature giv-
en that none of the recent IS success research have focused on IdMS as shown in Table 10.  
The study highlights the important role of trust and information privacy, described in Chapter 
2, in effective IdMS. Many user-centric and trusted IdMS models and initiatives have been 
proposed (Grant, 2011a; 2010; Microsoft, 2011).  
A key requirement of a trusted and citizen-centric identity management systems is to ensure 
the cooperation of all stakeholders within the identity ecosystem (Grant, 2011a). We propose 
a conceptual model for a trusted identity framework based on the Delone and McLean IS suc-
cess model. Since national identity transcends individual and organisational level of analysis 
to become a societal issue, we adapted the model by examining the definition of the dimen-
sions and excluded those that are not applicable to a trusted identity framework within a soci-
etal context. The adapted constructs are explained in Table 7. 
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System quality Citizens do not only consider performance characteristics, functionali-
ty, and ease of use of the system but also the skill set of the people, 
availability of documentation and the reliability of the processes. This 
is in line with the definition of information systems, which is the com-
bination of technology, people, procedures and processes (O’Brien & 
Marakas, 2010). For instance, if the system has all the attributes as 
described in success (Delone & McLean, 2003; DeLone & McLean, 
1992; Petter et al., 2008, 2012; Urbach & Müller, 2012) with no skilled 
personnel to run it or ineffective processes, the performance of the sys-
tem can be affected as well as the trustee’s relationship with the trustor. 
Information quali-
ty 
Information quality is the degree to which the information produced by 
IdMS is accurate, relevant, complete and in the right format (Schaupp, 
Fan, & Belanger, 2006). Information is said to be of good quality when 
it is useful, timely, cost effective, reliable and understandable. These 
are critical factors in identity management systems, and plays a promi-
nent role in affecting how all the stakeholders in the identities ecosys-
tem trust the system and each other (Petter et al., 2008; Schaupp et al., 
2006). 
Service quality Service quality is used to measure the overall support that users receive 
from service providers. Key aspects of service quality; responsiveness, 
reliability, empathy, competence (Delone & McLean, 2003; DeLone & 
McLean, 1992; Petter et al., 2008, 2012; Urbach & Müller, 2012). 
User empower-
ment 
User empowerment is the extent of user participation in decision mak-
ing, the users’ ability to exercise a degree of control over their personal 
information or their informational self-determination, and to have con-
fidence that third parties respect their privacy (Biskup & Brüggeman, 
1988). Previous research found that individuals who believe they can 
exert more control over events, such as the secondary use of personal 
information, are less likely to perceive that their privacy is being in-
vaded (Tolchinsky et al., 1981). When users are involved and empow-
ered they are more likely to have positive attitudes toward secondary 
information use and hence will also have a lower concern for privacy. 
Deci et al (1989) have posited that self-determined individuals experi-
ence a sense of freedom to do what is interesting, personally important, 
and vitalizing (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989a). User empowerment 
therefore leads to state of belief in individuals that they can influence 
the system of which they are an integral part. 
Institutional coop-
eration 
This describes the aspects of key stakeholders working together to en-
sure interoperable laws, technologies, systems and standards. This type 
of collaboration also leads to effective communication and compliance 
with standards with the identities ecosystem. 
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Use, user satisfac-
tion 
In many countries the use of government provided credentials are 
mandatory due to the coercive power of government and for that matter 
user satisfaction will be the best measure of the success. The trusted 
identities framework describes how stakeholders in the identity ecosys-
tem trust each other and not necessarily the use of the credentials or 
services by the service provider's systems. Hence the use and user sat-
isfaction dimensions are merged as one construct since it is the satis-
faction that give the user confidence for repeat purchases. (Delone & 
McLean, 2003; DeLone & McLean, 1992; Petter et al., 2008, 2012; 
Urbach & Müller, 2012). User satisfaction is achievable in a situation 
where stakeholders trust each other and privacy concern is low. The 
relationship between privacy concern and trust is illustrated in Figure 
23. 
Net benefits Net Benefit describes the extent to which IS promotes the interest of 
the different stakeholders (Urbach & Müller, 2012). In  a trusted iden-
tities environment, the ultimate success will be where the threshold 
point of privacy concern trust is met. Net Benefit in this regards is 
measured by the level of institutional cooperation, technology, policy 
regulatory framework interoperability, opportunities for secondary 
uses of personal information, attribute based credential technologies 
etc. 
Table 9 Dimensions of Adapted DeLone & McLean IS Success Model. 
Where there is a positive perception of trust and privacy among the stakeholders in an identity 
ecosystem, and the services they provide, it can engender collaborative environment and more 
innovative use of personal information for secondary purposes. 
 
Figure 22  Trusted Identities Framework. 
 
System Quality: 
- Perceived Usefulness 
- Ease of Use 
- Reliable Team /Documentation 
 
User Empowerment: 
- Information Sharing 
- Assurance & Involvement 
- Informational Self-determination 
 
Information Quality: 
- Timeliness, Cost-Effective 
- Understandable 
- Accuracy 
 
Trustworthiness 
 Ability, Integrity, 
Benevolence 
 
Perceived Privacy 
User Control, User Consent, 
Minimum Disclosure 
 
Trusted Identities 
Privacy Concern – Trust 
Equilibrium 
 
Service Quality: 
- Competent Personnel 
- Responsiveness, Compliance 
- Empathy and Flexibility, etc. 
 
Institutional Co-op: 
- Interoperable Regulations 
- Interoperable Technologies  
- Compliance with Standards  
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Figure 22 describes the trusted identities framework. Institutional cooperation has a positive 
influence on trustworthiness. Interoperable laws, technologies, policies and standard are typi-
cal examples of institutional cooperation. Also, strict enforcement of regulation and the abil-
ity to seek redress are also signs of institutional cooperation. Systems' quality and information 
quality have also a positive relationship with trustworthiness. Usefulness and ease of use (F. 
D. Davis, 1989; Delone & McLean, 2003) skilled and reliable credential issuers signify their 
abilities whilst information signifies integrity on the part of the identity and relying parties. 
These are the attributes of trustworthiness (Roger C. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995a). 
User empowerment, information quality and service quality have the potential of minimizing 
societal privacy concerns. Positive societal privacy concerns are signs that identity and ser-
vice providers are benevolent – which is an attribute of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness and 
positive privacy concerns result in a trusted identities ecosystem.  
Research Focus Authors 
Data warehouse Nelson et al. (2005), Wixom and Todd (2005) 
e-Commerce system Wang (2008) 
Enterprise system Lin et al. (2006), Qian and Bock (2005), Sedera (2006) 
Finance and accounting system Iivari (2005) 
Health information system Yusof et al. (2006) 
Intranet Hussein et al. (2008), Masrek et al. (2007), Trkman and 
Trkman (2009) 
Knowledge management system Clay et al. (2005), Halawi et al. (2007), Jennex and Olf-
man (2003), Kulkarni et al. (2007), Velasquez et al. 
(2009), Wu and Wang (2006) 
Learning system Lin (2007),  (2012) ,  (Alsabawy, Cater-Steel, & Soar, 
2012; Lin & Wang, 2012) 
Online communities  Lin and Lee (2006) 
Picture archiving and commu-
nications system 
Pare et al. (2005) Portal Urbach et al. (2009a), Urbach et 
al. (2010), Yang et al. (2005) 
Web-based system Garrity et al. (2005) 
Web sites Schaupp et al. (2006) 
Payment Systems (Sørebø & Fuglseth, 2012) 
Underground Pipeline Systems (Cheng, 2012) 
Table 10 Recent Applications of IS Success Model. 
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3.2.4 Privacy Concern-Trust Curve 
Generally, societal interactions and business relationships begin from a low level of trust (dis-
trust) and high privacy concern. With the disclosure of more information, strong institutional 
cooperation, stakeholder involvement and awareness exposure to the technology, they begin 
to exercise some degree of user control over their personal information. Such informational 
self-determination results in the establishment of a certain level of trust. Thus, citizens be-
come more empowered and revise their negative perceptions about the IdMS and identity 
service providers. This establishment of trust reduces the initial privacy concerns. In princi-
ple, a low level of trust is associated with a high privacy concern, whereas a high level of trust 
is associated with low or reduction in privacy concerns. Thus, the mediating and moderating 
effect of trust can result in either a negative or positive societal attitude change towards IdMS.  
The qualitative relationship between trust and privacy concern is shown in Figure 23. A cer-
tain threshold level of trust must be overcome, before the citizens are ready to open up for 
interaction. The figure also shows that absolute trust or zero privacy concern is not possible 
within a trusted identities environment, and hence the curve can only asymptotically approach 
the two axes. The purpose of the trust framework therefore is for society to establish the 
framework that can overcome the trust threshold. Beyond this level, trust and privacy is ade-
quate to encourage more collaboration, creation of new identity-based services, institutional 
collaboration, etc.  
 
Figure 23  Privacy-Concern-Trust Curve. 
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3.3 Summary of Theoretical Perspectives 
This chapter has demonstrated how relevant literature drawn from different domain was inte-
grated in constructing a framework for evaluating citizen-centric trusted identities environ-
ment. This study has carefully addressed the caveat that  researchers should not merely apply 
existing theories in a new context as this may potentially hinder the discovery of aspects 
unique to the artifact under study (Sarker & Wells, 2003). The updated DeLone and McLean 
IS Success model form the core of the discussion but it is expanded and modified based on 
the findings from Ives, (1984) user involvement theory, stakeholder theory, trust and infor-
mation privacy. This approach to research has given a strong methodological support and op-
portunity for scholarly manifest and acceptance (V. Venkatesh & Davis, 2000) among IS suc-
cess researchers. As it has been suggested by earlier scholars, the relevancy and applicability 
of approaches can be developed by adopting ideas and constructs from research which are 
either consumption, process or socially oriented so long as there is a clear understanding of 
the motivations and contextual issues (P. E. Pedersen, 2003).  This is the approach adopted in 
this study. 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology, Approach and Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence ……. There are no “knowns”. There are things we know that 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we now know 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know. 
So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say well that's basically 
what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we 
discover a few more of those unknown unknowns22. 
Donald H. Rumsfeld 
 
Confused as they may seem, the above quotation reflects the importance of scientific inquiry 
and the need for systematic due diligence and multiple probes in all scientific inquisitions, 
although the obvious is simply missing in the quotation; “the knowledge we do not want to 
know” (Daase & Kessler, 2007). These are things we could know but rather decide not to 
know by either discounting it as irrelevant or simply repressing their relevance. Hence it is the 
appreciation of what we do not know, what we cannot know and what we do not like to know; 
and our ability to address the relevance paradox that determines our cognitive frame. 
The world-view, knowledge and assumptions that researchers bring to bear on a particular 
study can immensely impact on the research paradigm23, ontological and epistemological as-
sumptions, conclusions drawn and lessons learnt, and also contributes to the evaluation of 
theory construction (Walsham, 1995, 2006). I present the research philosophy, methodology, 
the research design and methods in this chapter. Such reviews are greatly influenced by the 
philosophical paradigm underpinning the study and my ontological and epistemological 
views. I also present the limitations of my relation to the research design and the approach 
including the methodological contributions identified in this study.  
                                                 
 
22
 US Defense Secretary, Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 06, 2002. 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3490 
23
 A paradigm is a worldview, or a way of thinking that reflects fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the 
nature of phenomena. An ontology, ultimately, is how one sees and views the world and reality. It is an agreed 
upon theory, world view, or methodology embodied in the beliefs, practices and products of a group of scientists 
(A. Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010, p. 85) 
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This chapter is a logical progression of the phenomena24, research objective and rationale of 
the study as presented in Chapter 1, the state-of-the-art and context in Chapter 2 and then the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Philosophy, ‘the love of wisdom (Cavalier, 2003; Gregory, 2012) tends to be viewed as the 
business of philosophers (Ruona & Lynham, 2004), although it has a very practical purpose 
and intent, coupled with its utility to inspire learning. Rouna & Lynham, (2004) observed 
that; “how we think about the world shapes and directs how we act in the world; and how we 
act in the world, in turn, reflects and influences how we think about and consequently see the 
world”. Therefore the declaration of one’s philosophical stance is vital to the critical evalua-
tion of the research, since many researchers can arrive at different conclusions given their 
varied world view, in dealing with similar research phenomena, questions or hypothesis 
(Pring, 2000). Thus researchers must clearly explicate the philosophical assumptions and their 
axiological, ontological, epistemological and methodological concepts.  
Generally, philosophical discourse is concerned with the issues of; being (ontology), knowing 
(epistemology) and acting (axiology) (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, 2011; Fielding, 1999; Ruona 
& Lynham, 2004).  To explicate the trajectory between these philosophical stances, I deem it 
necessary to elaborate on the philosophical stances.  
Ontology focuses on the assumptions about the nature of phenomena, thus the nature of reali-
ty and nature of human beings as they are in the real world (Gioia and Pitre 1990). It focuses 
on basic questions and assumptions about what is reality? As in Rouna & Lynham, (2004), 
the following are some ontological question;  What is ‘there’ and what do we mean by 
‘there’?,  what is the world made of?, Is reality ordered in any way?, is reality ‘out there’ or 
‘inside us’ or a combination of both?,  what are humans? (Ruona & Lynham, 2004). 
Epistemology Epistemology (also described as the theory of knowledge) is the component of 
philosophy that raises questions about the nature of knowledge and reasonable belief (Bry-
man, 2012). It focuses on the nature of and scope of knowledge, and the relationship between 
the inquirer, the knower and/or the known (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Thus, epistemology 
makes fundamental assumptions about the nature of knowledge about a phenomena (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011; Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 585; Ruona & Lynham, 2004). In so doing, it ad-
                                                 
 
24
 Any incident deserving of inquiry and investigation, any event that is observable or any observable occurrence  
Page | 74 
dresses questions like: what is knowledge?, how does knowledge differ from mere opinion or 
belief?, How is knowledge acquired? In other words should the social world be studied like in 
natural sciences, following the same principles, procedures and ethics or otherwise? Hence 
epistemological inquiry is about how the subjective and objective relationship between the 
researcher, the phenomena of interest and what he seeks to know about it. In essence, episte-
mology is about how we know and think about the world. 
Axiology play a vital role in adhering to the standards and requirements of acceptable meth-
odology and methods in research and practice (Ruona & Lynham, 2004; Abbas Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2010). Axiology is also described as ethics in scientific inquiry and  focuses on what 
is good, what ought to be done, how a researcher should act, and the extent to which re-
searchers’ actions are in congruence with the ontological and epistemological ideals (Ruona 
& Lynham, 2004; Abbas Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). 
Methodology – Philosophical questions and assumptions are usually elucidated in the light of 
the systematic organization of the research, the methods employed, and in the manner in 
which the findings and conclusions are presented. Methodology is the means by which com-
prehension of a research phenomena is generated (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Abbas Tashak-
kori & Teddlie, 2010). Thus methodological questions deal with how the inquirer can set 
forth to find out what they believe exist and can be known or otherwise (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2011; Abbas Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). 
4.2.1 Philosophical Paradigm 
Kuhn’s (1996) observed in his structure of scientific revolution (Bird, 2012; Kuhn, 1996) that 
the paradigmatic manifestation of the work of a researcher is a reflection of the sets of his/her 
congruent assumptions and worldview. Thus, Guba and Lincoln (1994), and in their recent 
study, Guba et al., (2011), identified five underlying paradigms for research: positivism, post-
positivism, constructivism/interpretivism, critical and participatory (Lincoln et al., 2011, 
2011). The findings from the work of Orlikowski and Baroudi’s (1991) showed a majority of 
IS publications had a positivist anchoring followed by interpretivism. This study discusses 
only the first three since they are relevant either in their application or for comparison. Post-
positivism and constructivism are considered relevant for my study as it is also consistent 
with Chen & Hirschheim, (2004) paradigmatic bracketing of IS research (Chen & Hirsch-
heim, 2004). 
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4.2.2 Positivism 
Positivism is an epistemological position that argues for the application of natural science 
research methods to the study of social reality (Bryman, 2012). In his book, social research 
methods, Bryman catalogued the positivism principles as: “the purpose of theory is to generate hy-
potheses that can be tested in order to explain laws (deductivism principles); Knowledge is the outcome of gath-
ering of facts that provides the basis of laws (inductive principle); Science must be conducted in an objective 
manner; and that scientific statements are the true domain of scientists and must be distinguished from norma-
tive statements”. Similarly, Lee, (1991), describes positivism as “the manipulation of theoretical 
propositions using the rules of formal and hypothetico-deductive logic, so that the theoretical 
propositions satisfy the four requirements of falsifiability, logical consistency, relative ex-
planatory power, and survival”(A. S. Lee, 1991). Thus Positivist studies an objective world, 
measures physical and social phenomena in order to characterise them and predict their be-
haviour. In an attempt to increase predictive understanding of phenomena, positivist studies 
usually serve primarily to test theory. In essence positivist researchers tend to believe in 
achieving a ‘scientific’ ideal by objectively being detached from the phenomena under inves-
tigation. This is in contrast with post-positivist research as it is grounded on the centrality of 
meaning (and often language) to human affairs (Sharp et al., 2011). 
4.2.3 Post-Positivism 
Post-positivism, seen as a mild form of positivism, is often described as the “natural-science 
model” of social science (A. S. Lee, 1991). While positivists believe that the researcher and 
the researched person are independent of each other, postpositivists accept that theories, 
background, knowledge and values of the researcher can influence what is observed.[1] How-
ever, like positivists, postpositivists pursue objectivity by recognizing the possible effects of 
biases. Post-positivists believes that the social world is sought and explained under assump-
tions and with procedures and evaluation criteria similar to those of the natural sciences. 
Thus, post-positivists focus on examining how phenomena are understood by relevant actors, 
and how these different understandings and values play out in research. Ontologically, post-
positivists are pitched against critical realism, and belief in a ‘real’ reality – a reality ‘out 
there’. Moreover post-positivists maintain the epistemology of objective and detached stance 
both in relation to the phenomenon being investigated and to the knowledge which can be 
derived from it. Hence post-positivist conducts rational analysis of data in a mental problem 
space by constructing deductive arguments of cause-and-effect” (Boland & Day, 1989, p. 
353). The methodological principles applied by post-positivists for obtaining knowledge 
about phenomena focus on the verification or falsification of the hypothesis using statistical 
Page | 76 
inferences, structural equation modeling, mathematical analysis and experimental and quasi-
experimental test designs (A. S. Lee, 1991; Lincoln et al., 2011). 
4.2.4 Interpretivism (Constructivism) 
Interpretivism is an alternative or the contrasting epistemology of positivism (Bryman, 2012; 
Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Lincoln et al., 2011; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). Interpretivism 
is predicated on the premise that the differences between people and natural science objects 
must be respected and thus there is the need to grasp the subjective meaning of social action 
(Bryman, 2012). Interpretivists world view therefore of  phenomena – people and institutions, 
is different from that of positivists. Intrepretivists see the distinctiveness of human behaviour 
and try to understand such behaviour as opposed to explaining human behaviour based on 
natural logic which is in the realm of positivism. According to Henning et al (2004), the in-
terpretive paradigm places emphasis on experience and interpretation which is concerned with 
meaning. Thus, it seeks to unearth the way a given society understand a particular phenome-
na. Intrepretive inquires, in essence, are about producing descriptive analysis with the inten-
tion of highlighting deep understanding of the phenomena. 
Hence the ontological world view of interpretivism is that social phenomena and their mean-
ings are continually being constructed (Constructivism) by social actors and thus is in a con-
stant state of revision (Bryman, 2012). Thus ontologically, reality is seen as actively, locally 
and socially constructed and specific to actors or groups of actors (Lincoln et al., 2011). This 
state of constant revision implies that researchers only present specific version of social reali-
ty and definitive reality which is their construction of the social reality. Hence in constructiv-
ism, there is a thin line between ontology and epistemology given that knowledge is seen as 
very subjective and indeterminate (Bryman, 2012; Grene, 1967). In effect knowledge acquisi-
tion straddle between subjective and intersubjective characters resulting from the interaction 
between the inquirer and the knower/agent. Phenomenology, interpretive case studies and 
ethnography methodologies conform to interpretivism/constructivism paradigm.  
4.3 Methodological Considerations & Justification  
This study adopts interpretive ontology and epistemology in forming my understanding of 
citizen centric trusted identity management phenomena. Such a stance is what influenced my 
empirical data collection, since interpretation of the world and reality construction is a com-
mon occurrence in many spheres of human endeavour (Shils & Finch, 1949). 
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4.3.1 Methodological Considerations 
Klein & Myers, (1999) have described IS research as interpretive on the assumption that“our 
knowledge of reality is gained only through social construction such as language, social con-
sciousness, shared meanings, documents and artifacts”. Given that the study of information 
systems entails both computer science and its application in various shades of management 
and society, by implication, information systems research falls within social science research. 
Hence it focuses on the understanding that is based on reality since information system is not 
only concerned with technological systems design and development but also it is concerned 
with core aspects of planning, management, implementation, evaluation and maintenance. 
According to Schutz, (1954) and recently in (Bulmer, 2011; Weber, Shils, Finch, & Antonio, 
2011) the primary goal of social science is to obtain organised knowledge of social reality – 
“what the actor "means" in his action, in contrast to the  meaning  which  this action has for 
the actor's partner or a neutral observer” (Schutz, 1954). 
Axiological considerations: My axiological position is that ethos and values can influence 
the learning process and what should be legitimately reported. Thus in questioning it is im-
portant to respect the privacy of respondents such that what is reported does not expose cer-
tain vital respondents information or lead to privacy intrusion.  
Ontological Considerations: National identity management systems are not seen as a single 
identity management system by a particular institution but the entire identity management 
policies of a nation. Hence there are various stakeholders in the identity ecosystem compris-
ing; policy makers, credential issuers, relying parties, standard agencies, citizens and busi-
nesses whose core activities are offering services to either credential issuers or the relying 
parties. The idea of citizen centric trusted identities is that individuals have the liberty to pre-
sent claims that can be verified and also depending on the context certain information will be 
revealed. However the requirement for user control with respect to the identity presuppose a 
literate society, exposed to modern technology.  
Additionally, civil registration systems are usually the prime source for issuing trusted cre-
dentials but in many developing countries, civil registration systems are not reliable, giving 
room to various forms of identity abuses. The reality is that in a developing country like Gha-
na, there is a high rate of illiteracy and lack of exposure to modern technology. Also due to a 
lack of universal means of identification, there is the tendency of using certain credentials 
issued for a particular purpose (e.g. Driver’s license, voter ID card) as proof of identity. Inter-
net connectivity remains a challenge, due to comparatively high cost to citizens and lack of 
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adequate infrastructure that hinder access to many which in the end hinders online identity 
verification and identity service provision.  
In effect, the reality (ontology) is that trusted identities require the cooperation of the key 
stakeholders and policy makers who understand and are capable of addressing the contextual 
issues in order to achieve success. This means that technology is not  the panacea in national 
identity policy but must only act as a medium for addressing the contextual identity manage-
ment issues.  
Epistemological considerations. Given that the reality of the context affects the mode of 
learning and the knowledge acquired, it is thus implied that the acquired knowledge will not 
conclusively pass objectivity test. It is therefore important to emphasize that objectivity is a 
positivist epistemological stance. Interpretive studies are usually subjective and inter-
subjective, as it is in the case of this study in the sense that selection of key stakeholders in-
volves some level of subjectivity. I maintain a middle position between the foundationalist 
and the critical epistemologies since it offers me access to the local realities constructed by 
people that interact with the credentials in their day to day transactions and interactions. Such 
a world view is thus of a subjective (Lincoln et al., 2011) character where findings are con-
structed and reconstructed interpretively based upon theory and the data the inquirer gathered 
from credential issuers and citizens. From this position, it is acknowledged that more or less 
context specific ideas and meanings can exist within a peculiar circumstance. I do not aim to 
present a pure and unencumbered first person/first-level subjective understanding (Ver-
stehen25)  (Boland & Day, 1989; A. S. Lee, 1991). I rather participate in the discussion with 
the aim of focusing the discussion towards addressing perceived understanding (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011).  
Cultural orientation and human cognition can be very subjective, and has the tendency of giv-
ing meaning to perceptions and interpretation of human actions within a particular context. 
Such human behaviours reveal inter-subjectivity of human understanding which is pertinent 
in this study. In this study, I strive to understand the underlining factors that influence citi-
zens’ centered, trusted identity management systems and also how identity information can be 
                                                 
 
25
 Verstehen describes the process of understanding the underlying meanings of individual 
and social behaviour. Thus it differentiates the social world from the natural world (Lee, 
1991). 
Page | 79 
used for legitimate secondary purposes, and in essence it is important to examine their inter-
pretive meanings and social reality. This is more so since it offers me the opportunity to have 
a clear understanding of the context and the counter influences of the stakeholders on identity 
management systems and vice versa (Walsham, 1995, 2006). This world view does not run in 
consonance with positivist and post-positivist research approaches in that we do not prove or 
disprove  hypothesis within a controlled environment (Bryman, 2012; Lincoln et al., 2011).  
Thus, the choice of interpretivist approach and also taking cognizance of Klein & Myers, 
(1999) set of principles for conducting and evaluating interpretive field studies in IS (Klein & 
Myers, 1999). The ontological and epistemological foundations of the interpretivist world 
view provided the basis of understanding of the key issues for theory development in this 
study. In conducting this study, I was careful not to base my analysis of IdMS and IS success 
solely on the existing formulations and conceptualizations. Rather, evidence were understood 
and analysed within their context of emergence, taken into consideration, the shared views, 
experiences and perceptions of the subjects, and guided by the philosophical assumptions of  
IS Success Model. 
4.3.2 Methodological Justification 
This study adopts an interpretivist stance, with the subsequent reasons accounting for the 
choice of paradigm. In the first place, to understand the factors that lead to a trusted identities 
ecosystem in a nation, it was important that I interact with the key stakeholders to understand 
the issues from their perspectives and for the stakeholders to discuss their individual differ-
ences. It is however not possible and also undesirable that I can unravel all intimate detail 
through the interactions since adherence to ethics require that the subjects require space and 
certain questions needed to be avoided.  
Secondly, in order to be sensitive to the contextual factors and the resulting impact of associ-
ated changes, delimiting the phenomena of interest from the context (as it is in the case of 
positivist research) would have been incorrect given that citizen centric trusted identities are 
societal issues rather than a specific organisation. Thus, the phenomena cut across various 
segments of society. This requires an experiential knowledge which is different from what is 
acquired in a controlled environment. It is this background that has shaped my axiological, 
ontological, epistemological and methodological positions. It is however worth noting that, 
how I approached the study of the phenomena of interest, the related research questions were 
the direct results of the research design. 
Page | 80 
Thirdly, due to the dearth of literature on the measures of IdMS effectiveness from develop-
ing country perspective, this study began with an initial exploration of Identity management 
subject matter and the contextual issues.  
Moreover secondary research on identity management concentrates on technical and techno-
logical specifications and hence existing theories have not been tested or applied within the 
context of national electronic identity management. Although the concept of identity is not 
new, the digital representation of a real person is still a new research area and hence, I believe 
the reality is constantly changing with the unfolding interactions and deeper interpretive in-
sights emerging over time. 
 Positivist Paradigm Interpretivist Paradigm 
Basic beliefs and 
world view 
The world is external and objective The world is socially constructed and sub-
jective 
Observer is independent  Observer is part of what observed 
Science is value-free  Science is driven by human interests 
Research Design  Quantitative Qualitative 
Research Approach Deductive Inductive 
The researcher 
should 
Focus on facts  Focus on meanings  
Look for causality and fundamental 
laws 
Try to understand what is happening 
Reduce phenomenon to simplest ele-
ments 
Look at the totality of each situation 
Formulate hypotheses and then test 
them 
Develop ideas through induction from data 
Preferred methods 
include 
Operationalising concepts so that they 
can be measured 
Using multiple methods to establish differ-
ent views of phenomena 
Taking large samples  Small samples investigated in depth or over 
time 
Table 11 Summary of Interpretive Versus Positivist paradigms.  
 
4.4 Qualitative Research Design 
The real purpose of scientific methodology is to ensure that nature hasn’t led you to believe  
that you know something you don’t really know. Robert M. Pirsig26 
                                                 
 
26
 Quotation from ”Zen & the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance An Inquiry into Values” by  Robert M. Pirsig 
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Quantitative research is concerned with the collection and analysis of data in numeric form by 
assigning numbers to perceived qualities or variables in the description of a phenomena 
(Henning, Van Rensburg, & Smit, 2004). Stauss and Corbin (1998) on the otherhand has de-
scribed Qualitative research as a type of research that produces findings not arrived at by sta-
tistical procedures or other means of quantification.  
Based on my interpretive research world view, as explained previously, there was the need to 
adopt a research design that offers the opportunity to unravel all the tenets of reality and the 
comprehensive knowledge acquisition using various data collection methods. A Qualitative 
research approach is adopted in this study. Myers (1997),  in drawing a distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative research described qualitative research as “a subjective approach 
which includes examining and reflecting on perceptions in order to gain understanding of 
social and human activity” (Myers, 1997). Qualitative research strategy is used in social sci-
ences to enable the researcher to inquire about socio-cultural phenomena often within a given 
context. Case study, ethnography and action research are some of the common qualitative 
research strategies. In qualitative research, the major sources of evidence include observation, 
interviews, questionnaires, documents and texts, including the researcher’s impressions of the 
phenomena and the context (Myers, 1997). Quasi statistics (Becker, 1970; Maxwell, 2010) 
were also used in a survey to identify citizens’ concerns on national identification systems 
and also to specify contextual issues. Quasi Statistics generally, refer to the use of simple nu-
merical results that can be readily derived from the data. Quasi-statistics allow the researcher 
to support inherently quantitative claims, and enable easy assessment of the amount of evi-
dence in data bearing on a particular conclusion. – i.e. how many different sources they were 
obtained (Becker, 1970; Maxwell, 2010). 
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4.4.1 Case Study 
According to (John W Creswell, 2007a) a case study research involves the study of a phe-
nomena explored through one or more cases within a setting/context (cases) or multiple set-
Figure 24 Intellectual Research Process. 
 
Worldview 
This study delved into the main tenets of 
Positivism, Construstivism and Critical 
Realism, and resolved that the nature of the 
study resides in Constructionist tradition.  
 
The Quest for a Philosophiphical Position 
Based on extensive review of existing 
literature, discourse with my supervisor and 
other academics, and participation in various 
PhD courses, I realized that doctoral research  
must be grounded in a relevant philosophical 
world view. 
Realisation of Wrong Orientation 
I realized that such posturing was contrary to 
the nature evidence I was seeking in a study 
involving a multiplicity of stakeholder 
interests. Many of the evidence are 
experiencial and thus tacit knowledge could 
not be generated from quantitative mind set. 
Problem structuring methods were more 
appropriate.  
Persuing Options to Collect Evidence 
The nature of the study and its effect on 
multiple stakeholders meant that Problem 
Structuring Methods was more suitable. Thus 
the combination of Interviews, Stakeholder 
Workshop and Focus Group Discussions in 
the gathering of evidence. 
INTELLECTUAL RESEARCH 
PROCESS 
Translating Findinds into IdMS Policy 
Guidelines 
The use of narratives in the reporting of 
findings gives the reader an incite into the 
contextual issues. It is also very appropriate 
in qualitative research approach as 
researchers are encouraged to be creative in 
the reporting of findings. This approach 
gave me the flexibility to reflect critically 
at all times on the research process.  
Commencement of Study 
I commenced the study in February 2010 with 
a thorough positivists orientation. This is 
probably the result of my quantitative 
background based on my previous career in 
accounting and finance. 
Trusted Identity Framework.  
Interpretive analysis were used to establish 
relationships between the major findings 
which formed the bases for development of 
the trust identity framework.  
Evidence Interpretation 
My constructivst world view influenced the 
interpretation of evidence, whereby texts 
were read and reflected on and looking for 
Hermeneutical consistency (coherent 
explanation). Thus the application of 
interpretive phenomenological analysis in 
some of the papers published.  
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tings (cases). It also involves a detailed in depth data collection from multiple sources of data 
(e.g. Observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports) (Creswell, 
2007b). A case study was deemed most appropriate because, it is considered a very good 
strategy in finding answers to how and why questions, which is within the remit of my in-
quiry. Again, a case study is most appropriate in situations such as where the inquirer does 
not have control or cannot exercise significant influence on the behavioural outcomes of con-
temporary events (Yin, 2008a).  
Hence the inquirer is faced with reality, a major requirement in the interpretivist paradigm. 
Gillham (2000) also advocates triangulation as a method of validating the research, as does 
Yin (1994:91), stating that, “a major strength of the case study data collection is the oppor-
tunity to use many different sources of evidence.” Triangulation, often derived from naviga-
tion, pertains to the goal of seeking three or more ways of verifying or corroborating a partic-
ular event, description, or fact being reported by a study with the aim of strengthening the 
validity of a study (Yin, 2011a). Each of the data collection methods used in this research 
project could be considered part of an overall approach to improving the quality and validity 
of the research data through an approach known as triangulation.  
Darke et al. (1998), for example, advocated the use of triangulation to avoid bias on the part 
of the researcher, either in terms of the influence the researcher has on the behaviour of par-
ticipants or in terms of the bias the researcher brings himself into the conduct of the research. 
Triangulation is an approach intended to increase the quality and validity of the qualitative 
research methods and in minimising the potential sources of bias (Darke et al., 1998; Myers, 
1997; Patton, 2002; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Stake (1995:114) said that triangulation in-
cludes, “data triangulation (from other sources), investigator triangulation (use of observers), 
methodological triangulation (using multiple sample types and sources).” The strategy has 
been categorized into three phases as follows: 
1. Phase 1 – Explore Identification systems in Ghana and comparing the systems with 
the existing situation in OECD countries. 
2. Phase 2 – Explore the causes of identification challenges in developing countries with 
Ghana as a case study. 
3. Phase 3 – Explains the reasons for the challenges and propose guidelines for trusted 
identities policy formulation 
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Phase 1: I approached this phase of the study by exploring the identification systems in Gha-
na, and two OECD countries; Denmark and the United Kingdom, through literature review 
and my real life experiences of staying in those countries. The choice of exploratory case 
study at this initial stage of my study is in consonance with Yin, (2011), thus studying the 
phenomenon in its real life context, especially where there is an unclear boundary differences 
between the phenomenon and context  (Yin, 2011a). Scientific research on user-centric identi-
ty and trusted identity management within the context of a nation are in the trial stages (Ber-
tino, 2012; Grant, 2011a; IBM, 2010; Microsoft, 2011).  
Moreover the choice of exploratory case study was very necessary since it is the most appro-
priate strategy for resolving a “what” question was the case  and hence a justifiable rationale 
for conducting an exploratory study. Literature and document review, interviews and quasi 
statistics method in the form of citizens’ perception survey were the means adopted for data 
collection. 
 
Figure 25 Research Design. 
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Figure 26 Actual Research Audit Trail. 
 
PHYSICAL RESEARCH PROCESSES 
The Study Plan 
Based on the preliminaly literature review, the study plan was 
prepared for initial approval. Further literature reviews and my 
participation in PhD courses aided the finalization of the 11 months 
study plan. After effecting the required changes, the study plan was  
accepted in 2011. 
Formulation of Research Questions 
The extensive literature review and initial 
discussions with key stakeholder resulted 
in the formulation of my research 
questions. 
Problem Identification 
I became interested in Identity management as a 
result of my previous experiences dealing with user 
profiles and an initial discussion with my PhD 
supervisor on personalization. I became interested in 
the processes of identity formation and its effect on 
citizens’ trust in IdMS. 
Literature Review 
An initial exploration of the concepts in identity formation 
resulted in my interest in identity management subject 
matter. An extensive review of literature ensued covering 
identity, identification, identity management, trust and 
privacy. 
Quasi Statistical Survey 
As part of evidence gathering, IdMS 
perception survey was conducted in Ghana 
using questionnaire. Additional statistical 
information were gathered based on 
Eurobarometer survey, OECD digital 
economy papers, etc. These evidence also 
influenced the selection of interview and 
discussion themes. 
Identification of stakeholders 
The stakeholders were identified based on their direct involvement in identity policy and in-depth knowledge of IdMS. Those 
who by virtue of their responsibility and vested interest in ensuring successful outcome of national identity policy were also 
considered as key stakeholders. Using a combination of theoretical and purposive sampling, informants were identified and 
approached to participate in the study.  
Managing and analysing the evidence 
Computerized application was used to manage the evidence and  its categorization into themes. Both reflexive interpretation 
and heameunitical techniques were used to facilitate the interpretation of the evidence. 
Gathering of Qualitative Evidence 
Given the nature of the study, qualitative approach was employed. In 
total 45 open ended interviews were conducted lasting between 45 
minutes to 1 hour on average. Two stakeholder workshops were 
organized and five focus group discsussions were held. All the 
interviews, workshop and focus group discussions were tape recorded 
and subsequently transcribed.  
A summary of the transcriptions, together with the field notes, 
documents supplied by informants and information from  the internet 
and stakeholders’ websites formed the primary narrative. 
Findings 
The findings from the studies in the form of six publications were reshaped based on constructive critique at conferences, 
reviewers comments, new incite drawn through literature review. The narrative incorporates detailed description of the 
drivers of IDMS success, and is substantiated extensively by reference to statements made by the informants. Further 
reflection on the narrative led to a juxtaposition of the findings into an IdMS implementation guidelines  
Confirmation of findings 
The findings were discussed with various practitioners and researchers at 2012 World e-ID congress and at various seminars. 
The follow-up interviews also entailed confirming the research approach. Such important input led to the refinement of the 
findings and the identification of major requirements for effective Identity ecosystem. 
Detailed Literature Review 
Lessons learnt from the preliminary literature review, research questions and the proposals in the study plan triggered a 
further review of literature concerning the proposed research strategy and evidence generation. 
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Phase 2 was an attempt to identify the causes of the identification challenges as revealed in 
the findings from Phase 1. The strategy adopted for this inquiry is the explanatory case study 
of identity management systems in Ghana using triangulation as a research strategy. Explana-
tory case study strategy is very useful when the inquirer seeks explanation using “how and 
why” research questions (Yin, 2011a). Such questions are necessary in dealing with opera-
tional links that need to be traced over time (Yin, 2008a) The major sources of data collection 
at this stage were; interviews, focus group discussion and the stakeholder workshop/seminar. 
Phase 3 The strategy adopted for the final phase of the study is a confirmatory case study 
which integrates the result from the first and second phase of the study in addition to further 
evidence from stakeholder workshop, focus group discussion and a series of interviews. The 
selection of stakeholders was based on the preliminary study of stakeholder theory and analy-
sis (Crane & Ruebottom, 2012; Edward Freeman, 2010) as specified in Chapter 3. Stakehold-
er theory is concerned with who has input in decision making as well as the beneficiaries from 
the outcomes of such decisions (Phillips et al., 2003, p. 487).  
Thus the stakeholders were categorised as direct and indirect. The direct stakeholders com-
prised of institutions that are directly involved in the issue of identity credentials,  and en-
forcement identity policies in Ghana as shown in Table 4. The indirect stakeholders include 
institutions that rely on the identity credentials to facilitate business transactions. 
 
4.4.2 Unit of Analysis 
The study focused on national identity management systems and how they can be trusted and 
citizens centered. The unit of analysis are the citizens and the key actors who have a stake in 
the crafting of national identity policies. The stakeholder analysis gave me a broader perspec-
tive on how identity management can be trusted and citizens centered given that these stake-
 
Figure 27 Triangulation of Evidence. 
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holders can give meaning to their perception and these meanings actually influence their prac-
tice. The nature of my research questions gives credence to the nature of research strategy and 
is key to finding the best approach to crafting trusted and citizen centered identity manage-
ment systems. 
4.4.3 Sources of evidence 
Qualitative research using a case study as a research strategy thrives on the rich source of evi-
dential knowledge that is provided from multiple sources, where the complexity of the unit is 
studied intensively (Yin, 2011a). In compliance with such requirements, the goal was to ob-
tain a rich set of data surrounding the research objective and the related research questions, 
and to capture all the contextual realities and complexities (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 
1987; Cavaye, 2008). The key sources of evidence were as follows: 
Focus Group 
The focus group method is a qualitative data gathering technique where focus group sessions 
involve a group of participants assembled for a planned discussion to explore a specific topic 
of interest to researchers in a permissive, non-threatening environment (Krueger & Casey, 
2009). Focus groups are an organized discussion group that capitalizes on communication 
between participants in order to gather as through the group interaction (Gibbs, 1997; Kitz-
inger, 1995a, p. 311). The focus group research method benefits from the interaction among 
participants, which can reveal shared ideas, reactions, and opinions on the topic of the study. 
The unit of analysis of a focus group is not the members but the group.  
Focus groups provide the opportunity for the inquirer to collect in detail, qualitative data 
about a particular product, concept or innovation in an interactive manner in order to reveal 
differing viewpoints and perspectives among the participants (Jamieson & Williams, 2003). It 
is thus, a powerful and flexible means to gather qualitative evidence by exploring partici-
pants’ opinions, ideas or attitudes especially where group interaction is sometimes the ability 
to revise individuals’ initial perceptions and opinions (Gibbs, 1997; Kitzinger, 1995a, p. 311). 
These structured process of interaction aid the formation of perceptions and attitudes, in a 
sequential series of one–on–one interviews with the same individuals (Krueger & Casey, 
2009). Moreover, the objective of a focus group is the group interaction and not for group 
decision making, consensus building or to provide recommendations as is the case of group 
participatory methods like Delphi method (Kitzinger, 1995b). Thus, a focus group facilitator 
must create a permissive environment that nurtures different perceptions and points of view 
without needing to reach consensus. The extensive literature on focus groups recommends 
that groups should be composed of at least six participants, with most authors proposing be-
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tween five and twelve participants as the ideal number (Morgan, 1997). Very large focus 
groups can be unproductive as it may be difficult to include contributions from all participants 
and there may be a tendency for the discussion to fragment and a series of mini–conversations 
to emerge (Krueger & Casey, 2009). Very small focus groups are unlikely to reveal signifi-
cant insights from the group process as they can effectively become a series of individual in-
terviews.
 
Interviews 
A series of interviews were conducted during all the three phases of the study. I adopted serial 
interview (Murray et al., 2009) with open ended interview questions that usually give room 
for further discussions (Yin, 2008a). Each interview lasted between one hour and one and a 
half hours. Interviewees were chosen  in a purposive manner, rather than randomly, in order 
to assure extensiveness and diversity of opinion regarding the use of identity management 
systems and national identity policies. This style of Interviewing has the added advantage of 
revealing certain important facts about the interviewees and the context such as languages, 
social cues, opinions, attitudes, beliefs and feelings (Yin, 2008a).  
It also offered interviewees the opportunity to clarify some of the points raised during the 
workshop to solicit for further information. Interviewees included the officials of identity is-
suers, policy makers, journalists, private businesses involved in identity verification, and 
identity card manufacturers. This activity is also a very good way of establishing a good rela-
tionship with key stakeholders which acted as a means of identifying other important stake-
holders that I might not have included in my initial list of interviewees. The following issues 
were considered during the interviews: 
   
 
Figure 28 Characteristics of Focus Group Participants. 
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- Interviewees are given a brief explanation about the purpose and format of the inter-
view to be conducted. 
- Participants were given prior information about the length of the interviews. The dura-
tion of all the interviews were between forty-five minutes to one hour. 
- Where appropriate, the interviews were captured on a digital voice recorder with use 
being made of hand-written notes either as a complement to the recorder or as an al-
ternative.  
- Permission was sought from interviewees prior to the voice recording of the inter-
views and assurances were given regarding confidentiality. 
- Interviews were tracked by keeping a log of where and when the interviews took place 
and who took part in the interviews. 
Stakeholder Workshop 
Problem Structuring Method (PSM) have suitable in multi-actor situations, and their charac-
teristic mode of operation is the workshop, in which representatives of stakeholding groups 
interact. In such an environment, commonly fragmented information and knowledge could be 
organised and synthesised through a carefully formulated discussion questions. The organis-
ers and the facilitator of the PSM must provide an environment in which this can happen ef-
fectively. Thus, how the workshop is established and its processes managed can be crucial to 
the success of the engagement. 
To achieve the desired goal, the facilitator must ssume the positon of a disinterested facilita-
tor, and allow participants to have their voices heard. This involves managing the disparate 
contributions and making the participants feel safe in expressing their views as fully and 
openly as possible. Thus skilful communicator is not the key requirement, but rather sensitivi-
ty to potential fears and anxieties of participants. and to the power relations which may inhibit 
free expression (Phillips and Phillips, 1993; Ackermann, 1996; Vennix, 1996.) 
A stakeholder workshop was organised in Ghana on January 16, 2012, at Ghana Technology 
University College (GTUC) in Accra. 75 participants were offered the opportunity to discuss 
a number of issues and listen to presentations highlighting issues concerning secondary uses 
of personal information. Letters were written to all participants and participating institutions, 
and detailing the theme, agenda and activities for the day.  
The participants were made up of senior officials from national institutions involved in the 
collection and storage of personal information, such as the Registrar of Births & Deaths, The 
Passport Office, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), National Identification Au-
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thority (NIA), the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), the Electoral Commission 
(EC), the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). Also represented were senior officials of the ma-
jor financial institutions, biometric and identity-related businesses, academic institutions, the 
media, non-governmental organisations involved in civil right advocacy, and the general pub-
lic. Ghana was selected as the research setting because the challenges faced by the economy 
with respect to identification and secondary uses of personal information are similar to those 
of other developing countries. Notable challenges include unreliable civil registration sys-
tems, electoral issues due to unreliable voters register, lack of identity management systems 
interoperability, etc. 
The workshop began with a statement from the Minister of Communication and a keynote 
address by the President of GTUC, who chaired the event. To inform discussions, participants 
were given background information and copies of the discussion questions during a presenta-
tion on privacy and identity management. The presentation highlighted the key concepts of 
identity management, including major policy, technological and regulatory issues and related 
IdMS research and practices in OECD countries. This was followed by another presentation 
on existing secondary uses of personal information for identity verification by financial insti-
tutions. After the presentations, participants shared their observations on the topic during the 
discussion session. The facilitator’s role was to keep the discussion focused on the problem at 
hand and prevent the participants from engaging in personality-oriented conversation (Pa-
pamichail et al., 2007).  
Participants were also made to discuss the issues raised and share their experiences and their 
reservations. Where particular issues or questions were sector-specific, the agencies con-
cerned were given the opportunity to respond to such questions. Some of the discussion ques-
tions were: 
1. What are the potential benefits and risks regarding the secondary use of personal in-
formation? 
2. Who has the right to access personal information held by government agencies and for 
what purposes? 
3. What are the evolving public trust issues with respect to secondary use of personal in-
formation?  
4. Do citizens have the right to put constraints on the use of their personal information? 
5. What problems may develop as innovative technologies enhance the ability and ease 
of widespread personal data sharing for a secondary purpose and commercial uses? 
Page | 91 
6. What can be done to address issues arising from inappropriate use and/or exploitation 
of personal information?  
7. What regulations, legislation, and/or policies and procedures are needed to address 
these issues? 
 
4.4.4 Secondary Data Sources 
This study draws from two major secondary sources of evidence, in the form of scholarly 
publications, industry reports, reports issued by international agencies, and participation in 
PhD courses. OECD Digital economy papers, statistics from World Economic Forum, publi-
cations of European Union (EU) Privacy and Identity Management research consortia and 
newspaper and organisational publications in Ghana and Africa. These sources immensely 
influenced the definition of research context,  the design of interview guide, focus group and 
stakeholder workshop questions and in all publications during the study. The secondary 
sources of evidence also impacts on the discussions and analysis of the research findings and 
the conclusions drawn. 
Scholarly Publication: Although discussions on privacy and identity have been ongoing for 
many years, the concepts as used in digital identity management is fairly new.  There were 
also not many studies on the application of IS success theory in the assessment of IdMS effec-
tiveness or success. This implied broadening the scope of the research to cover the electronic 
government, which like an umbrella domain within which national identity management is 
situated. In the course  of the study, I witnessed a dramatic increase in Identity management 
literature with respect to the technical development and various proposed applications for 
privacy enhancing.  
However, I observed that not many research were being conducted on societal aspects of 
identity management. For instance, a search on Google scholar with the following parameters 
“successful national identity management systems”, or “successful identity management sys-
tems” revealed nothing but “successful e-id” brought only one hit. However, changing the 
Figure 29 Characteristics of Workshop Participants. 
Page | 92 
parameters to “successful e-government” made 1,560 hits. Similarly “national e-id” or “na-
tional electronic ID” revealed between 65 to 69 hits. Interestingly replacing the keyword 
“successful” with “effective” as follows "effective identity management systems", made 5 
hits, all of which discussing effective IdMS within the context of an organisation.  
With effectiveness or success of an information system in general, it is interesting to find sev-
eral literature, that sought to clarify the dependent variable in IS Success, testing and re-
specification of the DeLone and McLean IS success model (Eom & Stapleton, 2011; Mun, 
Yun, Kim, Hong, & Lee, 2010; Petter et al., 2012; Sharkey, Scott, & Acton, 2010; Tona, 
Carlsson, & Eom, 2012; Urbach & Müller, 2012). Such studies have informed my under-
standing and the development of my trust framework. 
Statistics and Official Reports: This study has also been influenced by various reports by 
OECD Digital Economy Papers and statistics from various international agencies like Euro 
Barometer Survey, UNESCO, etc, and quasi statistical survey conducted in Ghana.  
PhD Courses and Conferences: Participation in various PhD courses immensely broadened 
my horizon of understanding of academic research and academic writing. In particular, cours-
es on the Political Economy of ICT and Techno-economics of ICT provided a very good his-
torical background on ICT development and the role of institutions and its implication on 
contemporary developments in information and communication technology. Similarly, the 
courses on Theory of Science and Academic writing, Qualitative Research helped me to ap-
preciate the historical background of the various philosophical paradigms and their implica-
tion on  scientific research and practice.  
Participation in the Academic Writing course also enriched my understanding of the rudi-
ments of academic writing and publication of research in academic journals and conferences. 
I also learnt insightful lessons during my participation in various conferences and workshops. 
Particularly, participating and presenting a paper at the world e-id congress gave me more 
insight into various cutting-edge technologies and the state-of-the-art on privacy–enhancing 
IdMS and trusted Identities identity management systems. I also had the opportunity to dis-
cuss pertinent issues with many of the participants. 
E-mails, Skype and Podcast: In the course of the study, I exchanged several e-mail and 
Skype conversations with various stakeholders and IDM researchers. Given the distance bar-
rier, e-mail and Skype have proven to be a very good means of communication and seeking 
clarifications on pertinent questions and also a very good means of keeping track of research 
data. This is notwithstanding the context and unobtrusive nature which ensures convenient 
interaction and their ability to offer asynchronous means of interaction.  
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E-mail is also a very good means of obtaining documentations and reports from various or-
ganisations, as it is also a rich repository of relational communication and thus allows writers 
the flexibility to personalize their messages. This suggests that e-mail can assist in a negotiat-
ed understanding between the email sender and the recipient since the recipient can seek clari-
fications on a particular subject. This interactive characteristic of e-mail and particularly, 
Skype makes it somehow similar to face-to-face communication, whilst retaining its asyn-
chronous nature. Thus it allows writers to compose, edit and send it at their convenience 
(Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Z. Wang, Walther, & Hancock, 2009). 
Project 
Phase 
Type of 
Fieldwork Location Activity Approach Characteristics of Participant 
1 Fieldwork 1 Ghana 
IDMS 
perception 
Survey 
501 Questionnaire 
were circulated 
A group of MBA students from 
West Africa, Young Adults in 
three major cities in Ghana - Ac-
cra, Tema and Kumasi, and general 
public. 
1 Field work 2 Ghana Interviews 
20 open-ended Qualita-
tive interviews in ten 
days 
Interviewees included; key offi-
cials of credential issuers, financial 
institutions and general public. 
2 Field work 2 Ghana 
Workshop 
1 
Stakeholder workshop 
in GTUC, Accra on 
secondary use of per-
sonal information 
Participants included; Credential 
issuers, financial institutions, IT 
organsiations, academic institu-
tions, Media, private businesses, 
policy makers and NGOs. 
2 Field work 2 Ghana 
Expert 
Interviews 
25 open ended inter-
views were arranged in 
20 days 
Interviewees included all major 
stakeholders in the Ghanaian iden-
tity ecosystem. 
3 Field work 2 Ghana 
Workshop 
2 
Second Stakeholder 
workshop in GTUC, 
Accra which focused 
on crafting a trusted 
identity policy guide-
lines 
Participants included; Credential 
issuers, financial institutions, IT 
organsiations, academic institu-
tions, Media, private business and 
policy makers, NGOs, students 
from various schools and the gen-
eral public 
3 Field work 2 Ghana 
Focus 
Group 
5 Focus group sections 
were organized in 
Accra 
Participants included a blend of 
people from diverse background. 
Group sizes ranged between 9 to 
11.Each group had both male and 
female participants. 
Table 12 Overview of Empirical Data Collection. 
4.4.5 Data Interpretation 
What we call our data are really our own constructions of other people's constructions of what 
they and their compatriots are up to (Geertz, 1973). 
 
Page | 94 
The data collected from primary and secondary sources were mainly made up of text, statis-
tics, charts, voice and video recordings, notes and images that transmit ideas and concepts. In 
consonance with the overarching objective of the study, data collection interpretation was 
significantly informed by philosophical constructivism. This world view takes the position 
that our knowledge of reality, including the domain of human action, is a social construction 
by human actors. In that sense, what I call my data in this study are in fact my own construc-
tions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to (Geertz, 
1973, p. 9; Walsham, 2006). In his paper titled;“interpretive case studies in IS research” 
Walsham, (1995) also observed that the quality of researchers’ construction of reality (data 
collected) hinges on a good theory and an insightful analysis (Walsham, 1995). Thus, the in-
terpretation of data and the drawn conclusion follows what is described as the hermeneutic 
circle (Heidegger, 1982; Warnke, 2011). Thus an understanding of the text as a whole is es-
tablished by reference to the individual parts and similarly understanding of each individual is 
achieved with reference to the whole. 
In this study, data is interpreted and analysed, in the light of the theoretical underpinning pre-
sented in Chapter 3. Such an interpretivist posture implies that texts are perceived as the me-
dia that transmit experiences, beliefs and judgements of the author on the interpreting subject. 
Additionally, in my interpretation of the data and the phenomena, I see my role as an involved 
researcher through participant observation and not an action researcher (Walsham, 1995). The 
data analysis and interpretation were partly conducted during the three phases of the research. 
In interpreting transcripts of voice recording, notes and other written data, I observed the fact 
that the literal meanings are within the text, which is detached from emotions and communi-
cation mannerism (Gadamer, 1975, p. 392). Detailed analysis of the findings is presented in 
Chapter 5. 
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Ph
a
s
e 
Objective Theoretical Ref-
erence 
Data Collec-
tion method 
Type of 
Instrument 
Focus 
1 Explore the factors 
IDMS uses in develop-
ing countries  
Davis Interviews and 
Questionnaires 
used for  
Open ended 
interviews 
Factors that influ-
ence effectiveness 
of Identification 
systems  
1& 2 To understand the rela-
tionship between indi-
viduals’ intentions to 
disclose personal infor-
mation, their actual per-
sonal information disclo-
sure behaviours. 
(Roger C. Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoor-
man, 1995b) 
(K. Cameron & 
Jones, 2007) 
Interview and 
Secondary 
sources 
Open ended 
Questions 
Analysis of Priva-
cy-Enhancing 
Identity Manage-
ment Systems 
 
To understand the major 
issues involved in the 
design of privacy-
enhancing IDMS and 
contribute to improved 
framework and design 
principles. 
(Roger C. Mayer 
et al., 1995b) 
(K. Cameron & 
Jones, 2007) 
Interviews and 
Secondary 
sources 
Open ended 
questions 
Keeping Identity 
Private; Establish-
ing Trust in the 
Physical and Digi-
tal World for Iden-
tity Management 
Systems 
2 To provide a means of 
communicating identity-
related concepts to poli-
cy-makers, users and 
technologists.  
 
(Pavlou, 2011b), 
Stakeholder theory 
(Crane & Ruebot-
tom, 2012; Don-
aldson & Preston, 
1995; Jones & 
Wicks, 1999) 
Interview, 
Workshop 
Secondary 
sources 
Open ended 
questions 
 
Secondary Uses of 
Personal Identity 
Information: Poli-
cies, Technologies 
and Regulatory 
Framework 
2 To understand the key 
stakeholder concerns 
regarding the collection, 
storage and use of per-
sonal information and 
how such concerns 
should be addressed to 
ensure trusted identities. 
(Delone & 
McLean, 2003; 
Petter et al., 2008, 
2012). 
Interview,  
Workshop 
Secondary 
sources 
Open ended 
Questions, 
Problem 
structuring 
method 
Building Trusted 
National Identity 
Management Sys-
tems – Presenting 
Privacy-Concern 
Trust Curve 
2 To identify the key re-
quirements for crafting a 
trusted identities ecosys-
tem 
Problem structu-
ring methods 
(Papamichail et al., 
2007; Sinkko et 
al., 2008) 
Stakeholder theory 
Interview,  
Workshop 
Secondary 
sources 
Open ended 
questions 
Towards a Trusted 
National Identities 
Framework 
Figure 30 Theoretical References and Sources of Evidence. 
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Chapter 5 Findings and Contributions 
The key findings, contributions and limitations of this study are presented in this chapter 
based on six research papers published in the course of the study. Three of the papers were 
published in peer reviewed academic journals and the remaining three were published in pro-
ceedings of peer reviewed academic conferences.  A summary of the published papers is 
shown in Table 13.  
An overview of the papers is first presented, followed by the level of publication, and the 
overarching research question(s) that the paper addresses. The relevant research questions and 
objectives in Chapter 1, to which a paper relates is also discussed. The findings from each of 
the studies, a summary of contributions to research and practice, and the major limitations of 
each of the studies are also discussed. The following are highlights of the main findings dis-
cussed in each of the papers presented in this thesis.  
Paper 1 discusses identification systems from the perspective of a developing country focus-
ing on the major factors that influence effective uses of IdMS by citizens. The findings indi-
cate that although the introduction of identification systems by governments are usually man-
datory and are sometimes coercive in its introduction, citizens’ trust in the system and the 
institutions are sometimes a major precondition for its take-off. This study did set the scene 
for my further studies on trust and privacy as described in sections of subsequent papers.  
Papers II and III explore the factors affecting citizens' attitude towards IdMS and their inten-
tions to disclose personal information, and its effect on the development of privacy-enhancing 
identity management policy. Various privacy enhancing IdMS research and initiatives were 
reviewed with respect to their implications for national identity management policy. 
Paper IV discusses how to effectively communicate identity-related concepts to policy-
makers, technologists, credential issuers and other stakeholders. The paper addresses the core 
issues in relation to secondary uses of personal information based on results from a stake-
holder workshop in Ghana and a series of interviews. The paper also explains what constitutes 
personal identity information and user concerns in relation to secondary uses of personal in-
formation. Particularly, we observe the dimensions of information privacy and how they in-
fluence citizens’ confidence in credentials and credential issuers. It is at this stage that we 
learn the privacy concerns from citizens, institutional perspectives and the state-of-the-art in 
trusted IdMS research and practices. 
Paper V also discusses the key requirements for building a trusted National Identity Manage-
ment Systems. The Privacy-Concern Trust model is introduced at this stage.  
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Finally, paper 6 describes the requirements of the trusted identity ecosystem, which is a criti-
cal enabler for effective uses of digital IdMS. The findings show that, beyond the threshold 
level of trust, societal information privacy concern is low; and trust is high, thereby encourag-
ing further institutional cooperation and citizens’ informational self-determination. The table 
below presents a summary of the various research papers presented in the thesis. 
Paper Author (s) 
Title Publication Level Research Question Ad-
dressed 
1 Adjei & Tobbin 
Identification Sys-
tems in Africa; The 
Case of Ghana 
Published in proceedings of the 
12th International Symposium on 
Information Science (ISI 2011), 9 - 
11 March  2011, Hildesheim. 
(Internationales Symposium für 
Informationswissenschaft, Hildes-
heim, 9.—11. März 2011) 
Research Question 1:  
What underlying factors 
motivate or inhibit IDMS 
implementation 
2 Adjei & Olesen 
Analysis of Privacy-
Enhancing Identity 
Management Systems 
Published in Proceedings of 
WWRF26-WG1-xx 
Research Question 1: The 
major issues involved in the 
design of  privacy-
enhancing IDMS and con-
tribute to improved frame-
work and design principles 
for 
3 Adjei & Olesen 
Keeping Identity 
Private; Establishing 
Trust in the Physical 
and Digital World for 
Identity Management 
Systems 
Published in IEEE Vehicular 
Technology Magazine September 
2011 
Research Question 1 and 
2: The major issues in-
volved in the design of  
privacy-enhancing IDMS 
and contribute to improved 
framework and design prin-
ciples for these 
4 Adjei & Olesen 
Secondary Uses of 
Personal Identity 
Information: Policies, 
Technologies and 
Regulatory Frame-
work 
Published in Digiworld Economic 
Journal, no. 88, 4th Q. 2012, p. 79. 
Research Question 2 and 3: 
 - What underlying factors 
motivate or inhibit IDMS 
implementation 
- How can government 
agencies justify the imple-
mentation of national identi-
ty management systems. 
5 Adjei & Olesen 
Building Trusted 
National Identity 
Management Systems 
– Presenting Privacy-
Concern Trust Curve 
Published in Proceedings of Cen-
tric 2012 
Research Question 2 and 3: 
 How can government agen-
cies justify the implementa-
tion of national identity 
management systems?. 
6 
Joseph 
K. 
Adjei 
Towards a Trusted 
National Identities 
Framework 
Accepted for publication in Info 
Journal Emerald 
Research Question 2 and 3: 
 What architectural frame-
work will ensure citizen 
centric national identity 
management systems? 
Table 13 Summary of Published Papers. 
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5.1 Paper Selection 
A careful consideration is given to the papers selected based on their relevance and contribu-
tions to addressing the various research objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Together, the six 
papers contribute to the theory building from a qualitative research background, in conso-
nance with the methodological paradigm approached in this study, and presented in Chapter 
4. The papers are also a reflection of my appreciation of the trusted and citizen centric identity 
management phenomena based on the application of different analytical methods and inter-
pretative cycles.  
The papers are numbered from 1 to 6 in the order in which the papers were written to aid ref-
erencing in the discussion of findings. The progression of the papers also provides an indica-
tion of the research progress and the hermeneutic circle – which is described in section 4.4.5 
of chapter 4. Thus, the papers reveal how an understanding of the phenomenon of interest was 
refined and enhanced during the research. Chronologically, some of the concepts and pro-
cesses are carried over in their refined form. 
5.2 Identity Management in Africa; The Case of Ghana 
Paper 1 is based on a preliminary quasi statistical data collection collected during the early 
stages of the study, and analysis of existing literature. Using IdMS in Ghana as a case study, 
this paper examined the effects of perceived usefulness and ease of use on IdMS effectiveness 
and concluded that trust and privacy concern play major role in IdMS uses. The results also 
showed that citizens perceptions and experiences can unduly affect IDMS uses. During this 
initial phase, it also became apparent that user awareness of technology, institutional issues, 
trust and privacy concerns are major factors affecting identity management effectiveness. The 
paper also described at a conceptual level, what deliberations have to be taken into account to 
come up with appropriate compromises in the implementation of national identity manage-
ment systems. 
5.2.1 Research Objective & Methods 
This paper addressed my first research question as described in Section 1.3.2 in Chapter 1, 
under the phenomena of interest. The objective was to identify the key factors that determine 
the effectiveness of national identity management systems. The goal was to outline the critical 
factors that policy makers must consider in implementing an effective and efficient IDMS. 
The study was based on an extensive literature review, interviews and a quasi statistical sur-
vey about citizens' perceptions of identity management systems. 
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5.2.2 Research Findings 
An interesting finding was that majority of the respondents prefer that identity cards be issued 
to citizens free of charge as a means of universal coverage and forgery prevention. Respond-
ents also believed that their interest would be considered in deciding how identity data is used 
which is consistent with Davis’ (1989) suggestion that the design characteristics of a system 
exert immediate effects on perceived usefulness as well as indirect effects via perceived ease 
of use. However, a follow-up interviews of some of the respondents revealed an opposite re-
sults which is an indication that respondent did not adequately appreciate the survey ques-
tions. This outcome reinforced my resolve that, a qualitative research approach, using prob-
lem structuring methods will be the best approach to the study. 
5.2.3 Contributions 
This study contributes to IdMS research by enriching our understanding of the best approach 
to engage citizens regarding their perceptions on national IdMS. It also adds developing coun-
tries dimension to IDMS research. The study is also an important source of reference regard-
ing factors that affect citizen adoption of IDMS. It also shows that beside perceived useful-
ness and ease of use, institutional cooperation, and perceptions of trust and privacy concerns 
must be taken seriously. 
5.3 Analysis of Privacy Enhancing Identity Management Systems 
Following the results from the paper 1, this paper explored the literature on privacy, trust, 
contemporary initiatives in that regard, and how businesses use identity information. This 
study is an attempt to understand the relationship between individuals’ intentions to disclose 
personal information, their actual personal information disclosure behaviours, and how these 
can be leveraged in the development of privacy-enhancing identity management systems. 
Thus the concepts of privacy, trust, and the key regulatory and research initiatives on privacy 
enhancing IDMS were also explored specifically the Laws of Identity, the Fair information 
practice principles (FTC, 2000; Rotenberg, 2001; Schwaig, Kane, & Storey, 2006; Schwartz, 
2000) and the Privacy by Design principles (Cavoukian, 2012) and OECD Guidelines on pri-
vacy (OECD, 2002, 2011a). 
5.3.1 Research Objective & Methods 
The objective of this study is to understand the major design considerations for privacy-
enhancing IDMS and to contribute to an improved frameworks and identity management sys-
tems design principles. To achieve these set goals, the paper analysed the existing internation-
al privacy regulations and the proposed standards and best practices on trust and privacy. This 
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study draws extensively on literature, testing and demonstration of various IdMS applications 
as a means of gaining deeper insight into privacy enhancing IdMS.   
5.3.2 Findings 
The study unravelled the fact that identity management systems that facilitate anonymity and 
pseudonymity may offer better promise of privacy. Similarly, it was established that linking 
identities that do not share the same degree of anonymity, or that contain different sets of at-
tributes may allow others to overcome pseudonyms and discover the user’s identity. The 
analysis also revealed that, controlling linkability require the segregation of different contexts 
such that observers are unable to accumulate sensitive data.  
Moreover it was established that users' perceptions of privacy and trust must be taken serious-
ly in order to adequately derive benefits of identity management systems. Lastly, the study 
also highlights the need for more study on establishing trust in the physical world since the 
mechanisms of establishing trust in the physical world are not necessarily the same as those 
that are used online.  
5.3.3 Contributions 
This study provides important identity policy guidelines for practitioners and policy makers 
by highlighting the identity practices in data collection, use, and retention that can be left to 
market forces and those that should be the subject of government interventions. The study 
also contributes to the discussions on the best way of resolving the “Privacy Paradox” and the 
dilemma between privacy and identity assurance. This knowledge is very important for identi-
ty policy formulation since it has implications for institutional cooperation and citizens’ abil-
ity to exercise informational self determination. Thus this study also contributes to IdMS re-
search by adding to existing  knowledge of IdMS.  
5.3.2 Limitations 
 The key limitations of this study were that the study relied mainly only on secondary sources 
and also did not explore how the principles and technologies specically address privacy and 
trust issues. Subsequent studies such as papers 4 and 5 addressed these limitations. 
5.4. Keeping Identity Private 
This study is an attempt to understand the relationship between individuals’ intentions to dis-
close personal information, their actual personal information disclosure behaviours,  and how 
these can be leveraged to develop privacy-enhancing identity management systems that users 
can trust. Legal, regulatory and technological aspects of privacy and technology adoption are 
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also discussed. The study draws on three streams of literature, namely technology adoption, 
trust and privacy-enhancing IDMS. Thus this paper is a further improvement on paper 2. 
5.4.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this paper was to understand the major issues involved in the design of  pri-
vacy-enhancing IDMS and contribute to improved framework and design principles. This 
study is also important because it offered me the opportunity to summarize the literature that 
is available on privacy enhancing IDMS. This is consistent with the fundamental principle of 
all qualitative research approaches which is to explore meaning and develop understanding of 
the research topic (Aveyard, 2010). This conceptual paper addresses our first research ques-
tion. The paper  also based on the premise that designing a privacy-enhancing technology is 
not only a technological problem, but has theoretical, social, and regulatory dimensions must 
also be addressed. The research problem addressed in this paper is “what factors must be con-
sidered in designing privacy-enhancing IDMS that address both online and face-to-face iden-
tity management issues?” 
5.4.2 Methods 
This study also complements the previous study which focused on reviewing the central theo-
retical themes in privacy-enhancing IDMS, trust (Roger C. Mayer et al., 1995b) and citizens’ 
acceptance of IDMS Technology (Fred D. Davis, 1989). These conceptual understandings 
formed the basis of the analysis of key regulatory and research initiatives on privacy-
enhancing IDMS. This is a conceptual paper, therefore no empirical data were gathered but 
rather, also formed the basis for subsequent research as presented in subsequent studies. We 
thus identified the key concepts and propositions which were used to represent or describe 
(but not explain) the process of keeping identity private. In effect the propositions identified 
in the models are logical statements rather than epistemological relationships (Meredith, 
1993).  The paper begins with a review of the related literature and then based on the under-
standing of the literature, made recommendations on policies, technological and regulatory 
framework for keeping identity private. 
5.4.3 Research Findings 
The key regulatory and research initiatives on privacy-enhancing IDMS such as the Laws of 
Identity (K. Cameron & Jones, 2007), the FIP principles, and the PbD (Cavoukian & Carter, 
2006) principles were examined. The findings indicate that to ensure that national identity 
management systems are privacy enhancing, the systems must be useful, easy to use and must 
observe privacy and trust requirements. We also observed that adherence to such design prin-
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ciples and guidelines can contribute to resolving the privacy paradox (Norberg et al., 2007) 
and the dilemma between privacy and identity assurance (C. H. Lee & Cranage, 2011). An-
other observation made in this study is the fact that identity providers and policy makers un-
duly equate secrecy to  privacy and thus fail to address legitimate concerns of key stakehold-
ers in identity management. It was also observed that the underlining reason driving privacy-
enhancing IDMS is to enable the users to prove a predicate of their identity without giving 
third parties the opportunity to access unwarranted information. 
5.4.4 Contributions 
An interesting aspect of the study lies specifically in its contribution to theory developments 
in privacy-enhancing IDMS, and technology adoption in general. The study also contributes 
to the consolidation of the disparate and disjointed design principles and guidelines in order to 
empower users, protect their privacy, and support fine-grained control of access to resources 
online. By adding perceived privacy and trust as constructs in acceptance of IdMS, the study 
contributing to the ongoing discussion on effective ways of implementing privacy-enhancing 
IDMS. The paper also clarifies the role of the guidelines and regulatory framework on privacy 
enhancing IDMS. For instance, we offer key factors that need to be considered in the imple-
mentation of privacy-enhancing IDMS. This paper is an important contribution to research 
and the development of design guidelines for privacy-enhancing IDMS. 
5.5 Secondary Uses of Personal Identity Information: Policies, Technologies and 
Regulatory Framework 
This paper is based on the results of a stakeholder workshop and interviews in Ghana on sec-
ondary use of personal information. Although personal identity information must primarily be 
used for protecting and promoting the physical needs of individuals, it has also become cen-
tral to the business models of the digital age due to its use for other secondary purposes, re-
sulting in various innovative identity management (IdM) solutions in OECD countries. None-
theless, developing countries were still not able to address basic identification challenges such 
as civil registration, real-time credential verifications, etc.  
5.5.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this paper is to provide a means of communicating identity-related concepts 
to policy-makers, technologists, privacy advocates and users. The paper also addresses core 
issues relating to what constitutes personal identity information and user concerns in relation 
to secondary uses of information. The study proposes the adaptation and application of exist-
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ing IdM research and experiences from OECD countries to deal with issues involved in using 
personal information for secondary purposes in developing countries. 
5.5.2 Methods 
This paper adopted a qualitative methodological approach for data collection (Yin, 2008a, 
2011a) resulting in a review of literature on the state-of-art on identity management, privacy 
issues in secondary use of personal information. The primary data for this paper consists of 
responses of a series of interviews and a stakeholder workshop organised in Ghana. Interpre-
tative Phenomenological Analysis (J. A. Smith, 2004) approach was applied in the data analy-
sis due to its reliability with respect to audio-visual contents, which is very common in focus 
group and workshop discussions. A stakeholder workshop offered participants the opportunity 
to discuss a number of issues and listen to presentations highlighting issues concerning sec-
ondary uses of personal information. Ghana was selected as the research setting because the 
challenges faced by the economy with respect to identification and secondary uses of personal 
information are similar to those of other developing countries. Notable challenges include 
unreliable civil registration systems, electoral issues due to unreliable voters register, lack of 
identity management systems interoperability, etc.  
5.5.3 Research Findings 
 The discussions and interview responses revealed the need for a paradigm shift with respect 
to ownership and control of personal information. It was observed both from literature and the 
discussions and responses from the workshop and interviews that, individuals seek not just to 
assert the identity and privacy of their physical being, but an informational representation of 
the chain of their life events that define who they are. Thus a particular event of relevance 
depends on those with whom the individual is interacting which must lead to different enti-
tlements. In that regard, attention must be focused on access to and control of personal infor-
mation rather than data ownership.  
The workshop therefore recommended focus on data access, control policies and practices as 
the best approaches to risk management and mitigation for illegitimate secondary uses of per-
sonal information. Another interesting finding that emerged from the discussions and the re-
sponses is a lack of understanding and inability to differentiate privacy from secrecy; and 
secondly, inadequacy of safeguarding procedures that address user concerns in relation to 
secondary uses of personal information. In essence, citizens would like to be able to assert 
their identity with ease and confidence and hence they need such assurances (Crosby, 2008a). 
The workshop also observed that lack of clear regulations on secondary uses of personal in-
formation could result in the erosion of public trust. 
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5.5.4 Contributions  
Central to effective uses of personal information is an efficient civic registration system, a 
regulatory framework that encourages institutional collaboration, clear policies and guidelines 
that provide assurance of citizens' privacy and cost effective application identity management 
systems. This is what the paper attempted to highlight by using the stakeholder approach and 
is considered its major achievement. Moreover, the use of the stakeholder workshop was as 
an attempt to bring together users and researchers, public and private sector organizations. It 
is a key methodological contribution and also a response to (F. Bélanger & Crossler, 2011) 
call for closer collaboration between researchers, developers and users to ensure effective 
uses of privacy enhancing identity management systems. 
The study has also helped to raise awareness of current technological developments in IdMS 
and how developing countries can adapt and apply some of the relevant principles. The study 
has also shown that the application of  digital identity management is a process, rather than a 
state. Thus, the integrity of the process hinges on: how reliable were the initial processes of 
registration, verification and enrollment, and how hard is it to duplicate or alter the credentials 
used? (Wilton, 2008a).  
5.5.5 Limitations  
Like many qualitative research methodologies a key limitation of our study is its lack of em-
pirical testing of the claims compared to quantitative research. Also given that certain societal 
dynamics are peculiar to different countries, care must be taken in generalizing the findings 
from our study to other countries. However some of the limitations are ameliorated by the 
extensive review of related literature.   
5.6 Building Trusted National Identity Management Systems – Presenting Privacy-
Concern Trust Curve 
This paper discusses the effect of trust and information privacy concerns on citizens’ attitude 
towards national identity management systems. It also introduces the privacy-concerns-trust 
model, which highlights the role of trust in mediating and moderating citizens’ attitude to-
wards identity management systems.  
5.6.1 Research Objective 
The objective of the study is to explain to identity policy makers and other key stakeholders 
the requirement for achieving the trust threshold. It also shows how stakeholders information 
privacy concerns regarding the collection, storage, use, and transmission of personal identity 
information (Bennett & Raab, 2003a), should be addressed to ensure trusted identities. This 
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study also draws on literature on trusted identity initiative by the government of the United 
States (Grant, 2011b). 
5.6.2 Methods 
This study entailed two main phases – an exploratory phase, which saw the development of 
the model based on literature, and a qualitative based confirmatory phase, which was used to 
evaluate the model. The conceptual model on the basis of theoretical considerations is part of 
an on-going research project that seeks to present a reliable and valid instrument for measur-
ing trusted identities ecosystem. The exploratory phase of the study was organized in line 
with two-step approach for operationalizing constructs and identifying measures (Burton-
Jones & Straub, 2006). Due to the multi-stakeholder nature of trusted national identities, we 
decided to adopt a research approach that engages the key actors and hence a qualitative 
methodological approach was deemed the most appropriate means for data collection from a 
societal perspective (Creswell, 2007a; Yin, 2011b). We also applied interpretative phenome-
nological analysis (J. A. Smith, 2004) in data analysis because of its usefulness in understand-
ing the experiences of individuals. 
5.6.3 Research Findings 
The findings indicate that, beyond the threshold level of trust, societal information privacy 
concern is low; and trust is high, thereby encouraging further institutional collaboration and 
acceptance of citizens’ informational self-determination.  
Trust is what moderates and mediates citizens’ privacy concerns and citizens attitudes to-
wards IdMS. Thus, individuals are likely to engage in transactions, if their level of trust ex-
ceeds their personal privacy concern threshold, which is reached, when the potential benefits 
outweigh the risks. This threshold will always depend on the type of transaction and the 
amount of identifiable information revealed. For instance, transactions requiring the revela-
tion of other attribute data (Wilton, 2008a) might require a lower trust threshold. Figure 35 
Privacy concern Trust Model illustrates this point.  
Thus, when positive steps (i.e., data minimisation) are taken to improve the IdMS, the moder-
ating effect of trust will cause citizens to revise their attitude towards the IdMS, leading to 
more trust in the credential issuers and the technology and thereby moving threshold down-
wards, and to the right on the trust curve. Similarly, any negative actions on the part of cre-
dential issuers will increase the privacy concern, thereby causing a move upwards and to the 
left of the privacy trust curve.  
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The study also observed the  need to move away from an undue focus on credentials towards 
unique identification. This is due to the fact that credential usually encapsulates attributes and 
entitlements and thus the tendency to equate such documents as representing the identity of a 
person when in fact they might not be representing a given context or might reveal more in-
formation than necessary.  
5.6.4 Contributions 
The key contribution of the study is the development of the privacy concern-trust curve which 
clearly demonstrate the two steps towards establishment of a trusted identity framework. 
Identity relationships usually begin with a low level of trust and a high level of privacy con-
cerns. Once the the initial problems are identified and addressed, it is possible to pass a 
threshold level of trust, thereby reducing privacy concerns and paving the way for business 
and interaction. This is the point at which societal trust in Identity service providers is high 
enough to encourage institutional collaboration (Shirish C. Srivastava & Teo, 2005; Teo e al., 
2008), and citizens’ informational self-determination (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989b). We 
also highlight the need for policy makers to categorise personal information in a way that will 
encourage secondary uses of personal information whilst ensuring that sensitive personal in-
formation is released only to legitimate users. 
5.6.5 Limitations  
This study focused mainly on citizens’ attitudes towards identification systems in Ghana and 
that poses a number of issues in terms of its generalizability that will need to be tested. For 
instance, there are peculiar dynamics pertaining to every country and for that matter, the in-
ferences drawn might not be representative for all countries. Moreover, the use of a qualita-
tive research approach also gives room for inferences that are not tested empirically, as is the 
case of quantitative research. In the future, it will be interesting to examine quantitatively the 
relationship between trust and privacy concerns in relation to citizens’ attitudes towards iden-
tity management systems. 
5.7 Towards Trusted National Identities Framework 
The study is an attempt to integrate some of the previous findings as a means of proposing 
guidelines for establishing trust in an identity ecosystem. The paper discusses the key con-
cepts of trust, personal information uses and information privacy. A model of trusted identity 
framework is introduced in this paper.  
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5.7.1 Research Objective and Methods 
The study examined the key requirements for crafting a trusted identities ecosystem by adapt-
ing DeLone and McLean information systems (IS) success model (Petter et al., 2008, 2012; 
Urbach & Müller, 2012). Due to the multi-stakeholder nature of national identity manage-
ment, the study adopts a research approach that engages the key actors and hence a qualitative 
methodological approach was deemed the most appropriate means for data collection (Cre-
swell, 2007a; Yin, 2011b). The study is based on results from two stakeholder workshops in 
Ghana, focus group discussions and a series of interviews.  
5.7.2 Research Findings 
This paper mainly presented a reconstructed subset of the research themes that were explored 
during the stakeholder workshop, focus group discussions and the interviews (E. Whitley & 
Kanellopoulou, 2010a). Participants’ accounts of their experiences and impressions clustered 
around the following key thematic areas: Empowerment, system quality, institutional cooper-
ation, quality of service and information quality. For instance, a lack of user involvement or 
awareness usually affects the opinions and perceptions of a system (F. D. Davis et al., 1989).  
Another interesting finding of the study is that for IdMS to be effective, there is the need for 
institutional cooperation and user empowerment.  Moreover, the success must be redefined 
with respect to IdMS since many of government issued credentials are coercive in nature and 
thus ‘use’ might not be a good measure of IdMS success. 
5.7.3 Contributions  
This study has shown that to ensure trusted identities, each stakeholder must be able to au-
thenticate and verify identities on common terms and understanding. Thus, it is not enough to 
focus on system quality but also institutional cooperation and interoperability with respect to 
technology, legal framework and standards on the supply side. On the demand side, there is 
the need for user empowerment in addition to service and information quality.  
The study has also shown that any attempt to ensure institutional cooperation and collabora-
tion have the effect of enriching the trust within the identity ecosystem. In effect, through a 
collaborative effort and societal empowerment, it is possible to realise trusted identities, 
which have the effect of pushing the relationship between trust and privacy concern. This is 
an interesting contribution to IdMS research, and identity policy formulation. 
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5.7.4 Limitations  
The major limitation of the paper lies in the fact that the relationshipship between trust and 
privacy concern as presented in the privacy concern – trust curve is not tested empirically 
using quantitative methods. 
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Chapter 6 Discussions 
This chapter re-examines and expound on the findings in Chapter 5 by piecing the major 
themes together in the light of the research objectives in Chapter 1, context and theoretical 
framework in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively and the research methodology in Chapter 4. The 
overarching goal of this exercise is to highlight the key factors that affect the effectiveness of 
IdMS and to propose guidelines for ensuring trusted identity ecosystem. Exposition of the 
emerged themes thus helps in focusing on those outcomes from the study which specifically 
impact on IDMS effectiveness or complement the creation of guidelines for a trusted identity 
ecosystem.  
6.1. Emerging Themes 
The findings from the various sources of evidence projects the major factors that affect the 
IDMS effectiveness, a prerequisite for the trusted identity ecosystem. These include; a strong 
emphasis on stakeholder involvement, effective civil registration systems, which is an im-
portant basis for identity formation and thus a focus on identity and not credentials; system 
and information quality, service quality and adherence to standards, regulatory and interoper-
ability framework. These emerging themes are depicted in Figure 31. Subsequent sections of 
this chapter elaborates on the themes and how they impact on IdMS effectiveness or how they 
contribute to trusted identity ecosystem. 
 
 
Figure 31   Emerging Themes. 
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6.1.1. Trusted Identity Framework 
These important teams were used to develop the trusted identity framework as depicted in 
Figure 32. Beyond system quality, information quality, which has been extensively explained 
in the literature and in Chapter 3, Institutional cooperation, user involvement and empower-
ment, perceptions on information privacy and trust are the key requirements for a trusted 
identity ecosystem. This will also ensure that identity can be verified with a high degree of 
certainty so that business transactions and social interactions could be completed both online 
and face-to-face with high a degree of confidence. 
Figure 32 illustrates the relationships between the major factors that must be observed in de-
fining  a trusted identity framework. The figure is an adaptation of the updated DeLone and 
McLean’s IS success model described in Chapter 3.  Thus institutional cooperation, system 
quality and information are key factors that influence trustworthiness. Similarly, user empow-
erment, and service quality influence perception of privacy, since they have direct impact on 
user consent and control, minimum disclosure, etc. Thus information quality has a direct im-
pact on both trust and privacy. The moderation and mediation effect of trust can either posi-
tively or negatively affect user concerns depending on the level of trust as illustrated in Figure 
35.  
 
 
Figure 32 Trusted Identities Framework. 
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6.1.2 Stakeholder involvement  
The absence of stakeholder involvement in identity policy formulation leads to a certain lack 
of trust in institutions. Key stakeholder participation in identity policy formulation could be 
very instrumental in courting users‘ trust and the effectiveness of the identity policy. Such 
user involvements also provide a means for users to provide important feedback on certain 
decisions and actions of the identity providers by enabling transfer of trust amongst them 
(Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). The remarks of a focus group participants and respondents in an 
interview do highlight the importance of such involvement:  
“I feel that I have contributed to the identity policy, If my suggestions are implemented. Un-
fortunately, what they tell us at the beginning is usually different from what the identity pro-
viders give to citizens. For instance, during the voter registration, we thought we were going 
to receive an innovative voter ID cards but we ended up receiving a laminated card which can 
easily be copied”. “We were told by the EC that a biometric voting system is being intro-
duced, in the end, the head of the EC said the voting system remains manual and biometric 
verification was only to complement the manual system”. “Even if I have any feedback, i do 
not know how to inform them”. 
In view of such remarks, there is the need for the utilisation of effective channels of taking 
constructive and positive feedback. By informing key stakeholders about their actions, identi-
ty providers can reinforce citizens’ trust in such institutions. A possible means of getting user 
involvement is a dedicated feedback unit or Web site to track and respond to identity related 
concerns and to inform citizens of latest developments. This scheme could be very instrumen-
tal in engendering citizens’ trust identity and service providers. 
Generally, citizens might perceive identity policies as complex, confusing and too technical 
and thus additional considerations includes:  
• Greater transparency in the enrolment processes and the transfer processes for identity 
data are key issues to enabling them to make informed choices. 
• Public education and awareness programs can help consumers and citizens manage 
their digital identities appropriately.  
• Defining accountability and transparency measures across multiple services in diverse 
legal and technical regimes is an important issue in user empowerment.  
6.1.3 Interoperability  
A major issue that emerged from the finding of papers 3 is the requirement for interoperable 
IDMS policies and standards. This was noted during the two workshops, focus group discus-
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sions and interview responses. The following remarks typified such frustration; “Why can’t I 
present my drivers’ license as proof of identity for voting in an election, if I misplace my voter 
ID card; and why can’t I present my voter ID as proof of my qualification to drive, if the po-
lice stops me whilst driving?. In any case, all these documents bear my name and other de-
tails and I have not travelled outside the country”.  
The policy, legal, business process and technical implication of an interoperability framework 
includes: 
- Policy level: The challenge for organisations will be for each key actor being able to 
articulate a clear set of IdM policies containing a common set of elements which high-
light areas of compatibility and disparity. 
- Legal level: Compatible internal and international regulations and compliance obliga-
tions across organisations will facilitate legal interoperability.  The legal issues also 
include the need to address major contractual obligations. 
- Technical level: The challenge is to encourage the development and use of all types of 
standards, in the broadest senses, without stifling competition or undermining innova-
tion. 
- Business process level: Issues also arise at the business process level, where progress 
towards the adoption by organisations of common methods for IdMS to communicate 
with each other may need to be considered. 
In many developing countries, the interoperability policies have been formulated and what is 
necessary is their enforcement. 
6.1.4. Ensuring Privacy  
The information in an IdMS is mainly comprises of personal information and thus any lapses 
or insufficient privacy and data security controls in the use of the system could lead to ad-
verse consequences for data subjects, whereas effective deployment of the IdMS could play a 
privacy protective role, particularly in the context of social interactions. It is therefore impera-
tive that privacy considerations are made with respect to data collection, data usage and stor-
age, data minimisation, anonymity, pseudonymity. Moreover, users must be aware of the ex-
tent to which they can exercise control over how their personal data is used and how to exer-
cise such controls. Some of the important information privacy issues include:  
- The potentially unlimited lifespan of digital identity information and the declining 
costs of storage and processing raise issues regarding long-term assurances of safe 
storage and appropriate usage, and highlight the value of eliminating identity-related 
personal information when it is no longer needed.  
Page | 113 
- There is a risk that the greater availability of credentials from high-level assurance 
systems could increase their use in systems with lower-level assurance needs. This 
could increase the risk to personal data.  
- Linking identities that do not share the same degree of anonymity, or that contain dif-
ferent sets of attributes may allow others to overcome pseudonyms and discover the 
user’s identity.  
- Differences may arise as to which practices of identity and other data collection, use, 
and retention can be left to market forces and those that should be the subject of gov-
ernment intervention. 
To address such issues, it is important to implement identity policies that facilitate anonymity 
and pseudonymity depending on the context. Clear policies must also be implemented to ad-
dress issues regarding who has the right to decide which data should be disclosed and the cir-
cumstances under which it might be encrypted. This is particularly important to the exercise 
of informational self-determination. 
6.1.5 Trust in Institutions 
Trust in institutions emerged as a vital element for adoption and usage of any government 
initiatives since it is based on cognitive processes that tend to discriminate trustworthy institu-
tions from others (J. D. Lewis & Weigert, 1985). A remark by one of the respondents below 
reflects the general feelings of citizens: 
“If the systems were to be run by qualified personnel, identity abuses like forged passports 
and driving licenses will be minimised. The appointment of many of the key decision makers 
in these organizations is based on factors other than qualification and experience. We only use 
it because we have no option for an alternative”. 
Such statements clearly show a lack of trust in the institutions which issue credentials due to 
the perception that personnel handling the credentials are unqualified and inefficient. Trust in 
the institutions is also dependent on citizens’ previous experiences with policy enforcement as 
recounted by another respondent; 
“My brother sent me to withdraw foreign currency remittance from abroad, when I got to the 
bank the following day, I was told I had already collected the money. When I insisted that I 
had not been to the bank, I was shown a voter identity card bearing my name except the pic-
ture was different. I was advised to go to the electoral commission for redress instead. It 
turned out that the other card was forged and the bank had no means of verifying. So at the 
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moment I do not trust the voter’s ID card or any other credential for that matter since they can 
easily be forged”.  
This obviously implies a lack of confidence in identity service providers. Citizens trusting 
behavior in the identity and service providers usually stems from previous experiences, 
knowledge and exchanges. Such interactions give citizens the opportunity to access the com-
petences, benevolence, and integrity of identity providers which are the key measures of 
trustworthiness (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995). These points are clearly illustrated in a citizen’s 
account ot his experiences at the premises of one of the credential issuers; 
 
Where identity providers demonstrate technical knowledge and ability in successful imple-
mentation of IdMS, it increases the level of citizen’s trust (S. C. Srivastava & Teo, 2009). 
Similarly, trust increases, if citizens have positive perception of identity providers’ ability, 
intergrity and benevolence by acting in honesty and in the interest of the citizens. Thus so 
long as perceived government manipulation, and abuse of authority persist, lack of citizens’ 
trust in identity providers will continue. In the above encounter, the ending of the stody shows 
a frustrated citizens in shown below; 
Figure 33 My Experience at NIA Office: Source http://vibeghana.com/2012/09/03/.  
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Thus, identity providers must take steps to shed away such negative perceptions. For instance, 
the introduction of biometric voter identity verification system in the 2012 election Ghana 
resulted in two days of voting and several accusations of system manipulation. Such inci-
dences have the propensity to diminish the trust that citizens have in the identity provider.   
6.1.6 Focus on Identity and not Credentials 
The processes of citizens identity formation and how individuals are enrolled into identity 
policies affect the effective of the resulting identity management systems. Thus, where there 
are weakness in the identity formation and enrolment processes, the reliability of the resulting 
source documents (i.e. birth certificates) and the issued credentials and the IDMS become 
questionable. This is reflected in a concern shared by a workshop participant during a ques-
tion and answer session; 
“Many of people are not issued with birth certificates at birth and even for those 
who the information might not be in a reliable database. Individuals have to apply 
for such documents when they are already old or when it suits them resulting in the 
use of wrong or incurroct location and data-of-births. “If I am in doubt of the va-
lidity of the source document or can’t verify its authenticity, why will I trust the 
agencies to operate in my interest?”.  
A common misunderstanding on the part of credential issuers and policy makers which be-
came apparent during the workshop was the equation of strong credentials to effective IdMS. 
Thus more resources are invested in the technology and not how to ensure the reliability of 
the information and to make it available to citizens. The following statements coming from 
credential issuers were common during the workshop and focus group “we have introduced 
biometric based ID cards that are difficult to forge”.  
Source: http://vibeghana.com/2012/09/03/.  
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A distinct feature of a credential is that it encapsulates attributes and entitlements in a reliably 
verifiable form. There is therefore the tendency to equate such documents as representing the 
identity of a person when in fact they might not be represented in a given context. For in-
stance, passports and driving licenses have historically been presented as foolproof docu-
ments loaded with the necessary information that can enable the holder to access services and 
for authentication purposes. This is not without drawbacks, since it is susceptible to revealing 
more information about the holder than is necessary in any given authentication context. Us-
ing a passport for proof of age will no doubt reveal the passport holder’s name, place of birth 
and citizenship, and a driver’s license used for similar purpose can also reveal your date of 
birth and address.  
There is, therefore, the need to move away from credentials towards unique identification. 
Error! Reference source not found. provide a framework for addressing such concern using 
the model of identity which categorises personal information into three interrelated dimen-
sions. A credential such as a passport or driving license typically includes some attributes in 
each of the three aspects of identity – the basic idenitifier set (BIS), personally identifiable 
information (PII) such as height, eye colour; and any sector-specific data such as entitlement 
to drive specific classes of vehicle, or visas indicating entitlement to enter a specific country. 
A focus on identity will also make it easier to enforce policies appropriate to the data in ques-
tion, particularly when different sector-specific data items entail different policy controls. For 
instance, entitlement to drive a vehicle may not be part of major privacy concern, whereas 
credit status will, hence data security policies could be segregated to address such data. On 
the other hand, since healthcare history and medical conditions are very sensitive, a different 
set of policies must apply, segregating identity data into sector-specific segments in order to 
cater for discrete management policies by sector and data type. Thus, within a given data 
segment, assertions of identity (‘the holder of this credential is XX’) may make one kind of 
data security policy appropriate, while assertions of other attributes may require quite differ-
ent policy treatment. 
 
Figure 34 A Model of Identity. 
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6.2 Requirements for Trusted Identity Ecosystem 
Trust is what moderates and mediates citizens’ privacy concerns and attitudes towards IdMS. 
Thus, individuals are likely to engage in transactions, if their level of trust exceeds their per-
sonal privacy concern threshold, which is reached, when the potential benefits outweigh the 
risks. This threshold will always depend on the type of transaction and the amount of identifi-
able information revealed. For instance, transactions requiring the revelation of other attribute 
data (Error! Reference source not found.) might require a lower trust threshold.  
Thus, when positive steps (i.e., data minimisation) are taken to improve the IdMS, the moder-
ating effect of trust will cause citizens to revise their attitude towards the IdMS, leading to 
more trust in the credential issuers and the technology and thereby moving down and to the 
right on the trust threshold.  
 
Similarly, any negative actions on the part of credential issuers will result in a diminishing 
level of trust, thus, increasing citizens’ concern and thereby causing a move upwards and to 
the left of the privacy-concern-trust curve. The trusted identity framework in the United 
States, where the interest of all stakeholders in the identity ecosystems is taken into account, 
is a clear step taken by the US government to increase trust (Bertino, 2012; Grant, 2011b).  
Trusted identity ecosystems also depend on the availability of choice to citizens. In a recent 
European survey; around two-thirds of Europeans use credit cards and bank cards. When 
respondents were asked which type credentials they use, 74% of respondents use credit cards 
and bank cards (74%), and about two-thirds use national identity cards or residence permits 
(68%), government entitlement cards (65%), or driving license (63%). This is a clear indica-
 
Figure 35 Privacy concern Trust Model. 
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tion of user confidence in financial institutions as shown in Figure 36 below. It also shows the 
diminishing importance of certain credentials in a day to day transaction.  
 
 
Figure 36 Major Credentials Used in the European Union  (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Further Studies  
This research was conducted in a space of three years . In this period of time, I have engaged 
in a number of discourses with industry practitioners as well as academicians and I have also 
read a substantial body of literature. Trusted identity framework and privacy-concern-trust 
curve are products of all these interactions.  
While I have worked towards contributing to theory and practice, I also acknowledge the fact 
that attempting to encompass all the issues and all the relationships in the domain of identity 
management will be a project in futility. Thus, as posited by Feyerabend (1993:39) "we may 
start by pointing out that no single theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. 
Therefore I do not suggest that my findings are the only answers to the research questions that 
I set out to answer, since there could be alternative views upon which trusted IDMS is based. 
Similarly, there could be other contextual factors that I might have ignored which is a matter 
of further research to develop, extend or disprove the claims presented in this thesis. Hence, 
within the context of reliability of the research approach, verifying and confirming the re-
search outcomes, I can conclude that what I have presented are the competent and useful an-
swers to the research questions at this point in time. 
The concepts of identity and digital identity are central to contemporary business transactions 
and social interactions. The criticality of such a phenomenon emanates from identity service 
providers’ utilitarian attitude towards issues of security,  privacy and trust. Thus, IDMS de-
velopers and identity service providers especially those in developing countries have the ten-
dency of addressing privacy and trust issues from the perspectives of ease, personal data col-
lection and usage, whilst dealing with information privacy the same way official secrecy is 
treated. The result therefore is the equation of secrecy to privacy although identity issues 
transcend data collection and storage. 
Identity policy makers and IdMS developers must therefore take steps back from focusing on 
credentials towards identity itself and the underlying relationships that are present in the iden-
tity eco-system. Thus, the  need to also consider the context within which the IdMS and iden-
tity policies are implemented, and to analyse the impact of identity policies on the  lived expe-
riences of data subjects (Rahaman & Sasse, 2010).  
This dissertation has charted both historical and phenomenological paths to research and ad-
dresses such requirements in the formation of trust in identity policies regarding identity for-
mation and identity management systems. It also highlights the factors needed to be taken into 
consideration in meeting the trust threshold. 
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A multi-method qualitative research approach was employed to understand these factors. The 
insights from the research are in this concluding section captured as crafting a trusted citizen-
centered identity policy.  
7.1 Crafting a Trusted Identity Policy 
The research questions 1, 2 and 3 sought answers about the major factors that contribute to 
trusted IDMS that is privacy enhancing. The research findings suggested that contrary to the 
assumptions that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are the major determinants to 
IS effectiveness, rather it is the perceptions of trust and privacy that form  the major  determi-
nants. Thus, user empowerment and institutional collaborations were major determinants of 
the effectiveness of such systems. The proposal for user empowerment is also grounded in 
OECD privacy guidelines regarding user control and consent principles, thus implying its 
significance to the effective uses of IDMS. User experiences and exposure to technologies 
(especially the Internet, credit card uses) and cues in social surroundings minimises the risk of 
abuses of personal identity information.  
The solutions to the research questions thus underscore the need for a critical analysis of the 
artifact and context of the study (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). In other words, the specificities 
of artifacts and the process of their shaping need to be reflected in our conceptualizations and 
in the theoretical and methodological apparatus applied to generate theory. This is very im-
portant in ideas and answers to key issues which had hitherto stymied effective uses of IDMS. 
The study has also opened an array of channels which allow the flow of future research on 
trusted identity management systems. The privacy concern trust model and the trusted identiy 
framework are novel ideas that give policy makers a better understanding of steps that must 
be taken to ensure effective uses of IDMS. Despite the numerous research initiatives on iden-
tity management in general and user centricity in particular, the concepts of trust and privacy 
remain a dilemma, not just for users and service providers but for all stakeholders in the iden-
tity ecosystem. It seems there is a continued surge in proposed solutions that coarsely address 
user requirements and then leaving out the fine-grained aspects of identity management which 
is what will trigger an effective identity ecosystem.  
Addressing such fine-grain issues required a multi-stakeholder approach using qualitative 
research methods to research which is what this study sought to achieve. This is not with-
standing the fact that the study could have equally been approached objectively using quanti-
tative research approach. However, such an approach would have ignored certain tacit infor-
mation that can only be extracted from the minds of people who are engaged in conversation. 
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Thus, such complexities in a phenomenon having multi-actor perspective required the in-
volvement of the key actors in the decision making process and the analysis of the phenomena 
in the context (Lee, 2001).  
It is my hope that this pursuit as outlined in the thesis and culminating in the development of 
the  privacy concern trust framework contributes to extending human understanding of the 
phenomena. 
Another important strength of this research lies in the application of stakeholder approach and 
the adaptation of D&M IS success model to examine IS effectiveness and bringing OECD 
countries’ perspectives to bear on identity policies in developing countries. The study also 
highlights key aspects of identity policies that seem to be disregarded in IDMS research.  
Thus the study has offered a means of communicating key design principles and guidelines to 
IdMS developers and policy makers using diverse data collection and analysis, in an attempt 
to demonstrate how such issues associated with personal information are not to be taken for 
granted. The findings from the study highlights the urgency that is required to be applied in 
indentity policies. Interesting developing countries stand to lose the most if such remedial 
actions are not taken to avert the fundamental issues in identity policies which have culminat-
ed to the fragmented nature of IdMS. For instance the year 2012 biometric based voter regis-
tration exercise in Ghana cost $82,326,497.00 as compared to $12,437,000.00 in the year 
2004, indicating an astronomical percentage increase of about 562%. In contrast to a country 
like Denmark, where there is a relatively reliable civil registration system, such expenditure is 
avoidable, since the electoral register is usually generated from the CRS. Ironically, the high 
enrolment cost in Ghana has also not improved trust in the system as it is exemplified in the 
outcome of 2012 presidential elections in which for the first time in the country’s history, the 
validity of the results declared is being challenged at the supreme court be some of the key 
stakeholders. 
The adaptation of the IS success model to the phenomenon of the trusted identity manage-
ment system,  in addition to adding to existing sequence of IS literature, has also brought to 
the fore, context specific issues in developing countries  to understand their extent of influ-
ence especially in a substitution instead of complementary environment. 
During the workshops and focus group discussion, a discovery was made to the fact that users 
appreciate the benefits of legitimate secondary uses of personal information and rather,  the 
challenge to effective uses of personal information arises from policy makers and identity 
providers’ attitude to such information, by treating the privacy as part of official secrecy.  
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It seems to me that researchers and developers implicitly assume that sometimes all users 
have attained a certain level of literacy and exposure to appreciate the supposed patch-work 
meant to plug the gaping gap created by the lack of an identity layer on the Internet. Such a 
presumption is seen in many of the prescriptions such as the laws of identity (Kim Cameron, 
2005), and OECD privacy guidelines (OECD, 2011a). Such attitudes if not checked will con-
tinue to discredit the relevance of the resulting technologies in developing countries, although 
the alarming growth in digital IdM technology in these sub-regions provide a great market 
potential. 
Another interesting aspect of this study is the advocating of a move away from undue focus 
on physical verification of credentials towards Internet and mobile applications using identity 
data for authentication purposes. This move will open up several opportunities for application 
developers to develop cutting-edge solutions for businesses since successful secondary uses 
of personal information have the tendency to improve trust in the identity ecosystem. 
Finally, the mechanisms of establishing trust in the physical world are not necessarily the 
same as those that are used in the digital world online. However, since physical identity cre-
dentials are used in both worlds, there is the need for more work on linking usage in order to 
achieve more human integration. It is thus concluded that researchers should develop identity 
management systems that ensure that users can feel comfortable consuming services in the 
physical and digital worlds (J. K. Adjei & Olesen, 2011). Thus  individuals seek to assert  not 
their physical being as such, but rather an informational representation of the chain of life 
events that is defined by who they are. 
7.2 Implications for Practitioners and Scholars 
BCG estimates that two-thirds of the potential digital identity value – or about €440 billion in 
2020 alone , is at risk if stakeholders fail to establish a trusted flow of personal data. Identity 
policy makers, identity providers, service providers, identity and security technology driven 
organizations represent the audience who stands in good stead to benefit from the findings 
and contributions of this study. Thus it should remind identity policy makers and identity pro-
viders that for a national IDMS to be effective, measures must be taken to ensure the attain-
ment of at least, the trust threshold. The minimum level of trust required for institutional col-
laboration, IDMS interoperability, user involvement and legitimate secondary uses and com-
mercialisation of  personal information.  
Also, designers and policy makers must take context specific issues into consideration and 
thus, offer citizens' IdMS that address their basic transactional and interaction needs which is 
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their day-to-day “lived” experiences and social practices (Rahaman & Sasse, 2010). More 
specifically, it is observed that countries with strong civil registration systems in the long run 
benefit more from identity policies and comparatively spend less in addressing identity issues 
in interpersonal communication. 
7.3 Further Studies and Limitations  
Research in this area could be advanced by looking at developing a model for mapping insti-
tutions’ trust threshold levels. Such a study will be very useful in finding out a particular or-
ganisation’s trust threshold and the measurement of institutional progress with respect to trust 
that users have in them and the IdMS. A key proposal in this study is the need to strengthen 
the civil registration system as a key measure in ensuring effective and trusted identity eco-
system. A study that evaluates the impact of CRS post implementation on trusted identity 
ecosystem will also be a very interesting contribution to citizen centric IDMS research and 
practice.  
Further analysis of the demographic major factors and in the use of IdMS may increase our 
understanding of the policies required to cater for such specifics. For example, how does the 
privacy practices of women differ from  men and how does the privacy practices of adult dif-
fer from the youth. This exercise is not static and as such my  future endeavour will be, an 
attempt to address such requirements using the rich data and insight acquired during the 
study. 
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Abstract  
Several variations of Identity Management Systems are being implemented as an attempt to, 
curtail incidences of crime and abuse of privacy, and to give citizens easy and seamless ac-
cess to services. Despite the numerous perceived benefits, a number of challenges hinder suc-
cessful implementations and adoption in Africa. Using concepts of technology adoption and 
fit-viability theory, this paper examines the critical factors affecting Identity Management 
Systems adoption. A framework for IdMS implementation and successful adoption is devel-
oped based on the underpinning theories and validated with findings from a survey conducted 
in Ghana. The proposed conceptual framework would allow organizations and policy makers 
to determine the critical factors to be considered in future implementation of an identity man-
agement system. 
1 Introduction 
Identity management projects have lately become a major issue capturing media attention and 
driving how governments interact with citizens, business operations and processes. The ar-
guments by governments for Identity Management systems (IdMS) implementations have 
generally been to ensure high levels of security, efficiency, cost-effective provision of ser-
vices, promotion of commercial activity, and ensuring the rights of citizens to informational 
self determination (Beynon-Davies, 2007). The development of IdMS that is capable of 
achieving these goals can be a very complex process and will require the cooperation of a 
number of stakeholders (Aichhlozer & Strauß, 2009). In their paper on understanding com-
plex innovation, Aichhlozer & Strauß, (2009) argue that critical security and privacy systems 
architecture can be very challenging. This issue presents dilemma to policy makers leading to 
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their preoccupation with technological features of the systems at the expense of analyzing the 
wider societal implications of the systems implementation (Lips et al, 2009), (Aichholzer & 
Strauß, 2009).  
In spite of the numerous literature on  IdMS implementation, there is a dearth of literature on 
factors affecting IdMS implementation and adoption from developing countries’ perspective. 
Using a survey conducted in Ghana, we analyze key factors affecting implementations and 
from which a conceptual framework is developed for future implementations of National 
IdMS. The subsequent section discusses technological development in Africa and IdMS initi-
atives in Ghana. Section three discusses the research methodology and brief description of 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and Fit Viability Theory as used in this paper. In sec-
tion four,  we propose a framework for implementing IdMS from developing countries’ per-
spective  and description of the survey in Ghana ending with a discusion of the survey results. 
In section five we present our conclusions and recommendations for IdMS implementation 
and adoption. 
2 Technological Development in Africa 
Many African countries are technologically lagging behind. This has been attributed to sever-
al years of primitive cultural practices, bad governance, chaotic climatic conditions, poverty 
and illiteracy. Historically, natural disasters, landmark events and tribal body marks have 
been used as means of identification and reference points. These practices, which in the past 
served their purposes, have in these last days of rapid technological development proved very 
slow and unreliable, leading to improper forms of identification and authentication, and incor-
rect demographic statistics. In Botswana, the findings of (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009) indicated 
that biometrics usage is at its infancy despite the fact that industries may be aware of its abil-
ity to strengthen security and productivity.  The emergence of mobile phones and the tremen-
dous growth in cellular networks have made instant and reliable communication a reality in 
Africa. Cell phone subscription in Africa rose from 54 million in 2003 to 350 million in 2008 
with a forecast average cell phone penetration of 80% by 2012. In Ghana, 80% has already 
been achieved (GBN, 2010), (Comninos et al, 2008). This growth is driving a gradual shift in 
Africa towards implementation of various  biometrics based identity management and elec-
tronic payment systems. Throughout Africa, governments are moving towards various nation-
al identity management programs with the enactment of laws. In Ghana, for instance, these 
include the payment systems Act (ACT662) and National Identification Act (ACT 707), 
(NIA, 2010). The technological development has however, not come without challenges since 
there are several accounts of identity frauds. For instance, in Ghana, policy makers, security 
agencies and the private sector are bedevilled with a particular type of cybercrime popularly 
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known in Ghanaian parlance as “sakawa”. 419 cybercrimes have already become an interna-
tional issue in Nigeria (USDoS, 1997). 
 
2.1  Identity & Identity Management Systems 
Identity has several dimensions. Psychological identity is the distinguishing characteristics of 
an individual, whilst social identity refers to the positive self-concept of individuals such as 
organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender and age group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1985). In information systems, identity consists of traits, attributes, and preferences, by which 
one may receive personalized services either online, on mobile devices, at work, or in many 
other places (Liberty, 2004). Identity consists of both physical and digital identity. In 
(Bhargav-Spantzel, Camenisch, Gross, & Sommer, 2007) digital identity may be any kind of 
characteristics associated to an individual and may take the form of user logins, identity at-
tributes (eye colour, date of birth, etc.) and identifiers (account number, vehicle license plate).  
Identity management can mean different things to different people depending on the context 
(Van Thuan, Identity Management Demystified, 2007). As such existing literature contains 
several and sometimes overlapping definitions of identity management (IdM) or Identity and 
Access Management (IAM). In this study, IdM “consists of processes, policies and technolo-
gies to manage the complete lifecycle of user identities across a system and to control user’s 
access to the system resources. In effect technology-based identity management refers to the 
administration and design of identity attributes, credentials, and privileges (Cavoukian, 2008). 
Identity Management systems have been used throughout history to establish the basis for 
trade and governance using different tokens and technologies, seals, coded messages, signa-
tures, and jewelry, etc. (3G_Americas, 2009). IdMS should therefore be a reliable means of 
identification and authentication of individuals in order to offer them authorized access to 
resources. Depending on the situation and the context, an individual may be represented by 
different partial identities (Clauß & Köhntopp, 2001). IdMS helps in acquiring better 
knowledge about individuals, which is essential in building a certain level of trust. An effec-
tive IdMS ensures real-time identification and authentication to distinguish one person from 
the other. IdMS also assists in the protection of  privacy of parties to transactions. 
 
2.2 Identity Management Initiatives in Ghana 
In Ghana, several independent IdM initiatives are under way. The National Health Insurance 
Scheme has already rolled out a nationwide registration by issuing identity cards to benefi-
ciaries. The National Identification Authority is rolling out a biometric based national identi-
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fication system, and the Ministry of Interior has introduced a biometric passport. Births and 
death, voters register, business registrations, social security, drivers and vehicle licensing are 
other forms of registrations performed by various government agencies in different formats 
and databases. The government has recently implemented biometric based passports and 
Drivers and Vehicle License. Adoption has been successful with the main impediment being 
delays in the issuance of passports or the driving licenses. To enhance commercial activity 
and to reduce the unbanked and under-banked population in Ghana, a biometric based pay-
ment system (e-zwich card) was also implemented by Bank of Ghana (BOG) (Frempong, 
2010) whilst the National Identification Authority is in the process of rolling out national 
identity cards. All commercial banks were directed to reconfigure their existing POS termi-
nals and ATMs to make them e-zwich compatible (Hesse, 2009). These two projects have 
however failed to live up to expectation and even though the goals seemed laudable from a 
government point of view (France & Selormey, 2009). According to France & Selormey, 
(2009) GhIPSS opted for biometric technology because of its superior security in terms of 
user authentication and its ability to combat card cloning. 
3 Methodology 
This is a country study research on identification systems from developing countries’ perspec-
tive. The key question addressed in this paper is, “What factors influence adoption of Identity 
Management Systems in Developing Countries?”. Empirical data were gathered by consulting 
related studies on Privacy and Identity Management systems adoption and implementation, 
stakeholder interviews and self-administered questionnaires. Based on the literature review, it 
became apparent that Davies, (1989) Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), and Fit-viability 
theory (Tjan, 2001) & (Liang et al, 2007) were relevant to the study since they offered better 
constructs for this study. Opinions of typical Ghanaian adults were used as the unit of analy-
sis. The questionnaire was designed based on the results of the initial interviews. A multiple-
item approach was adopted where each item was measured on a five-point Likert scale, with 
answers ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree” to ‘‘strongly agree”.  The result of the analysis 
forms the basis for the development of the conceptual framework. The research is significant 
since it addresses identity management issues within the context of developing countries, 
scarcely represented in the IdM literature. 
The items in the questionnaire were developed by adapting existing measures validated by 
other researchers in IdMS, or by converting the definitions of the construct into a question-
naire format. The questionnaire consisted of five main sections. The questions in section 1 
were aimed at gathering demographic information such as gender, age group, occupation, 
educational background and level of income. Section 2 focused on citizens’ perceptions and 
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understanding of issues like privacy, security and controls in identification systems. Section 3 
dealt with perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use.  Sections 4 and  5 then focused on 
economic feasibility and transaction cost. In total, there were 43 questions. 
3.1 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
Factors affecting technology adoption and diffusion of innovation have been extensively stud-
ied with several theories and frameworks haven emanated from it within Information Systems 
literature. Notable among them are innovation diffusion theory (Rogers, Diffusion of 
Innovations, 1983), technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and the unified theo-
ry of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). In Davies 
(1989) TAM  for instance, what causes people to accept or reject information technology has 
been mainly attributed to its perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. External pressure 
to adopt has also been identified as another factor affecting technology adoption (Dass & Pal, 
2009). Additional factors include complexities, compatibility, relative advantage and all of 
these theories are aimed at deepening understanding of the factors affecting technology adop-
tion. In Davies, (1989), perceived usefulness describes the degree to which a person believes 
that an innovation will boost their performance. Perceived ease of use on the other hand de-
scribes the degree to which a person believes that adopting an innovation will be free of ef-
fort. Where a system is high in perceived usefulness but it requires a great effort from a user, 
it is beleived that its benefits will be eroded by the efforts required and thereby dissuading 
users from using it. In effect users are more likely to adopt systems which are easier to use 
and offer some benefits. These studies have however mainly focused on developed countries. 
Other factors like free riding, connectivity, and illiteracy that are peculiar to developing coun-
tries will also be covered in this study. 
3.2 Fit – Viability Model 
Liang et al (2007) adapted Tjan’s (2001) two dimensional fit-viability model for measuring 
the extent to which a new technology will fit into the core competence, structure, value and 
culture of organization and how viable it could be. In their model, Liang et al (2007), defined 
technology viability as the measure of the extent to which the organizational environment is 
ready for the application, as well as its economic feasibility, technical infrastructure, and so-
cial readiness of the organization. Fit measures the extent to which the technology is capable 
of meeting the requirement of task. They came with the conclusion that organizations must 
only pursue applications with good fit and strong organizational viability. Economic feasibil-
ity is a key indicator used to measure an organization’s readiness to implement technology. 
The two main criteria for measuring economic feasibility are; cost benefit analysis (e.g. net 
present value) and transaction cost analysis, where reducing cost can increase customer’s 
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willingness to use a technology (Spraakman, 1997). A high-transaction frequency on the other 
hand reduces transaction costs and the usage of the application. In effect transaction cost is 
higher where there is lack of usefulness and ease of use.  
4 IdMS Conceptual Framework 
TAM has proven to be a very useful tool for understanding and predicting user behaviour in 
information system implementation since it seeks to place administration and control of in-
formation directly into the hands of users. (Aichholzer & Strauß, 2009). The following con-
structs are therefore adapted from TAM:  
Perceived Usefulness:  is the degree to which a person thinks that using a particular system 
will enhance his or her performance. In the case IdMS the  focus must br on how users be-
lieve identification systems can enhance their day-to-day transactions and interactions. The 
more of such beliefs, the greater the confidence of users in the system. In effect high per-
ceived usefulness will lead to high intention to accept identification systems.  
Perceived Ease of Use: It is the degree to which a person believes that using a particular sys-
tem will be free of effort (Davis, 1989). In IdM implementations, this consists of the enrol-
ment process, ability to gain access to different services, easy access to support services, etc. 
In effect high perceived ease of use will encourage users to accept IdMS. Factors such as 
network anonymization tools, minimum disclosure of personal information, or password 
managers that securely keep track of different credentials will lead to a high perceived ease of 
use. (Cavoukian, 2008)  
External pressure (Dass & Pal, 2009). Where there is a certain level of force or users require 
the system to transact business activities, adoption of the system is high. For instance pass-
ports are mandatory for international travels and for that matter citizens will be under pressure 
to adopt a biometric passport.  
Privacy: Privacy is the right of individuals to decide what information about himself should 
be communicated to others and under what circumstances (Westin, 1970). It is about people’s 
right  to choose how they want to live their life, and what things they want to keep private (De 
Hert, 2008). In effect privacy refers to the claim or right of individuals to exercise a measure 
of control over the collection, use and disclosure of their personal information. (Cavoukian, 
2008). Users are more inclined to adopt identity management systems which offer a high level 
of privacy assurance. 
 
Trust: Trust is the state of readiness for unguarded interaction with someone or something. 
(Tway, 1993). Trust can be influenced by perceptions of intentions and past experiences. In 
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Ghana for instance many business people perceive that national identifications systems can be 
used for tax purposes or political witch hunting and will therefore find various means to avoid 
it. Negative perception on trust can have a direct effect on attitudes towards the system. Ther-
fore high reliability and privacy protection policies will lead to high level of trust. 
Fit-Viability: (Tjan, 2001) technology fit issues are qualitative factors that determine to what 
extent an investment fits with the organization’s processes, capabilities and culture. Fit issues 
are therefore ‘internal’ factors. In developing countries, such internal factors are literacy rate, 
the level of political tolerance, infrastructure, cultural norms etc. Viability issues deal with 
expected return the system is able to generate, such as the value-added potential of the sys-
tem. 
Transaction Cost:  Many people are reluctant to pay for government services even if it di-
rectly affects their livelihood. Therefore any system requiring high transaction cost is bound 
to fail in developing countries unless there are no alternatives.  
4.1 IdM Adoption Survey in Ghana 
In an attempt to determine factors affecting IdMS adoption we conducted a survey using 
stakeholder interviews and questionnaires. The objective of the interviews was to acquire bet-
ter understanding of the issues involved in National IdMS implementation, which will influ-
ence the design of the questionnaire. The interview focused on key stakeholders in the ongo-
ing National Identification project and the government electronic payment systems (E-Zwich 
Project). We also interviewed key officials of major commercial banks and trading merchants 
and two groups of citizens; those who have acquired the E-Zwich cards and those who have 
not. An interview guide was designed to ensure consistency and to ensure that researchers 
focus on the IdMS related issues. 
In the case of the questionnaire, a group of executive masters in administration (EMBA) par-
ticipants of Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) were select-
ed. This group was selected because they represent a typical group of opinion leaders whose 
views on national IdMS was the unit of analysis. Additionally I found it to be  very cost effec-
tive due to budgetary constraints and offered me the opportunity to explain the rationale be-
hind the various questions. 250 questionnaires were administered and 230 responses were 
received and analysed. The following key constructs stated in 4 above were used to develop 
the questionnaire. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
Based on employment positions, 95% of the candidates occupy managerial positions. Even 
though National Identity (NID) Cards system encounter a lot of opposition in western coun-
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tries, particularly the US and the United Kingdom, 90% of respondents believed that NID 
cards must be compulsory for all Ghanaians and that the cards can be forged. Another inter-
esting finding was that 80% of respondents prefer that cards be issued to citizens free of 
charge as a means of universal coverage and forgery prevention. Another interesting finding 
from the survey was that the respondents were unanimous in their responses to questions on 
governance, policy and monitoring. For instance, they all believed that their interest would be 
considered in deciding how identity data is used which is consistent with Davis (1989) sug-
gestion that the design characteristics of a system exert immediate effects on perceived use-
fulness as well as indirect effects via perceived ease of use. 
Even though security is a major concern in the West, in this survey respondents rather be-
lieved that the system will be secure and for that matter their personal data will not be affect-
ed even though they believed there are some risks involved due to lack of competent person-
nel to manage the databases. Concerning complexity in the use of the cards, majority of the 
respondents did not think it would be very difficult to use. A further probe however indicated 
that this belief stems from the fact that respondents have all used ATM cards and thought the 
NID cards even in its advanced form may not be anything different. They also believed that 
the introduction of the identity cards will not have any negative impact on users’ personal 
information and that they were prepared to trade off some privacy for convenience, security 
and faster access to public service. Strangely, all the respondents were willing to allow identi-
fication authorities to share their personal data with other government agencies and private 
businesses. The analysis showed that among those who  did not want identifications systems 
to reveal their identity 90% were business owners.  Where IdMS are required for key business 
activity to take place, adoption is usually high (e.g. passport and health insurance card). 
5 Conclusion and Recommendation 
This paper has identified factors influencing the adoption of IdMS and its implementation 
from developing countries’ perspective. It has shown that security issues, privacy and ano-
nymity, which are very critical to developed countries, are not the major concerns of those in 
developing countries. Rather, costs of equipment, tax implications and political issues were 
the key factors. On the other hand perception of political and taxation motives were seen as 
key factors that can inhibit the sustainability of the system. This implies that to achieve high 
levels of IdMS adoption, policy makers must go beyond perceived usefulness and ease of use. 
Citizens must have confidence in the system without any hidden motives. Again IdMS im-
plementations can be successful in Africa if they are associated with mandatory systems like 
passports and driving licences. Therefore, policy makers and businesses must be careful in 
dealing with the inhibiting factors, if future IdMS implementations are to be successful.  
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Abstract— Privacy has become a major issue for policy makers. This has been impelled by 
the rapid development of technologies that facilitate collection, distribution, storage, and ma-
nipulation of personal information. Business organizations are finding new ways of leverag-
ing the value derived from consumer information. On the other hand, consumers have ex-
pressed concerns that their rights and ability to control their personal information are violated. 
Paradoxically, it appears that users provide personal data freely and willingly, as it has been 
observed on Facebook and other social networks. This study is an attempt to understand the 
relationship between individuals’ intentions to disclose personal information, their actual per-
sonal information disclosure behaviours, and how these can be leveraged to develop privacy-
enhancing identity management systems (IDMS) that users can trust. Legal, regulatory and 
technological aspects of privacy and technology adoption are also discussed. 
 
Keywords—Privacy, Trust, Identity, Identity Management   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Incidences of cyber fraud and abuse of privacy on the Internet can have serious consequences 
for electronic business and the users’ trust in performing online transactions. When security is 
breached, it also endangers user privacy and trust in institutions.  Such security breaches have 
contributed to a growing desire for efficient and cost-effective measures in the design and 
administration of IDentity Management Systems (IDMS).  
Several governmental and business initiatives seek to place the administration and control of 
identity information directly in the hands of individuals. These initiatives are aimed at curtail-
ing security breaches and abuses of privacy in order to boost user confidence in online trans-
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actions and interactions. They require that individuals be given the right to exercise control 
over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information – their digital personae. 
Previous researches have proposed Fair Information Practice (FIP) principles, Privacy by De-
sign (PbD) and The Seven Laws of Identity (Cameron, The Laws Of Identity, 2005), [2], and 
[3]. These proposed frameworks and best practices seek to balance an individual's right to 
privacy with the organization's legitimate need to collect, use, and disclose personal infor-
mation. Such attempts to give users the latitude to their digital identities are generally referred 
to as user-centric. 
Unfortunately, researchers and developers of user-centric IDMS have mainly focused on 
making existing IDMS architectures interoperable, while privacy should actually be at the 
core of the IDMS design. Again, there is the perception that even though individuals advocate 
for their privacy, they have little or no reservations in releasing their personal information in 
social networks (e.g. Facebook).  
This so-called “privacy paradox” is what motivates our study. Furthermore, many of the cur-
rent initiatives are focused on online solutions and services in the digital world, but identity 
management also needs to take into account differences between users’ behaviour in the phys-
ical and the digital world. The objective of this work is therefore to understand the major is-
sues involved in the design of privacy-enhancing IDMS and contribute to improved frame-
work and design principles for these. 
The paper analyses existing international privacy regulations and the proposed standards and 
best practices in view of Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [4]. The remaining part is 
divided into five sections. Section II contains definitions and concepts and gives a review of 
research on identity management, privacy and trust. In Section III, some of the major frame-
works, initiatives and best practices are presented and compared. Section IV deals with priva-
cy enhancing technologies for authentication and authorization, in particular U-Prove and 
OAuth. In Section V we present an updated framework and discuss the requirements and 
guidelines for realizing privacy-enhancing identity management, and finally, Section VI 
summarizes our findings and conclusions and give some recommendations for future studies. 
 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT, PRIVACY AND TRUST 
The objective of this work is to understand the major issues involved in the design of privacy-
enhancing IDMS. This is based on the premise that designing privacy enhancing technology 
is not just a technological problem but theoretical, social and regulatory dimension must also 
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be addressed. The research problem then is “What factors must be considered in designing 
privacy-enhancing IDMS that address both online and offline identity management issues?”. 
To address the research question we analysed the major privacy and data protection regula-
tions, research initiatives, privacy-enhancing technologies in the light of technology ac-
ceptance model. 
 
Identity and Identity Management 
Identity in information systems consists of traits, attributes, and preferences, based on which 
an individual may receive personalized services. These services could be online, on mobile 
devices, or face-to-face (Liberty, 2004). In essence, identity has both physical and digital di-
mensions. Digital (or electronic) identity is therefore an electronic representation of a real-
world entity or an online equivalent of an individual (Roussos, Peterson, & Patel, 2003). Tra-
ditionally, IDMS are ran by organizations that control all mechanisms for authentication (es-
tablishing confidence in an identity claim’s truth) and authorization (deciding what an indi-
vidual should be allowed to do), as well as any behind-the-scenes profiling or scoring of indi-
viduals [5].  
 In this study, we adopt the Van Thuan (2007) definition of IDMS as “consisting of 
processes, policies and technologies used to manage the complete lifecycle of user identities 
across a system and to control the user access to the system resources by associating their 
rights and restrictions”. 
To ensure protection of privacy, security and provision of trusted services, different variations 
of IDMS were used throughout history to establish the basis for trade and governance by 
means of tokens and technologies, seals, coded messages, signatures, jewellery, etc. 
(3G_Americas, 2009). There has been a tremendous growth in  online government services, 
business transactions and social interactions via single sign-on (SSO) (Aichholzer & Strauß, 
2009). Such activities require efficient and effective user identification and authentication, 
making IDMS very challenging. Clarke (1994) posits that identification is “the association of 
data with a particular human being”. Authentication is a process that results in a person be-
ing accepted as authorized to engage in or perform some activity (Whitley, 2009). Lips (2008) 
suggested a shift in focus towards analyses of the wider societal implications of IDMS im-
plementation and related social design issues.  
Concepts of Privacy 
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Privacy refers to the claim or right of individuals to exercise a measure of control over the 
collection, use and disclosure of their personal information. Westin (2003) described privacy 
concern as customers’ apprehension over the acquisition and use of their personal data.  
Until recently, personal identity and privacy were something of which each human being 
could exercise a reasonable degree of control [6]. With the advent of the Internet and high-
speed communication technologies, it has become an illusion for users to assume physical 
control over the collection and use of their personal information since data can be mishandled. 
For example in many instances, users have little or no involvement the dissemination of their 
personal information. In essence, mishandled personal information puts individuals’ privacy 
interests at risk.  
It is for this reason that governments must protect their citizens. Interestingly, many of the 
present privacy legislations in Europe were drafted on the basis of the Strasburg Convention 
of 1981 [6]. Therefore, legislation does not adequately assist in resolving contemporary pri-
vacy intrusion cases. 
Furthermore, what constitutes personal information has comparatively widened due to in-
creased usage of digital media for business and social interactions, e.g. user names, pass-
words, etc. Moreover, the concept of privacy has both collective and individual dimensions 
[7]. Hence, privacy cannot be conceptualised as autonomy from collective norms. This is 
what informs the debate on whether privacy protection is best approached on the basis that it 
is a private good or a common good [8]. The rights and obligations of individuals in many 
countries have therefore been weighed against the collective security and public safety goals – 
particularly in the USA and UK [8].  
 
Concepts of Trust 
Privacy concern has far-reaching effects on individuals’ attitudes towards IDMS. Where there 
is the concern of vulnerability, people become apprehensive towards the systems. According 
to the Oxford Dictionary, trust is the belief that somebody or something is good, sincere, hon-
est, etc., with no intention to harm or trick. There are different research positions on what 
constitutes trust and on the outcomes of trust [9]. In the literature, trust has been defined as 
the confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity [10]. This confidence pro-
vides the basis for customers to believe in the reliability and integrity of organizations. It is 
one of the building blocks for information  sharing. Milne & Boza (1999) and Norberg et al. 
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(2007) examined how privacy concerns are related to trust. They have suggested that increas-
ing trust can mitigate privacy concern.  
In Mayer et al. (1995) trust is conceptually distinct from the behaviours that may or may not 
reflect it. Without a clear distinction between the behaviours the difference between trust and 
similar constructs is blurred. For instance, Mayer et al. conceptualized trust as the willingness 
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party.  
Effectively, in a trustworthy relationship, individuals are motivated to share personal infor-
mation freely with no fear of exploitation. Hence, trust can influence both positive and nega-
tive behaviour of people. This claim is shared by  Jøsang & Fabre in  [11]. They observed that 
the basic ingredients of trust are: 1) dependence on the trusted party, 2) reliability of the trust-
ed party, and 3) risk in case the trusted party does not perform as expected. This implies that 
trust requirements have direct correlation with risk exposure.  
In the study conducted by Mayer et al., three important characteristics of trust were revealed: 
Ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability also implies competence or perceived expertise. 
Consistency, fairness and reliability were also used  to describe integrity whereas loyalty, 
openness and availability were used to describe benevolence. These trust characteristics are 
adopted in this study as the constructs of trust. 
 
The Privacy Paradox 
In many privacy scenarios, commercial interests seek to maximize the value of consumer in-
formation. For instance, many websites that provide useful information also require users to 
register in order to access the information. Even though individuals may be willing to part 
with personal information in order to realize the perceived benefits, many express concern 
about the violation of their rights and ability to control their personal information.  
If we had perfect identity, security would not be an issue, just as systems with perfect ano-
nymity will not present any privacy problem. In spite of the complaints, common use of Fa-
cebook, Twitter, etc., indicates that consumers quite often freely release personal data in their 
interactions and business transactions [12]. This is referred to as “The Privacy Paradox” [12], 
[6]. Privacy paradox is the relationship between individuals’ intentions to disclose personal 
information and their actual personal information disclosure behaviours. 
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An IBM 2008 survey suggests that individuals see a trade-off between the increased value of 
services and the consequent erosion in their privacy [13]. Consumers are on the one hand 
seeking for online experience devoid of fraud, cheaper and more conveniently delivered. Yet, 
there are fears that this could lead to an erosion of users’ privacy. In essence, technology has a 
dual nature: User empowerment and raising security and privacy concerns. 
 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
Factors affecting technology adoption have been extensively studied in the Information Sys-
tems literature. Morris & Dillon (1997) posit that user acceptance is “the demonstrable will-
ingness within a user group to employ information technology for the tasks it is designed to 
support”. Notable research on adoption and diffusion of technology includes Innovation Dif-
fusion Theory (Rogers, 1983), TAM (Davis, 1989) and the unified theory of acceptance and 
use of technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000).  
 
 
 
In Davis (1989) perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) were theorized 
to be fundamental determinants of behavioural intentions to accept or reject information tech-
nology, cf. Fig. 1. Perceived usefulness essentially describes the degree to which a person 
believes that an innovation will boost their performance (Davis, 1989). Perceived ease of use 
on the other hand describes the degree to which a person believes that adopting an innovation 
will be free of effort. In effect, users are more likely to adopt systems, which are easier to use 
and offer some benefits, since these two factors can affect the behavioural intention to consid-
 
Fig. 1. Main elements of the Technology Acceptance Model (Adapted from [4]). 
 
 Perceived 
Usefulness 
Perceived Ease of 
Use 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
Actual System 
Use 
Perceived Ease of Use and Perceived Usefulness can 
Influence User Behaviour 
Behavioural Intentions Will Then Lead to Actual Use 
of Technology 
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er using it and actually using the innovation. Behavioural intentions are formed on the basis 
of an individual’s attitude, subjective norms, and perceived control of an outcome [14].  
Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and behavioural intentions will have already been 
proven to be a reliable means for determining adoption of technology [4], [15]. This study 
introduces aspects of trust and privacy in the design of privacy-enhancing IDMS.  This is 
based on the premise that users will feel comfortable with systems that protect their privacy 
and are more likely to release personal information to only trusted third parties – the essence 
of user centricity [16]. 
FRAMEWORKS AND INITIATIVES 
Regulatory Framework on Privacy 
Motivations for good behaviour can generally be analysed based on the risk of data disclosure 
and regulatory exposure. Regulation in this regard can be categorized into national and inter-
national. The Fair Information Practice principles (FIP) are a set of such principles developed 
in the 1970s, which has been adopted by many government agencies, public interest groups, 
and private companies around the world [5]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) issued a set of data protection guidelines, which are an adaptation of 
FIPs. These guidelines focus on privacy as personal data flows between member countries. It 
addresses the collection and use of personal data, such as names, addresses, government-
issued identifiers, etc.  
The OECD guidelines are very instructive for design of privacy-enhancing IDMS. The key 
sections are as follows (OECD): 
• Collection limitation. Limits to the collection of personal data should exist. Personal data 
should be collected by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the 
knowledge or consent of the data subject (the individual). 
• Data quality. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which it is collected 
and used. It should be accurate, complete, and timely.  
• Purpose Specification Principle. The purpose for which personal data are collected must 
be specified no later than at the time of date collection and subsequent use must be lim-
ited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with the 
original purpose and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 
• Use limitation. Personal information should not be disclosed or otherwise used for other 
than a specified purpose without consent of the individual or legal authority. 
• Security. Reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss, unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification and disclosure should protect personal data.  
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• Openness. The existence of systems containing personal data should be publicly known, 
along with a description of the system’s main purposes and uses of the personal data in 
the system.  
• Individual Participation. An individual should have the right: a) to obtain confirmation 
from a data controller, or otherwise, any information relating to them within a reasona-
ble time. The cost of obtaining such information must be reasonable and in a form that is 
readily intelligible to him.  
• Accountability. The keepers of personal data should be accountable for complying with 
fair information practices. These principles are the logical starting point for anyone de-
signing an identity management system. 
There are also various country- (or region-) specific laws on privacy that seek to protect pri-
vacy. In Europe for instance, many of the privacy and data protection laws have been brought 
together as a harmonized European Union (EU) data protection directive. All EU member 
states are required to comply. The Directive provides mechanisms to track misuse of personal 
data and protection against the misapplication of personal data [18]. Unlike the FIPs, breach-
ing legislations and directives can result in prosecution in courts. 
 The major defects of the regulatory framework are twofold. In the first place, FIPs 
originated long before the World Wide Web and the digital age [5]. Hence, they are inade-
quate in dealing with modern privacy since acquisition and use of personal information occurs 
in microseconds and usually with no direct involvement of parties. Secondly, on the Internet, 
there are no specific border demarcations, making it difficult to enforce country- or region-
specific laws on privacy and data protection. This is because culprits might not be nationals of 
the countries, where the incidence occurred (e.g. the WikiLeaks cases).  
 
User-Centric Identity Management Systems 
The focus on users’ quest for power to exercise informational self-determination has resulted 
in several user-centric and claims-based IDMS initiatives (PrimeLife, 2009), (FIDIS, 2007), 
(Cameron, 2005). User-centric IDMS is an approach to give users greater control over their 
personal information. However, the notion of user centricity does not imply a trade-off be-
tween security and usability, but rather a focus on user’s privacy and trust. For instance, in 
their Austrian IDMS study, Aichholzer & Strauß (2009) identified equality of access, privacy 
protection and user convenience as major factors determining users’ acceptance of IDMS. 
Cameron’s Seven Laws of Identity have therefore been widely regarded as a guide for provid-
ing user-centric IDMS solutions. Generally, the laws of identity prescribe the need for con-
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sistent user experiences in online transactions, user understanding, user choices and control, 
and minimum disclosure of user information to only the intended parties.  
Identity providers therefore act as trusted third parties to store user accounts and profile in-
formation and authenticate users (OECD, The Role of Digital Identity Management in the 
Internet Economy: A Primer for Policy Makers, 2009). Service providers on the other hand 
accept assertions or claims about users from the identity providers. Since identity providers 
do not form a federation in a user-centric IDMS model they are seen as operating in the inter-
est of users instead of the service providers (also called “relying parties”).  
A feature in user-centric IDMS, which makes them more privacy enhancing, is the fact that 
users have the privilege of choosing what information to disclose when dealing with service 
providers in particular transactions and still satisfy the need to provide certain information  
the transaction requires (OECD, The Role of Digital Identity Management in the Internet 
Economy: A Primer for Policy Makers, 2009), [20]. 
 
Privacy Research Initiatives 
To address the inefficiencies of regulations discussed above, a wide range of industry, aca-
demic, and governmental organizations in Europe joined forces in a number of research pro-
jects, among these “Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (Prime)”, and “Privacy 
and Identity Management in Europe Throughout Life (PrimeLife)” [21]. These projects have 
developed working prototypes of privacy-enhancing IDMS, These EU initiatives provide very 
good frameworks for building privacy-protecting IDMS, although they do not cover US spe-
cific regulations.  
Kim Cameron, Microsoft Identity Architect, and Ann Cavoukian, Ontario’s Information Pri-
vacy Commissioner, have done a lot of research on privacy, which is becoming industry 
standard. In her paper, “7 Laws of Identity: The Case for Privacy-Embedded Laws in the Dig-
ital Age,” Cavoukian (2008) offered a unique interpretation of Cameron’s Laws of Identity. 
Cavoukian further proposed seven foundational privacy principles, referred to as Privacy by 
Design (PbD) principles. Her proposal was based on the notion that innovation, creativity and 
competitiveness must be approached from a design thinking perspective [22]. In a separate 
study, Peter Schaar posits that “PbD is adjuvant for all kinds of IT systems designated or used 
for the processing of personal data. It should be a crucial requirement for products and ser-
vices provided to third parties and individual customers.” [3]. Table I provides a summary of 
the seven laws of identity, the FIPs and Cavaokian’s PbD. 
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The seven laws of identity also describe the basis for a “unifying identity metasystem” that 
can be applied to identity on the Internet. The Identity Metasystem is an interoperable archi-
tecture for digital identity, which assumes that users will have several digital identities based 
on multiple underlying technologies, implementations, and providers (Cameron, The Laws Of 
Identity, 2005). It ensures that not only are individuals in control of their identity, but also 
TABLE I 
MAPPING OF THE LAWS OF IDENTITY, PRIVACY BY DESIGN AND THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 
Seven Laws of Identity FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 
(FIP) 
PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
1 – User Control and Consent: 
Technical identity systems must 
only reveal information identify-
ing a user with the user’s con-
sent 
 
Collection limitation 
 
Privacy as the default 
setting 
 
2 – Minimal Disclosure for a 
Constrained Use: The identity 
metasystem must disclose the 
least identifying information 
possible, as this is the most sta-
ble, long-term solution. 
Data quality 
Privacy as the Default 
Setting 
 
3 – Justifiable Parties: IDMSs 
must be designed so the disclo-
sure of identifying information 
is limited to parties having a 
necessary and justifiable place in 
a given identity relationship. 
Purpose Specification 
 
 
Use limitation.  
Privacy as the default 
setting 
 
4 – Directed Identity: 
A universal identity meta system 
must support both “omnidirec-
tional” identifiers for use by 
End-to-End Security 
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organizations will be able to continue to use their existing identity infrastructure investments, 
choose the identity technology that works best for them, and more easily migrate from old 
technologies to new technologies without sacrificing interoperability with others (Cameron, 
The Laws Of Identity, 2005).  
The major informational privacy [23] emanating from digital identities in the identity meta-
system are observability and linkability. Observability is the possibility that others, including 
communicating parties, service providers, eavesdroppers and third parties will gain infor-
mation. Linkability on the other hand describes the possibility of linking different data or data 
sets to an individual for further analysis. 
 
PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 
The move to online services offers great promise in terms of both cost reduction and im-
proved user experience. However, the realization of this promise has been severely hampered 
by the lack of trust on the Internet – specifically, the absence of a practical mechanism for 
users to obtain and present strong, verified digital identity information online. In some cases, 
the information simply is not available in a digital form; however, even when it is available, 
the current set of identity technologies force a trade-off between the level of identity infor-
mation assurance that can be achieved and the level of privacy given to users. Further, the 
user‘s experience for providing this information is often inconsistent and difficult, and some-
times redundant.  
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Digital identity must embrace both being public and being private by providing both anonym-
ity and pseudonymity. It always exists in a context, and we expect the context to have the 
same degree of separation, which we are used to in the natural world, even though space and 
time no longer serve as insulation. 
In a user-centric IDMS, the issue of distrust between the user and the relying party is ad-
dressed, because the identity provider acts as a trusted third-party broker. This occurs because 
individuals may have several identity providers and for that matter, their information may not 
be stored in one place. Users will naturally trust brokers they can control whereas relying par-
ties will not trust a broker if the claims asserted are actually self-vouched by the user [16], 
(OECD, The Role of Digital Identity Management in the Internet Economy: A Primer for 
Policy Makers, 2009).  
This is what the U-prove and OAuth technologies seek to address by managing claims and 
attributes so that relying parties are assured that the information is correct before engaging 
with the user, without necessarily revealing the identity of the user. This approach will still 
leave the user in control. U-Prove and OAuth enable the use of services with minimum dis-
TABLE II 
ANALYSIS OF U-PROVE AND OAUTH IN THE LIGHT OF THE USER-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS 
DESCRIPTION U-PROVE OAUTH 
Purpose of the Applica-
tion 
Designed for Electronic 
Transactions and Communi-
cation 
For information sharing on 
the internet 
Coverage  Video, Photos and Contact 
List 
Minimal Disclosure   
Trust Uses Cryptography Does not use Cryptography 
User Control & Consent 
Privacy 
Perceived Trust 
Does not allow profiling Users can grant 3rd access 
personal resources without 
sharing password 
Pluralism of Operators 
and Technologies 
 OAuth works on Desktop 
Applications 
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closure of personal information and fine-grained delegation of authorization between service 
providers. Some of their features are summarized in the following. 
 
U-Prove 
U-Prove is an advanced cryptographic software designed for electronic transactions and 
communications to overcome a long-standing dilemma between identity assurance and priva-
cy already mentioned (OECD, The Role of Digital Identity Management in the Internet 
Economy: A Primer for Policy Makers, 2009), (Microsoft_Connect, Microsoft U-Prove 
Community Technology Preview R2, 2010). The technology is part of Microsoft’s drive to 
promote an open identity and access model for individuals, businesses and governments, 
based upon the principles of the identity metasystem (Cameron, The Laws Of Identity, 2005).   
The dilemma is addressed by enabling minimal disclosure of identity information in electron-
ic transactions and communications. To ensure minimum disclosure the U-Prove Agent soft-
ware acts as an intermediary between websites. This allows users to share data in a manner 
that protect their privacy, since they can now choose to share or otherwise. U-Prove includes 
a mechanism that separates the retrieval of information from trusted third parties from the 
release of this information to the destination site. This implies that the organization issuing 
the information is prevented from tracking where or when information is used. The destina-
tion site is similarly prevented from linking users to their activities. 
 
OAuth 
Open Authorisation (OAuth) is an open standard for authorization, which gives users the abil-
ity to grant third-party access to their resources without sharing their passwords [25]. It also 
provides a way to grant limited access (in scope, duration, etc.). OAuth allows users to share 
their private resources (e.g. photos, videos, contact lists, bank accounts) stored on one site 
with another site without having to hand out their credentials, typically username and pass-
word. The concept of OAuth is based on the metaphor of a valet key of car, since it only gives 
third parties a controlled (limited) access to the car [26], [25]. OAuth mimics the valet key 
metaphor by providing sites with just enough information to accomplish what the user has 
requested, but not allowing third-party sites access to any other user information. Precisely, it 
only allows users to hand out to third parties tokens (instead of credentials) to their data host-
ed by a given service provider. The tokens could be granting a printing service access to pho-
tos without sharing username and password. OAuth 2.0, which is the latest version, focuses 
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on client developer simplicity (not user simplicity) while providing specific authorization 
flows for web and desktop applications, mobile phones, and living room devices [25]. 
Table II presents some of the main features of U-Prove and OAuth and compares them with 
the privacy design principles discussed above. 
 
IMPROVED FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES 
The fact that present privacy laws are based on principles drafted many years ago, when the 
web did not exist, shows that privacy legislation need to make a quantum leap to be in line 
with the realities of today’s real life operating environment. In cyberspace, there are no clear 
visual cues about the level of privacy available [7]. Existing privacy legislations and regula-
tions do not adequately deal with digital identity issues, because laws are country- or region-
specific, and the FIPs are not laws.  
Important privacy considerations are in relation with data collection, data usage, storage, data 
minimization, anonymity, pseudonymity, and the extent to which individuals have control 
over  their personal information. Generally, identity systems that facilitate anonymity and 
pseudonymity may offer better promise of privacy. In essence, to ensure privacy, risk of vul-
nerability, the lifespan of identity information, and the costs of processing, storage and dele-
tion are critical. 
 Linking identities that do not share the same degree of anonymity, or that contain dif-
ferent sets of attributes may allow others to overcome pseudonyms and discover the user’s 
identity. Differences may arise as to which practices of identity and other data collection, use, 
and retention can be left to market forces and those that should be the subject of government 
intervention. Controlling linkability involves both maintaining separate contexts so observers 
cannot accumulate sensitive data and being cautious when identity information is requested to 
keep track of information disclosure [5]. 
Since much of the literature on privacy enhancing initiatives aims at introducing technologies 
with the user in mind it was apparent that the analysis is carried out in the light of Technology 
Acceptance Model. For instance if privacy must be at the core of the design [22], then obvi-
ously the original TAM must be extended to include privacy as a construct. Likewise, to ad-
dress the dilemma between identity assurance and privacy, trust must also be added as a con-
struct. 
  We therefore propose to add Perceived Privacy and Perceived Trust as constructs to 
the original TAM, cf. Fig. 2. As shown in the diagram Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease 
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of Use, Perceived Trust and Perceived Privacy will affect users’ behavioural intentions and in 
the end their decision to conveniently use the IDMS. 
IDMS having privacy design flaws can generate adverse consequences for consumers, includ-
ing the risk of identity theft. On the contrary, IDMS can play a privacy protective role, partic-
ularly in the context of social interactions.  
 
 
 
TABLE III 
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN OF PRIVACY-ENHANCING IDMS 
Item MEASUREMENT  
CRITERIA 
Description 
Perceived Usefulness Ease of Use 
Enhanced Security  
Identity Fraud prevention  
Data Quality 
 
Perceived usefulness describes the 
degree to which a person believes 
that an innovation will boost their 
performance 
Perceived Ease of Use User-Centricity 
Universal Coverage 
(Online/Offline)  
Perceived ease of use describes 
the degree to which a person be-
lieves that adopting an innovation 
will be free of effort. 
Perceived Privacy Best Practices 
Regulations, Privacy by 
design  
Application of Laws, Regulations 
and the laws of identity (see table 
2) 
Perceived Trust Ability The group of skills, competences 
and characteristics that enable a 
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On the basis of this extended theoretical framework recommendations for improved design of 
privacy-enhancing IDMS can be derived. Table III is a summary of the major items, which 
must be taken into consideration during the design of privacy-enhancing technologies. For 
instance, the concept of privacy will result in a system having privacy as a default [22]. Simi-
larly, trust considerations will help in overcoming the “dilemma between identity assurance 
and privacy (OECD, 2009), (Microsoft_Connect, 2010). 
 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
This study analysed the concepts of privacy, trust, and the key regulatory and research initia-
tives on privacy enhancing IDMS. Major frameworks including the Laws of Identity, the Fair 
Information Practices principles and the Privacy by Design principles were examined. As a 
result, we found that perceived privacy and perceived trust should be added as constructs to 
the Technology Acceptance Model, in order to adequately represent privacy-enhancing identi-
ty management for the benefit of users and service providers. This also aids in resolving the 
“Privacy Paradox” and resolving the dilemma between privacy and identity assurance. 
The extensive amount of research in this area has led us to the stage, where we now have a 
fairly good understanding of design principles and best practices, and we also start to have 
technologies available for development of services and solutions that can empower users, 
protect their privacy and support fine-grained control of access to resources online. This work 
is therefore an important contribution to the further development. 
 
 
Fig.2. Technology Acceptance Model applied to privacy-enhancing identity management. The diagram 
shows that users’ privacy behaviour is influenced by how easy it is to use the IDMS, and their perceptions on 
the system’s usefulness, privacy and trust considerations. This behaviour then influences the actual system 
use. (Adapted from [4]). 
 Perceived 
Usefulness 
Perceived Ease of 
Use 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
Actual System 
Use 
Perceived Privacy 
Perceived Trust 
In the case of Privacy Enhancing IDMS, Privacy and 
Trust can also affect user’s behaviour in addition to PU 
and PEOU.  
Hence, PU, PEOU, Perceived Trust and Perceived Privacy 
will influence Behavioural intention 
Behavioural Intentions will then lead to actual use of the 
Privacy Enhancing IDMS 
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One of the remaining issues is to explore how these frameworks and technologies can address 
privacy and identity management in the physical world. The mechanisms of establishing trust 
in the physical world are not necessarily the same as those that are used in the digital world 
online. As it has been phrased “the Internet was built without a way to know who or what you 
are connecting to” (Cameron, The Laws Of Identity, 2005). Many of the recent initiatives are 
aimed at establishing an “identity layer” on the Internet. But since physical identity cards, 
tokens etc. are use in both worlds we need more work to link the usage and achieve “human 
integration” [1]. Users need to feel equally comfortable consuming services in the physical 
and digital world. 
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Paper 3 
KEEPING IDENTITY PRIVATE: 
ESTABLISHING TRUST IN THE PHYSICAL AND A DIGITAL WORLD FOR 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
Joseph K. Adjei and Henning Olesen 
 
Privacy has become a major issue for policy makers. This has been impelled by the rapid de-
velopment  of  technologies that facilitate collection, distribution, storage, and manipulation 
of personal information. This study is an attempt to understand the relationship between indi-
viduals’ intentions to disclose personal information, their actual personal information disclo-
sure behaviors, and how these can be leveraged to develop privacy-enhancing identity man-
agement systems (IDMS) that the users can trust. Legal, regulatory and technological aspects 
of privacy and technology adoption are also discussed.  
Incidences of cyber fraud and abuse of privacy on the Internet can have serious consequences 
in electronic business and the users’ trust in performing online transactions. When security is 
breached, it endangers users privacy and trust in institutions. Such security breaches have 
contributed to a growing desire for efficient and cost-effective measures in the design and 
administration of IDMS.  
Several government and business initiatives seek to place the administration and control of 
identity information directly in the hands of individuals. These initiatives are aimed at curtail-
ing security breaches and abuses of privacy to boost user confidence in online transactions 
and interactions. IDMS require that individuals be given the right to exercise control over the 
collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information—their digital personae. Previous 
researches have proposed the Laws of Identity [1], Fair Information Practice (FIP) principles 
[2], and Privacy by Design (PbD) [3]. These proposed frameworks and best practices seek to 
balance an individual’s right to privacy with the organization’s legitimate need to collect, use, 
and disclose personal information. Such attempts to give users the latitude to their digital 
identities are generally referred to as user-centric. 
Unfortunately, researchers and developers of user-centric IDMS have mainly focused on 
making existing IDMS architectures interoperable, while privacy should actually be at the 
core of the IDMS design. Again, there is the perception that even though individuals advocate 
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for their privacy, they have little or no reservations in releasing their personal information in 
social networks (e.g., Facebook). This so-called privacy paradox [4] is what motivates our 
study. Furthermore, many of the current initiatives are focused on online solutions and ser-
vices in the digital world, but identity management needs to take into account the differences 
between users’ behavior in the physical and digital worlds. The objective of this article is to 
understand the major issues involved in the design of privacy-enhancing IDMS and contribute 
to improved framework and design principles for these.  
Identity Management, Privacy, and Trust  
The objective is based on the premise that designing a privacy-enhancing technology is not 
only a technological problem, but theoretical, social, and regulatory dimensions must also be 
addressed. The research problem is then: “What factors must be considered in designing pri-
vacy-enhancing IDMS that address both online and offline identity management issues?” To 
address the research question, we analyzed the major privacy and data-protection regulations, 
research initiatives, and privacy-enhancing technologies in light of technology acceptance 
model (TAM) [5].  
Identity and Identity Management 
 Identity in information systems consists of traits, attributes, and preferences so an individual 
can access protected resources and receive personalized services. These services could be 
online, on mobile devices, or face to face [6]. In essence, identity has both physical and digi-
tal dimensions. Digital identity is therefore an electronic representation of a real-world entity 
or an online equivalent of an individual [7]. Traditionally, IDMS are ran by organizations that 
control all mechanisms for authentication (establishing confidence in an identity claim’s 
truth) and authorization (deciding what an individual should be allowed to do), as well as any 
behind-the-scene profiling or scoring of individuals [8]. In this study, we adopt the Van Thu-
an definition of IDMS as consisting of processes, policies, and technologies used to manage 
the complete life cycle of user identities across a system and to control the user access to the 
system resources by associating their rights and restrictions. [9] 
To ensure protection of privacy, security, and provision of trusted services, different varia-
tions of IDMS were used throughout history to establish the basis for trade and governance by 
means of tokens and technologies, seals, coded messages, signatures, and jewelry [10]. There 
has been a tremendous growth in online government services, business transactions, and so-
cial interactions via a single signon (SSO) [10]. Such activities require efficient and effective 
user identification and authentication, making IDMS very challenging. Clarke posits that 
identification is ‘‘the association of data with a particular human being’’ [11]. Authentication 
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is a process that results in a person being accepted as authorized to engage in or perform some 
activity [12]. Lips suggested a shift in focus toward analyses of the wider societal implica-
tions of IDMS implementation and the related social design issues [13]. 
Concepts of Privacy 
Privacy refers to the claim or right of individuals to exercise a measure of control over the 
collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information. Westin described privacy con-
cern as customers’ apprehension over the acquisition and use of their personal data [14]. Until 
recently, identity and privacy were things in which each human being could exercise a rea-
sonable degree of control [15]. With the advent of Internet and high-speed communication 
technologies, it has become an illusion for the users to assume physical control over the col-
lection and use of private information since data can be mishandled. For example, in many 
instances, the users have little or no involvement in the dissemination of their details. In es-
sence, mishandled personal information puts individuals’ privacy interests at risk. It is for this 
reason that governments must protect their citizens. Interestingly, many of the present privacy 
legislations in Europe were drafted on the basis of the Strasburg Convention of 1981 [15]. 
Therefore, the legislation does not adequately assist in resolving contemporary privacy-
intrusion cases. 
Furthermore, what constitutes personal information has comparatively widened due to the 
increased usage of digital media for business and social interactions, e.g., usernames and 
passwords. Moreover, the concept of privacy has both collective and individual dimensions 
[16]. Hence, privacy cannot be conceptualized as autonomy from collective norms. This is 
what informs the debate on whether privacy protection is best approached on the basis that it 
is a private or a common good [17]. The rights and obligations of individuals in many coun-
tries have therefore been weighed against the collective security and public safety goals—
particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom [17]. 
Concepts of Trust 
Privacy concern has far-reaching effects on individuals’ attitudes toward IDMS. Where there 
is the concern of vulnerability, people become apprehensive toward systems. According to 
Oxford Dictionary, trust is the belief that somebody or something is good, sincere, honest, 
etc., with no intention to harm or trick. There are different research positions on what consti-
tutes trust and the outcomes of trust [18]. In the literature, trust has been defined as the confi-
dence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity [19]. This confidence provides the 
basis for the customers to believe in the reliability and integrity of organizations. It is one of 
the building blocks for information sharing. Milne and Boza [20] and Norberg et al. [21] ex-
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amined how privacy concerns are related to trust. They have suggested that increasing trust 
can mitigate privacy concerns. 
In Mayer et al. [18], trust is conceptually distinct from the behaviors that may or may not re-
flect it. Without a clear distinction between behaviors, the difference between trust and simi-
lar constructs is blurred. For instance, Mayer et al. conceptualized trust as the willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control the other party. Effectively, in a trustworthy relationship, individuals are 
motivated to share personal information freely with no fear of exploitation. Hence, trust can 
influence both the positive and negative behaviors of people [22]. Jøsang & Fabre, (2005) 
observed that the basic ingredients of trust are 
• dependence on the trusted party 
• reliability of the trusted party 
• risk in case the trusted party does not perform as expected. 
This implies that trust requirements have a direct correlation with risk exposure. In the study 
conducted by Mayer et al., three important characteristics of trust were revealed: 
• ability 
• benevolence 
• integrity. 
Ability implies competence or perceived expertise. Consistency, fairness, and reliability were 
used to describe integrity, whereas loyalty, openness, and availability were used to describe 
benevolence. These trust characteristics are adopted in this study as the constructs of trust and 
are therefore important factors that must be considered in the design of privacy-enhancing 
IDMS. 
The Privacy Paradox 
In many privacy scenarios, commercial interests seek to maximize the value of consumer in-
formation. For instance, many Websites that provide useful information make the users regis-
ter to access the information. Even though individuals may be willing to part with personal 
information to realize the perceived benefits, many express concern about the violation of 
their rights and ability to control their personal information. If we had perfect identity, securi-
ty would not be an issue, just as systems with perfect anonymity will not present any privacy 
problem. In spite of the complaints, common use of Facebook and Twitter indicates that con-
sumers quite often freely release personal data in their interactions and business transactions 
[21]. This is referred to as the privacy paradox [15], [21]. The privacy paradox is the relation-
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ship between individuals’ intentions to disclose personal information and their actual personal 
information disclosure behaviors. The 2008 IBM survey suggests that individuals see a 
tradeoff between the increased value of services and the consequent erosion in their privacy 
[23]. Consumers are on the one hand seeking an online experience that is devoid of fraud, 
cheap, and more conveniently delivered, yet, on the other hand, there is fear that this could 
lead to an erosion of users’ privacy. In essence, technology has a dual nature: 1) user empow-
erment and 2) raising security and privacy concerns. 
Technology Acceptance Model 
Factors affecting technology adoption have been extensively studied in the information sys-
tems literature. Morris and Dillon posit that user acceptance is ‘‘the demonstrable willingness 
within a user group to employ information technology for the tasks it is designed to support’’ 
[24]. Notable research on the adoption and diffusion of technology includes innovation diffu-
sion theory [25], TAM [5], and the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology [26]. 
In [5], perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) were theorized to be fun-
damental determinants of behavioral intentions to accept or reject information technology 
(Figure 1). PU essentially describes the degree to which a person believes that an innovation 
will boost their performance [5]. PEOU, on the other hand, describes the degree to which a 
person believes that adopting an innovation will be free of effort. In effect, users are more 
likely to adopt systems that are easier to use and offer some benefits since these two factors 
can affect the behavioral intention to consider using the technology and actually using the 
innovation. The behavioral intentions are formed on the basis of an individual’s attitude, sub-
jective norms, and perceived control of an outcome [27]. PU, PEOU, and behavioral inten-
tions have already been proven to be a reliable means for determining adoption of technology 
[5], [28]. This study introduces aspects of trust and privacy in the design of privacy-
enhancing IDMS. This is based on the premise that users will feel comfortable with systems 
that protect their privacy and are more likely to release personal information to only trusted 
third parties—the essence of user centricity [29].  
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Frameworks and Initiatives  
Regulatory Framework on Privacy 
Motivation for good behavior can generally be analyzed based on the risk of data disclosure 
and regulatory exposure. Regulation in this regard can be categorized as national and interna-
tional. The FIP principles are a set of such principles developed in the 1970s, which has been 
adopted by many government agencies, public interest groups, and private companies around 
the world [8]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued 
a set of data-protection guidelines that are an adaptation of FIPs. These guidelines focus on 
privacy as personal data flows between member countries. It addresses the collection and use 
of personal data such as names, addresses, and government issued identifiers. The OECD 
guidelines are very instructive for the design of privacy-enhancing IDMS. The key sections 
are as follows [30]: 
• Collection Limitation: Limits to the collection of personal data should exist. Personal 
data should be collected by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the 
knowledge or consent of the data subject (the individual). 
• Data Quality: Personal data should be relevant to the purpose for which it is collected 
and used. It should be accurate, complete, and timely. 
• Purpose Specification Principle: The purpose for which personal data are collected 
must be specified no later than at the time of data collection, and its subsequent use 
must be limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incom-
patible with the original purpose and as are specified on each occasion of change of 
purpose. 
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• Use Limitation: Personal information should not be disclosed or otherwise used for 
other than a specified purpose without the consent of the individual or legal authori-
ty.  
• Security: Reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss, unauthorized ac-
cess, destruction, use, modification, and disclosure should protect personal data. 
• Openness: The existence of systems containing personal data should be publicly 
known along with a description of the system’s main purposes and uses of the per-
sonal data in the system. 
• Individual Participation: An individual should have the right to obtain confirmation 
from a data controller, or otherwise, any information relating to them within a rea-
sonable time. The cost of obtaining such information must be reasonable and in a 
form that is readily intelligible to him. 
• Accountability: The keepers of personal data should be accountable for complying 
with the FIPs. These principles are the logical starting point for anyone designing an 
IDMS. 
There are various country- (or region-)specific laws on privacy that seek to protect privacy. In 
Europe for instance, many of the privacy and data-protection laws have been brought together 
as a harmonized European Union (EU) data-protection directive. All EU member states are 
required to comply. The directive provides the mechanisms to track misuse of personal data 
and protection against the misapplication of personal data [31]. Unlike the FIPs, breaching 
legislations and directives can result in prosecution in courts. The major defects of the regula-
tory framework are twofold. In the first place, as FIPs were implemented long before the 
World Wide Web and digital age [8], they are inadequate in dealing with modern privacy 
since acquisition and use of personal information occurs in microseconds and usually with no 
direct involvement of parties. Secondly, on the Internet, there are no specific border demarca-
tions, making it difficult to enforce country- or region-specific laws on privacy and data pro-
tection. This is because culprits might not be nationals of the countries where the incidence 
occurred (e.g., the WikiLeaks cases). The Copenhagen Privacy Workshop 2011 came up with 
some recommendations, which were summed up in the Copenhagen Privacy Principles 
(CPPs) [32]. Some of the key recommendations were the need for a mandatory privacy risk 
assessment and privacy impact assessment. Another key suggestion was the possible 
measures taken to enhance privacy protection, which included the right to not be tracked and 
traced without consent, the introduction of metadata when collecting data to aid data expira-
tion and deletion, and the right to have data deleted upon request (the right to be forgotten). 
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User-Centric IDMS 
The focus on users’ quest for power to exercise informational self-determination has resulted 
in several user-centric and claims-based IDMS initiatives [1], [33], [34]. User-centric IDMS 
is an approach to give users greater control over their personal information. However, the 
notion of user centricity does not imply a tradeoff between security and usability but rather a 
focus on users’  privacy and trust. For instance, in their Austrian IDMS study, Aichholzer and 
Strauß [35] identified equality of access, privacy protection, and user convenience as major 
factors determining users’ acceptance of IDMS. Cameron’s seven Laws of Identity [1] have 
therefore been widely regarded as a guide for providing user-centric IDMS solutions. Gener-
ally, the Laws of Identity prescribe the need for consistent user experiences in online transac-
tions, user understanding, user choices and control, and minimum disclosure of user infor-
mation to only the intended parties. 
Identity providers therefore act as trusted third parties to store user accounts and profile in-
formation and authenticate users [36]. Service providers, on the other hand, accept assertions 
or claims about users from the identity providers. Since identity providers do not form a fed-
eration in a user-centric IDMS model, they are seen as operating in the interest of users in-
stead of service providers (also called relying parties). A feature in user-centric IDMS, which 
makes them more privacy enhancing, is the fact that users have the privilege of choosing what 
information to disclose when dealing with service providers in particular transactions and still 
satisfy the need to provide certain information for the transaction required [35], [36]. 
Privacy Research Initiatives 
To address the inefficiencies of regulations discussed above, a wide range of industry, aca-
demic, and governmental organizations in Europe joined forces in a number of research pro-
jects [among these Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (Prime) and Privacy and 
Identity Management in Europe Throughout Life (PrimeLife)] [33] that have developed work-
ing prototypes of privacy-enhancing IDMS. These EU initiatives provide very good frame-
works for building privacy-protecting IDMS, although they do not cover the U.S.-specific 
regulations. Kim Cameron, Microsoft Identity Architect, and Ann Cavoukian, Ontario’s In-
formation Privacy Commissioner, have done a lot of research on privacy, which is becoming 
an industry standard. In her article ‘‘7 Laws of Identity: The Case for Privacy-Embedded 
Laws in the Digital Age’’ [2], Cavoukian offered a unique interpretation of Cameron’s Laws 
of Identity. Cavoukian further proposed seven foundational privacy principles, referred to as 
PbD principles. Her proposal was based on the notion that innovation, creativity, and compet-
itiveness must be approached from a design-thinking perspective [37]. In a separate study, 
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Schaar posits that ‘‘PbD is an adjuvant for all kinds of IT systems designated or used for the 
processing of personal data. It should be a crucial requirement for products and services pro-
vided to third parties and individual customers’’ [3]. Table 1 provides a summary of the seven 
Laws of Identity, the FIPs, and Cavoukian’s PbD. The seven Laws of Identity describe the 
basis for a unifying identity metasystem that can be applied to identity on the Internet. The 
identity metasystem is an interoperable architecture for digital identity, which assumes that 
users will have several digital identities based on multipleunderlying technologies, implemen-
tations, and providers [1]. It ensures that not only are individuals in control of their identity 
but also the organizations will be able to continue to use their existing identity infrastructure 
investments, choose the identity technology that works best for them, and more easily migrate 
from old technologies to new technologies without sacrificing interoperability with others [1]. 
The major informational privacy [14] emanating from digital identities in the identity meta-
system are observability and linkability. Observability is the possibility that others, including 
communicating parties, service providers, eavesdroppers, and third parties,will gain infor-
mation. Linkability, on the other hand, describes the possibility of linking different data or 
data sets to an individual for further analysis. 
 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
The move to online services offers great promise in terms of both cost reduction and im-
proved user experience. However, the realization of this promise has been severely hampered 
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by the lack of trust on the Internet specifically, the absence of a practical mechanism for users 
to obtain and present strong, verified digital identity information online. 
In some cases, the information is simply not available in digital form; however, even when it 
is available, the current set of identity technologies force a tradeoff between the level of iden-
tity information assurance that can be achieved and the level of privacy given to users. Fur-
ther, the users’ experience for providing this information are often inconsistent and difficult 
and sometimes redundant. Digital identity must embrace both being public and private by 
providing both anonymity and pseudonymity. It always exists in a context, and we expect the 
context to have the same degree of separation, which we are used to in the natural world, even 
though space and time no longer serve as insulation. In a user-centric IDMS, the issue of dis-
trust between the user and the relying party is addressed, because the identity provider acts as 
a trusted third-party broker. This occurs because individuals may have several identity pro-
viders, and for that matter, their information may not be stored in one place. The user will 
naturally trust brokers who can control, whereas the relying parties will not trust a broker if 
the claims asserted are actually self-vouched by the user [29], [36]. 
This is what the state-of-the-art technologies and frameworks such as U-Prove, identity mixer 
(IDEMIX), and open authorization (OAuth) technologies seek to address by managing claims 
and attributes so that the relying parties are assured that the information is correct before en-
gaging with the user, without necessarily revealing the identity of the user. This approach will 
still leave the user in control. U-Prove [38], IDEMIX [39], and OAuth [40] enable the use of 
services with minimum disclosure of personal information and fine-grained delegation of au-
thorization between service providers. Some of their features are summarized in the follow-
ing. 
U-Prove 
U-Prove [38] is an advanced cryptographic software designed for electronic transactions and 
communications to overcome a long-standing dilemma between identity assurance and priva-
cy already mentioned [36], [38]. The technology is part of Microsoft’s drive to promote an 
open identity and access model for individuals, businesses, and governments based on the 
principles of the identity metasystem [1]. The dilemma is addressed by enabling minimal dis-
closure of identity information in electronic transactions and communications. To ensure min-
imum disclosure, the U-Prove agent software acts as an intermediary between Web sites. This 
allows the users to share data in a manner that will protect their privacy, since they can now 
choose to share or otherwise. U-Prove includes a mechanism that separates the retrieval of 
information from trusted third parties releasing this information to the destination site. This 
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implies that the organization issuing the information is prevented from tracking where or 
when the information is used. The destination site is similarly prevented from linking users to 
their activities. 
IDEMIX 
IDEMIX [39] is an anonymous credential system developed at IBM Research that enables 
strong authentication and privacy at the same time. Privacy is guaranteed by solving the pri-
vacy dilemma and enabling sustainable secondary use of identities over the whole identity life 
cycle by various partners without trust erosion. IDEMIX follows Ann Cavoukian, a proponent 
of PbD, that the best way to protect sensitive information is never to reveal it at all. Hence, 
the desired goal of all privacy-enhancing technologies is to mask sensitive personal infor-
mation during online transactions and thereby fulfilling the privacy principle of data minimi-
zation. Presentation of traditional identity tokens such as passports and ID cards can reveal 
vital and unwarranted information to third parties by virtue of it being on the token. Creden-
tials are fundamental concepts in IDEMIX implementation. A credential in this case is a 
means to establish a claimed identity, roles, or attributes about oneself with an entity, typical-
ly as part of an access-control request. For instance, an IDEMIX identity card can serve as a 
credential to establish that a user is above 18 years of age as a requirement to access a gaming 
site. In essence, by using anonymous credentials, the user can selectively reveal any of the 
attributes contained in the credential without revealing unnecessary personal information, 
giving the opportunity for the relying parties to link the identity attributes. IDEMIX works by 
allowing a computer user who has the appropriate software to obtain an anonymous digital 
credential or voucher (containing all the information the issuer is ready to reveal) from a 
trusted third party such as a bank, insurance company, or government agency. When a user 
later wants to prove to a service provider a statement about her, she employs IDEMIX to se-
curely transform the issued credential. The transformed credential will only contain the subset 
of the attested information that she is willing to disclose. The user can apply this transfor-
mation as many times as she wants, and still none of the credentials can link to each other. As 
consumers hand over personal details in exchange for downloading music or subscribing to 
online newsletters, they leave a data trail behind that reveals pieces of information about the 
size, frequency, and source of their online purchases that can be traced back to the user. 
IBM’s IDEMIX software eliminates the trail by using artificial identity information, known as 
pseudonyms, to make online transactions anonymous. For example, the software allows the 
people to purchase books or clothing without revealing their credit card number. It can con-
firm someone’s spending limit without sharing their bank balance or provide proof of age 
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without disclosing his or her date of birth. ‘‘Unlike other IDMS that transmit parts of a user’s 
true identity, systems built using IDEMIX software will help protect user privacy by sharing 
only pseudonyms, so real identity information can never be intercepted or exposed,’’ explains 
Jan Camenisch of IBM Research, the project lead and head designer (IDEMIX) [41].  
OAuth 
OAuth [40], [42] is an open standard for authorization, which gives users the ability to grant 
third-party access to their resources without sharing their passwords [40]. It provides a way to 
grant limited access (in scope and duration). OAuth allows the users to share their private 
resources (e.g., photos, videos, contact lists, bank accounts) stored on one site with another 
site without having to hand out their credentials, typically username and password. The con-
cept of OAuth is based on the valet key metaphor for a car since it only gives third parties a 
controlled (limited) access to the car [40]. OAuth mimics the valet key metaphor by providing 
sites with just enough information to accomplish what the user has requested but not allowing 
third-party sites access to any other user information. Precisely, it only allows the users to 
hand out to third parties tokens (instead of credentials) to their data hosted by a given service 
provider. The tokens could be granting a printing service access to photos without sharing 
username and password. OAuth 2.0, which is the latest version, focuses on client-developer 
simplicity (not user simplicity) while providing specific authorization flows for Web and 
desktop applications, mobile phones, and living room devices [40]. 
Improved Framework and Guidelines 
The fact that privacy laws are based on the principles drafted many years ago when the Web 
did not exist, shows that privacy legislation needs to make a quantum leap to be in line with 
the realities of today’s real-life operating environment. In cyberspace, there are no clear visual 
cues about the level of privacy available [16]. Existing privacy legislations and regulations do 
not adequately deal with the digital identity issues, because laws are country- or region-
specific, and the FIPs are not laws. Important privacy considerations exist in relation with 
data collection, data usage, storage, data minimization, anonymity, pseudonymity, and the 
extent to which the individuals have control over their personal information. Generally, iden-
tity systems that facilitate anonymity and pseudonymity may offer better promise of privacy. 
In essence, to ensure privacy, risk of vulnerability, the life span of identity information, and 
the costs of processing, storage and deletion are critical. 
Linking identities that do not share the same degree of anonymity or that contain different sets 
of attributes may allow others to overcome pseudonyms and discover the user’s identity. 
Questions may arise as to which identity management practices, i.e., data collection, use, and 
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retention can be subjected to market forces and which of them should be subjected to gov-
ernment interventions. Controlling linkability involves both maintaining separate contexts 
so that the observers cannot accumulate sensitive data and being cautious when identity in-
formation is requested to keep track of information disclosure [8]. Since much of the literature 
on privacy-enhancing initiatives aims at introducing technologies with the user in mind, it 
was apparent that the analysis is carried out in light of TAM. For instance, if privacy must be 
at the core of the design [37], then obviously the original TAM must be extended to include 
privacy as a construct. Likewise, to address the dilemma between identity assurance and pri-
vacy, trust must be added as a construct. We therefore propose to add perceived privacy and 
perceived trust as constructs to the original TAM (Figure 2). As shown in the diagram PU, 
PEOU, perceived trust, and perceived privacy will affect users’ behavioral intentions and, in 
the end, their decision to conveniently use the IDMS. IDMS having privacy-design flaws can 
generate adverse consequences for consumers, including the risk of identity theft. On the con-
trary, IDMS can play a privacy-protective role, particularly in the context of social interac-
tions. On the basis of this extended theoretical framework, recommendations for the improved 
design of privacy-enhancing IDMS can be derived. Table 2 is a summary of the major items, 
which must be taken into consideration during the design of privacy-enhancing technologies. 
For instance, the concept of privacy will result in a system having privacy as a default [37]. 
Similarly, trust considerations will help in overcoming the dilemma between identity assur-
ance and privacy [36], [38]. 
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Design Guidelines for Privacy-Enhancing IDMS Privacy protection has been traditionally 
based on laws, policies, and regulations with the aim of protecting the individual from large 
entities such as corporations and governments [43]. Lately, various privacy-enhancing initia-
tives on a national scale, such as CPPs by European Privacy Association and the White 
House’s National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace [44], are aimed at enhancing 
online choice, efficiency, security, and privacy. These initiatives make provisions for protect-
ing one’s privacy from other individuals by addressing issues such as hacking online stalking 
and voyeurism [45]. On the other hand, there are various industry-driven initiatives such as 
Microsoft’s U-Prove and IBM Research’s IDEMIX, which have been greatly influenced by 
Cameron’s Laws of Identity. Overall, governments and policy makers are yearning for the 
application and compliance with the privacy initiatives. From a design perspective, IDMS 
developers have been preoccupied with the technical issues by focusing on providing privacy 
awareness instead of privacy being at the core of design [2], [45]. It is therefore imperative 
that the design guidelines are proposed to ensure that all the fine-grain issues are considered 
that will put privacy issues into perspective. Privacy can be perceived from normative, social, 
and technical perspectives. In [45], the social perspective of privacy focuses on what practices 
relate to privacy, while the normative aspects are about whether a particular behavior is ethi-
cally (or legally) justified. The technical dimension of privacy must therefore focus on how 
the ethical (or legal) and social understandings can be represented formally and implemented 
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practically in an operational system [45]. In other words, the designers must address the ques-
tions regarding the criminal consequences when individuals’ privacy rights are violated. Our 
proposed guidelines address these issues by looking at these questions, given that the three 
perspectives of privacy are not mutually exclusive but interdependent. From the social per-
spective, developers must include features that enhance security and data quality, ease of use, 
and the capability in offering both online and offline a satisfactory user experience. From the 
normative perspective, developers must be aware of existing regulatory framework and pro-
vide users a level of assurance such that the systems can be trusted and are secure. From the 
technical perspective, developers must consider the contexts such as offline or online, com-
mercial or informational, and local or cross border. These factors are summarized in Table 2 
as PU, PEOU, perceived privacy, and perceived trust. 
 
Privacy laws may be enacted based on technical or social considerations, while social interac-
tions may be altered due to changing laws and technology. 
Conclusions 
This study analyzed the concepts of privacy, trust, and the key regulatory and research initia-
tives on privacy enhancing IDMS. Major frameworks including the Laws of Identity, the FIP 
principles, and the PbD principles were examined. As a result, we found that perceived priva-
cy and trust should be added as constructs to the TAM, to adequately represent privacy-
enhancing identity management for the benefit of users and service providers. This aids in 
resolving the privacy paradox and resolving the dilemma between privacy and identity assur-
ance.  
The extensive amount of research in this area has led us to the stage, where we now have a 
fairly good understanding of design principles and best practices, and we also have technolo-
gies available for the development of services and solutions that can empower users, protect 
their privacy, and support fine-grained control of access to resources online. This article is 
therefore an important contribution to further development. The existing legal framework is 
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not sufficient to secure the protection of privacy and has to be improved. The CPP’s when 
implemented will improve and strengthen the existing privacy legislations. Having had a 
thorough review of privacy-enhancing policies, legal framework, and research and commer-
cial initiatives, it seems to us that underlining the reason driving privacy-enhancing IDMS is 
to enable the users to prove a predicate of their identity without giving third parties the oppor-
tunity to access unwarranted information.  
One of the remaining issues is to explore how these frameworks and technologies can address 
privacy and identity management in the physical world. The mechanisms of establishing trust 
in the physical world are not necessarily the same as those that are used in the digital world 
online. As it has been phrased ‘‘the Internet was built without a way to know who or what 
you are connecting to’’ [1]. Many of the recent initiatives are aimed at establishing an identity 
layer on the Internet. But since physical identity cards and tokens are used in both worlds, we 
need more work to link usage and achieve human integration [1]. The users need to feel 
equally comfortable consuming services in the physical and digital world. 
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Abstract: Although personal identity information must primarily be used for protecting and 
promoting the physical needs of individuals, it has also become central to the business models 
of the digital age due to its use for other secondary purposes, resulting in various innovative 
identity management (IdM) solutions in OECD countries. Nonetheless, developing countries 
were still not able to address basic identification challenges such as civil registration, real-
time credentials verifications, etc. This paper discusses a means of communicating identity-
related concepts to policy-makers, technologists, credential issuers and other stakeholders by 
addressing core issues relating to secondary use of personal information. The results of a 
stakeholder workshop in Ghana on secondary use of personal information are presented by 
stating the core issues and recommendations. We propose the adaptation and application of 
existing IdM research and experiences from OECD countries to deal with issues involved in 
using personal information for secondary purposes. 
Key words: identity, identity management, personal information, secondary use, trust, priva-
cy. 
 
Technological advancements have paved the way for fast, easy and relatively cheap collec-
tion, aggregation and analysis of large volumes of data by third parties, with little or no in-
volvement of the data subject 27 (MALHOTRA, KIM & AGARWAL, 2004; BÉLANGER & 
CROSSLER, 2011). At the core of these developments is the commoditisation of personal 
information, which has become a key component of modern business models. Parties in busi-
                                                 
 
27
 Data subject is the individual to whom personal data relates. 
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ness transactions and social interactions usually rely on unique credentials 28 for proofs of 
identity, which sometimes are unrelated to the primary purpose of the credentials. Such sec-
ondary uses of personal information are necessary in various jurisdictions, because the ma-
jority of business transactions and social interactions entail various forms of identity verifica-
tions and identity assurances. For instance, passports are primarily issued to aid border con-
trol, but sometimes might be required by banks or car rental agencies as proof of identity. 
Incidentally, such personal information usage also presents complex ethical, technological 
and policy challenges, which usually border on privacy, trust and security. These challenges 
have played a significant role in preventing access to and expansion of personal identity in-
formation (or simply "personal information") uses for secondary purposes. 
Research consortiums and technology business organisations in countries within the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have developed cutting-edge 
solutions for addressing both offline and online technological and regulatory issues in identity 
management systems (IdMS), e.g. U-prove (Microsoft_Connect, 2010), OpenID (RECOR-
DON & REED, 2006), Idemix (IBM_Research, 2010), Touch2id (Evry, 2010), etc. These 
developments can aid successful or effective uses of personal information for secondary pur-
poses. For instance, businesses can now instantly verify the authenticity of credentials pre-
sented by clients, whilst maintaining the privacy of the holder. Government agencies can rely 
on information in identity databases to offer targeted social services to citizens.  
In developing countries identification problems continue to persist, although many different 
credentials and tokens are issued to citizens, sometimes at a huge cost to the state. In Ghana, 
for instance, several independent IdMSs have been implemented resulting in the distribution 
of many forms of credentials. National Identification Cards, Birth and Death Registration, 
National Health Insurance Cards, Biometric Passports, Biometric Driver's Licences, Bio-
metric Voter's Identity Cards and Tax Identification Numbers (TIN) are some of the widely 
used credentials. 
All the IdM projects have focused on physical verification by the issuer 29 or their agencies in 
fulfilment of their mandate, with little emphasis on secondary usage by third parties and 
                                                 
 
28
 Credential is a generic term that can apply to both paper documents like Passports or Birth Certificates, and 
non-paper based objects such as smartcards and other tokens. 
29
 Issuer is an agency that is legally authorised to issue credentials, such as the National Identification Authority 
or Passport Office. 
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online or Internet-based transactions. Many of the projects are initiated by government agen-
cies with little private sector participation. Moreover, there is a general lack of interoperabil-
ity and institutional co-operation contributing to difficulty in verifying the validity of key 
source documents like birth certificates and identity credentials, multiple registrations, imper-
sonation, etc. Coherent policies, standards and best practices for secondary uses of personal 
information have therefore become imperative as a result of the growing availability of tech-
nologies supporting secondary uses. Addressing the many challenges ultimately requires a 
national framework for secondary use of personal information that is in the interest of citi-
zens. The issues raised inspired this study to organise a stakeholder workshop to promote na-
tional discourse on secondary uses of personal information and their attendant issues. 
The objective of this paper is to provide a means of communicating identity-related concepts 
to policy-makers, technologists, privacy advocates and users. The paper also addresses core 
issues relating to what constitutes personal identity information and user concerns in relation 
to secondary uses of personal information. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The 
subsequent section discusses the background for this work. We then proceed to a comprehen-
sive literature review discussing primary and secondary uses of personal identity information, 
the issue of identity, identification and identity management systems, and the major concerns 
of secondary uses of personal identity information. Subsequently we introduce our methodol-
ogy for the study. The results from a stakeholder workshop in Ghana and follow-up inter-
views are presented, followed by a summary and discussion of the findings from the study. 
We present our conclusions in the final section, making a case for further studies in connec-
tion with commercialisation of personal identity information.  
Background 
Research, development and implementation of identity management systems in OECD coun-
tries have progressively gone through many stages, and various models have emerged. Cur-
rently, IdMS discussions in OECD countries have moved beyond issues in relation to civil 
registration coverage of births, silo and federated IdM models to user-centric IdM, where 
many of the research efforts are focused on identity assurance (EnCoRe, 2012; CROSBY, 
2008). Moreover, many of the issues in connection with offline credential presentation and 
verification have been largely addressed, leading to more emphasis on electronic identity 
management systems with attribute-based credentials for enhancing privacy and anonymity as 
the research focus. Several pilot and real life solutions have been successfully tested (CA-
MENISCH, et al., 2011).  
Page | 193 
On the contrary, many developing countries have still not been able to deal with fundamental 
identification challenges, and undue emphasis is still on primary usage of tokens by credential 
issuers and on physical verification, with little room for identity assurance and real-time veri-
fication by third parties. Some of the identification challenges can be traced to the reliability 
of source documents like birth and death register. In Ghana, for instance, the birth registration 
coverage is 71% according to WHO 2012 Health Statistics Report (WHO, 2012). This situa-
tion hinders the reliability of identity tokens for secondary uses by businesses and government 
agencies.  
Existing IdM initiatives in Ghana are heterogeneous and independently managed with little 
involvement of other government agencies and the private sector. The various identification 
databases are all in silos and used primarily by the credential issuers as a means of fulfilling 
their main objective – e.g. voters' identity card is for electoral purposes. If a citizen's status 
changes (e.g. name change due to marriage), or the citizen changes address, the necessary 
changes have to be made with all the credential issuers separately. Moreover, Internet applica-
tions of such credentials have not been a priority, thereby all the credentials are mainly for 
physical verifications. For instance, if a credential is presented for services, the service pro-
viders have no formal means of verifying its authenticity in real-time. There are opportunities 
for application developers to collaborate with credential issuers to develop verification and 
authentication systems for business. One such scenario is a local business that has developed 
credential verification application for financial institutions based on the voter register. The 
major challenge in this regard is lack of clear policies on secondary uses of personal infor-
mation. 
Literature review  
An important aspect of the study has been to review IdM-related publications in research 
journals, and IdMS research and development in OECD countries. The key research works 
studied were: OECD Digital Economy Papers on identity management, European Union re-
search projects on Future of IDentity in the Information Society (FIDIS) (FIDIS, 2007), Pri-
vacy and Identity Management in Europe for Life (PrimeLife), and Attribute Based Creden-
tials for Trust (ABC4Trust 30) (CAMENISCH et al., 2011); the Kantara Initiative (WILTON, 
2008); United Kingdom based research project on Ensuring Consent and Revocation (En-
CoRe, 2012) and the US government's National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 
                                                 
 
30
 http://www.abc4trust.eu/ 
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(NSTIC, 2011). Our study also draws on key IdM and privacy-related articles from MIS 
Quarterly (BÉLANGER & CROSSLER, 2011; PAVLOU, 2011), The Seven Laws of Identity 
(CAMERON, 2005), and Privacy by Design (CAVOUKIAN, 2008). The authors also listened 
to and watched various podcasts on U-Prove (Microsoft_Connect, 2010), and Idemix 
(IBM_Research, 2010) to understand the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving identity man-
agement systems. Unfortunately, there were not many IdMS-related research articles from 
developing countries.  
 
Identity, identification and identity management 
The issue of identity has been widely researched from the perspective of technical scientists, 
psychologists, sociologists, etc. From a mathematical perspective, Leibnitz defined identity 
on the basis of whether two things can be distinguished from each other (WILTON, 2008; 
FELDMAN, 1970). He postulated that two objects sharing similar characteristics like shape, 
extent, position in time and space, could be deemed to have or share the relationship of identi-
ty (FELDMAN, 1970). Likewise, in our day-to-day physical interactions and on the Internet, 
we leave our footprint in the form of pieces of information about ourselves, which accrete in 
various ways as we interact online. A person's identity is regarded as a reflection of those 
things, which are generally known about them by the people with whom they interact (WIL-
TON, 2008). Identity is therefore a part of a chain of events from enrolment and credential 
issue through to credential presentation and hence a process, rather than a state. 
Identification on the other hand is the process of linking information with a particular person, 
thus the action of being identified (CROMPTON, 2004). If identification is a process, then the 
integrity of the identification process and its usefulness will depend on the following factors: 
the reliability of the registration processes, verification and enrolment; how difficult it is to 
duplicate or alter credentials; and the difficulty in verifying the link between the credentials 
themselves and the person presenting them. To meet such identification criteria, an efficient 
system for managing identity will be necessary. Identity management therefore consists of the 
processes and all underlying technologies for the creation, management and usage of identi-
ties and their attributes. In effect, identity management unduly focuses on credential issuers 
and identity service providers with its implication on trust and misinterpretation of secrecy as 
a means of privacy protection.  
Measures aimed at working towards user satisfaction lead to more focus on identity assur-
ance. Identity assurance is a consumer/user led concept that enables data subjects to prove or 
provide informational representation during a chain of events that can define who they are 
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without the need for them being physically present (CROSBY, 2008). Identity assurance must 
be a key element in identity management since it offers mutual benefits to identity service 
providers and to citizens. An identity assurance scheme can address issues such as the amount 
and type of data stored and the degree to which this information is shared. 
 
Personal identity information 
Personal information has become central to the business models of the digital age; to the 
management of government and state institutions; and to people's everyday lives and relation-
ships. Business organizations sometimes apply strategies aimed at personalising service de-
livery to customers by focusing on customer preferences in order to offer specialised services 
(ALATALO & SIPONEN, 2001). Such practices could offer customers convenience, effi-
ciency and personalisation, which can contribute to repeat of purchases. This inherently re-
quires collection of pieces of customers' personal data or attributes. Among others, this is one 
reason why there is the need to take a closer look at what constitutes personal information 
(ANDRADE, KALTCHEVA & WEITZ, 2002).  
Personal information is any information that specifically identifies an individual (e.g. name, 
telephone number, e-mail address, or account number), or their location or activities, such as 
information about his or her use of a website, when directly linked to personally identifiable 
information. In his Onion Model (WILTON, 2008), Wilton uses the layers of an onion as an 
illustration to categorise personal information into three layers – the core, inner layer and the 
outer layer. Information that can uniquely identify an individual and does not change over 
time, (e.g. name, date of birth) was placed at the core. Information at the core is known as a 
Basic Identifier Set (WILTON, 2008). The inner layer consists of information that is capable 
of being used for identification but susceptible to change over time, such as address, height, 
etc. The outer layer consists of information that cannot uniquely identify a person, except 
when combined with some other information or aggregated overtime, such as a person's 
transaction history and sector specific information like blood group and health status. In ef-
fect, personal information is any information describing a natural person or information that 
describes an identifiable individual (TRUBOW, 1992) 
Primary and secondary uses of personal information 
Information must generally be used for the purpose of protecting, promoting, or meeting the 
physical needs of an individual or to enable that individual to participate in social interactions 
or benefit from services. Such information usages are regarded as the primary purposes of 
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collecting personal information. For instance, the primary purpose of a Voter ID card is for an 
individual to vote in an election and that of a passport is to facilitate border control. Many of 
the data protection regulations mandate that personal information gathered for one purpose 
may not be used for any other purpose without the specific, informed consent of the data sub-
ject (TRUBOW, 1992). However, in order to conduct business such as opening a bank ac-
count, banks sometimes require tokens like a passport as a proof of identity. Such a require-
ment by the bank is secondary to the original intention of passports and voter IDs. 
Culnan conceptualised secondary uses of personal information as having two dimensions: (1) 
The information processing activity (acquisition, use, or transfer) and (2) The relationship 
between the consumer and the firm utilizing the information (existing customer or prospect) 
(CULNAN, 1993). Secondary use of personal information therefore implies collection and 
storage of information for purposes other than originally intended by the issuer of the creden-
tial, whether legitimate or otherwise. Access to and use of personal information can in princi-
ple pose a number of complex challenges. In effect, for secondary use of personal information 
to be legitimate, there must be an "implied social contract" (tacit or explicit consent by service 
provides to protect the interest of data subjects) between service providers and users (MILNE, 
1993). Where there is a perception of breach of such confidentiality, it affects the trusting 
relationship that should exist between service providers and data subjects (SOLOVE, 2006). 
Given that technological developments make such breaches difficult to notice, secondary use 
of personal information poses technological, policy and regulatory concerns in relation with 
the ability to collect, store, aggregate, link, and transmit personal information for legitimate 
purposes. Such challenges have generally been researched in information systems under in-
formation privacy. 
Privacy, information privacy and privacy concerns 
Privacy is a topic, which has been studied in many different ways due to its many dimensions 
(SMITH, MILBERG & BURKE, 1996). It has been described as a condition or a state in 
which an individual can be more or less inaccessible to others, either on the spatial, psycho-
logical or informational plane (WHITLEY & KANELLOPOULOU, 2010). From psychology 
literature, WESTIN (1967) described privacy as the ability of individuals to control the terms 
under which personal information is acquired and used. From a sociological viewpoint, priva-
cy has been defined as individuals' ability to independently dispose of their roles according to 
their right of self-determination, and then to have confidence that third parties respect the in-
tended separation of their roles (BISKUP & BRÜGGEMANN, 1988). Defining privacy as an 
individual's personal space, CLARKE (1999) categorized personal space into four dimensions 
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– privacy of the person (concerned with the integrity of the Individual's body), privacy of per-
sonal behaviour, personal communications, and privacy of personal data. Recent research has 
merged personal communication and data privacy into what is referred to as information pri-
vacy, due to the increased digitalization of information and communications (BÉLANGER & 
CROSSLER, 2011; PAVLOU, 2011). Hence, information privacy refers to the claims of in-
dividuals that their personal data should generally not be available to others, and that, where 
data are possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial de-
gree of control over the data and their use (BÉLANGER & CROSSLER, 2011). 
Information privacy concerns are related to factors affecting a person's willingness to render 
personal information (DINEV & PAUL, 2006), engage in online transaction activity (PAV-
LOU, LIANG & XUE, 2007), and the attitude towards government regulation (MILBERG et 
al., 2002). Although individuals express privacy concerns, many are willing to trade-in their 
privacy for convenience. This so-called privacy paradox (NORBERG, HORNE & HORNE, 
2007; ZALLONE, 2010; ADJEI & OLESEN, 2011) also reaffirms the need for a more meas-
ured treatment of personal information. Thus, information privacy is not about secrecy, which 
is an intentional concealment of information and (or) a disposition toward the sharing of po-
tentially inaccurate information (TRUBOW, 1992). OECD guidelines (OECD, 1980), and 
other national data protection laws address various aspects of information privacy concerns, 
such as; (1) The existence of record systems cannot be kept secret; (2) an individual must be 
able to "find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used"; and (3) an 
individual must be able to "correct or amend a record of personally identifiable information 
(SOLOVE, 2006). 
BÉLANGER & CROSSLER (2011) observed that development of privacy tools and technol-
ogies is usually done in isolation of the actual users and for that matter their input are not re-
flected in the systems design. The research approach adopted in this study is to address such 
concerns and to ensure active user involvement in secondary uses of their personal infor-
mation. 
Figure 1 – Privacy and dimensions of privacy 
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Figure 1 outlines the dimensions of privacy. Information privacy is related to personal com-
munication privacy and data privacy. Major sources of concern are during data collection, 
data processing and data dissemination. Information privacy concerns affect individuals' will-
ingness to provide information, their transaction activities and responses to government regu-
lations. 
 
Stakeholder workshop and interviews 
This study adopted a qualitative methodological approach for data collection (YIN, 2009) 
resulting in a review of literature on the state-of-art on identity management, privacy issues in 
secondary use of personal information. The Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(SMITH, 2004) approach was applied in the data analysis due to its reliability with respect to 
audio-visual contents, which is very common in focus group and workshop discussions. The 
issue of concern and for that matter the subject of the study was to find out what needs to be 
done in order to trigger successful or effective secondary uses of personal information within 
the context of an economy.  
 
Stakeholder workshop 
A stakeholder workshop was organised in Ghana on January 16, 2012, at Ghana Telecom 
University College (GTUC) in Accra. 75 participants were offered the opportunity to discuss 
a number of issues and listen to presentations highlighting issues concerning secondary uses 
of personal information. Letters were written to all the participants, and detailing the theme, 
agenda and activities for the day. The participants were made up of senior officials from na-
tional institutions involved in the collection and storage of personal information, such as Reg-
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istrar of Births & Death, The Passport Office, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), 
National Identification Authority (NIA), National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), Elec-
toral Commission (EC), Ghana Revenue Authority. Also represented were senior officials of 
the major financial institutions, biometric and identity-related businesses, academic institu-
tions, the media, non-governmental organisations involved in civil right advocacy, and the 
general public.  
Ghana was selected as the research setting because the challenges faced by the economy with 
respect to identification and secondary uses of personal information are similar to those of 
other developing countries. Notable challenges include unreliable civil registration systems, 
electoral issues due to unreliable voters register, lack of identity management systems in-
teroperability, etc. The workshop began with a statement from the Minister of Communica-
tion and a keynote address by the President of GTUC, who chaired the event. To inform dis-
cussions participants were given background information and copies of the discussion ques-
tions during a presentation on privacy and identity management. The presentation highlighted 
the key concepts on identity management, including major policy, technological and regulato-
ry issues and related IdMS research and practices in OECD countries. This was followed by 
another presentation on existing secondary uses of personal information for identity verifica-
tion by financial institutions. 
After the presentations participants shared their observations on the topic during the discus-
sion session. Participants were also made to discuss the issues raised and share their experi-
ences and their reservations. Where a particular issue or questions were sector-specific, the 
agencies concerned were given the opportunity to respond to such questions. Some of the 
discussion questions were: 
What are the potential benefits and risks regarding the secondary use of personal information? 
Who has the right to access personal information held by government agencies and for what 
purposes? 
What are the evolving public trust issues with respect to secondary use of personal infor-
mation?  
Do citizens have the right to put constraints on the use of their personal information? 
What problems may develop as innovative technologies enhance the ability and ease of wide-
spread personal data sharing for a secondary purpose and commercial uses? 
What can be done to address issues arising from inappropriate use and/or exploitation of per-
sonal information?  
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What regulations, legislation, and/or policies and procedures are needed to address these is-
sues? 
Interviews 
A series of expert and stakeholder interviews were conducted after the workshop to offer 
stakeholders the opportunity to elaborate on some of the concerns raised by participants. It 
also offered interviewees the opportunity to clarify some of the points raised during the work-
shop and to solicit for further information. Interviewees included the officials of identity issu-
ers, policy makers, journalists, private businesses involved in identity verification, and identi-
ty card manufacturers. 
Transcription and coding 
Transcripts of the workshop discussions and the interviews, in the form of audio-visual re-
cordings, interview notes and summary of the discussion session were produced by the au-
thors. The transcription mainly focused on speeches and statements made rather than who 
said what. This was meant to maintain speaker anonymity. No attempt was made either to 
identify speech patterns, since that was not the focus of our research. Each of the transcripts 
was coded on the basis of the introductory background of the various speakers, since each of 
the participants and interviewees were told to introduce themselves before speaking. This 
served as a basis for coding and sub-categorisation of the transcript. This style of coding and 
categorisation aided to consolidate the transcript into analytically distinct segments that could 
be examined together both within and between groups that covered the same concept 
(SMITH, 2004; WHITLEY & KANELLOPOULOU, 2010). For instance, statements like 
"Sorting out accurate birth register can reduce multiple registration", were felt to convey the 
same ideas as "many people present fraudulent birth certificate for IdMS enrolment". Hence, 
these two sets of codes were merged.  
 
Results from the workshop and interviews  
The organisation of the workshop, the presentations, application demonstrations, and ques-
tions and responses, prompted a lively discussion of the key issues, the available opportunities 
for secondary uses, and the major challenges. The analysis was also based on the major 
themes from the literature involving constant search through the codes and categories for con-
tradictory and distinct claims and statements from the transcript (WHITLEY & KANEL-
LOPOULOU, 2010).  
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The workshop enumerated many important issues associated with secondary uses of personal 
information. The issues were discussed from user, national and business perspectives. How-
ever there were areas where there existed commonality of opinions among participants. For 
instance, many of the participants were of the opinion that "organisations that make a con-
scious effort to maintain customer's privacy will in return gain customer loyalty". Highlights 
of the discussion are summarised in the following: 
User perspective  
From the user perspective, privacy and security of personal information, risk and cost associ-
ated with privacy abuses, government intervention policies and programs were of major con-
cern. As an example, there are instances where "a person will go to a bank to withdraw remit-
tances only to find out to their amazement that another person had already withdrawn the 
funds with that individual's personal details and sometimes fraudulent credentials". The panel 
discussed privacy implications of a real life scenario, where an identity issuer has authorised a 
private entity to operate a system for financial institutions to verify the authenticity of creden-
tials, presented by customers. The key challenges to real time electronic information ex-
change were cost of bandwidth and power fluctuation, which are common in developing 
countries. Wilton's Onion model of Identity (WILTON, 2008) was also used to discuss, how 
personal information can be segregated to avoid linkability. It was observed that for users' 
interest to be served there was the need for emphasis on identity assurance (CROSBY, 2008; 
WHITLEY & KANELLOPOULOU, 2010)  
Business perspective  
Major discussion topics included the growing commercialization of personal information 
where there were several varied opinions. It became apparent that efforts should be made by 
government agencies to promote effective secondary uses. Panellists observed that there were 
not many opportunities for secondary uses in Ghana, a situation that is common in many de-
veloping countries, and hence the need for creation of a taxonomy of secondary uses of per-
sonal information. Two industry viewpoints provoked dialogue, one from the credential issu-
ers, who think that third party verification is not their core business, and a second from the 
financial institutions, who need such verification to conduct transactions. Tables 1, 2 and 3 
outline business, the key roles and responsibilities.  
National perspective 
The panel discussed the growing use of IdMS for national security, public health, social secu-
rity, child protection and payment processing. These can only be realised if policy makers and 
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credential issuers will see personal information not as matter of secrecy but something that, if 
well managed, can facilitate business transactions and a knowledge economy. Options for 
adaptation of various OECD research initiatives were discussed including roles and responsi-
bilities of key stakeholders as shown in tables 1, 2 and 3. For instance, the rules for obtaining 
user consent secondary uses, addressing civil registration issues, etc. There were diverse opin-
ions regarding the most effective and practical approaches to accomplish this, and hence this 
is a subject for further discussion. 
Table 1 – Typical secondary use scenario:  
key stakeholders, their interests and responsibilities 
Typical Trans-
actions 
Businesses Consumers Identity Issuer 
Online transac-
tions 
Business need information 
on customers and their 
transaction history  
Consumers would like to apply 
for jobs or make online pay-
ment and to ensure privacy 
protection 
Must ensure that 
credentials held by 
the right person 
Transaction 
Negotiation 
Businesses want prior 
knowledge of customer 
preferences. 
Consumers would like to know 
if the seller or the transaction is 
genuine.  
Must ensure real-time 
credential verifica-
tion. 
Identity Verifi-
cation 
Businesses want proof that 
customers are legitimate.  
Customers need assurance that 
their privacy is not abused 
Enforce minimum 
disclosure and data 
security policies 
Payment Con-
firmation 
Businesses want assurance 
that customers are credit 
worthy 
Customers need a proof of total 
cost to avoid any hidden charg-
es.  
Would like to issue 
credentials that are 
easy to use  
Payment Assur-
ance  
Businesses want assurance 
that customers will pay on 
due date. 
Desires protection against dis-
closure of payment details and 
unauthorised deductions  
Must ensure that 
systems are secure 
from abuse. 
Order Fulfil-
ment/ Delivery 
Businesses need protection 
against customers' unjusti-
fied cancellation of order. 
Customers would like to ensure 
that goods and services are de-
livered. 
Must ensure that 
credential infor-
mation is reliable. 
 
Major findings and discussion  
The discussion revealed the need for a paradigm shift with respect to ownership and control 
of personal information. The "identity" an individual seeks to assert is not their physical being 
as such, but rather an informational representation of the chain of life events that is defined by 
who they are. The particular events of relevance depend on with whom the individual is deal-
ing and will lead to different entitlements. In that regard, attention must be focused on access 
to and control of personal information rather than data ownership. Focusing on data access 
and controls will ensure that appropriate policies for secondary uses of personal information 
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will be developed since focusing on data ownership diverts attention from needed policies and 
practices. The workshop therefore recommended focus on data access, control policies and 
practices as the best approaches to risk management and mitigation for secondary use of per-
sonal information.  
Table 2 provides a summary of some of the key recommendations. 
Table 2 – Recommendations for secondary uses of personal information 
Issues discussed Recommendation 
Policy on secondary uses Implement transparent policies and practices for secondary uses of 
personal information, taking advantage of available research and 
technologies.  
Access to personal information Focus on data access and control policies and practices for second-
ary use of data and not data ownership or secrecy. 
Trusted identities Ensure reliable civil registration. 
Benefits and challenges associat-
ed with secondary use of infor-
mation 
Increase public education on benefits of secondary use of personal 
information. 
Available secondary uses Create a taxonomy of secondary uses of personal information and 
clarify its societal, public policy, legal, and technical implications 
Privacy and trust emerged as two major issues; firstly, lack of understanding and inability to 
differentiate privacy from secrecy; and secondly, inadequacy of safeguard procedures that 
address user concerns in relation to secondary uses of personal information. In essence, citi-
zens would like to be able to assert their identity with ease and confidence and hence they 
need such assurances (CROSBY, 2008). The workshop observed that lack of clear regulations 
(e.g. uses of data obtained via coerced or compelled consent) could result in the erosion of 
public trust. A taxonomy for identifying possible secondary uses of personal information is 
therefore required in order to clarify societal, public policy, legal and technical issues arising 
from secondary use of personal information. 
Policy considerations 
"As long as we persist with a 17th century notion of national sovereignty, an 18th century ju-
diciary and 19th century law enforcement, the 21st century will belong to organised crime." 
(Jeffrey Robinson 31) 
                                                 
 
31
 Jeffrey Robinson: writer on money laundering and organized crime. 
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Addressing the issues raised requires clearly defined policy initiatives. The following section 
outlines requirements for appropriate policies to provide high-level guidance for secondary 
uses of personal information, user empowerment, security, and privacy protection. 
Interoperability  
Policy issues in relation to IdMS interoperability have legal, business process and technical 
implications. The challenges are for credential issuers and service providers to articulate clear 
sets of policies containing a common set of elements, to enable comparison of those policies 
across organisations, to highlight areas of compatibility and to facilitate policy interoperabil-
ity. At the legal level, there is the need for regulatory interoperability among various creden-
tial issuers in order to minimise regulatory complexities (OECD, 2011).  
Information privacy and user empowerment  
Many of the digital IdM solutions and privacy related principles like user control and consent, 
anonymity, (un)linkability, minimum disclosure, etc, implicitly assume a certain level of user 
literacy. This is not always the case for all users (CAMERON, 2005; OECD, 1980). Public 
education and awareness programs will play a major role in empowering users and fostering 
trust. 
Security and trust 
There is a need for the development of consistent policies to ensure availability, confidentiali-
ty and integrity of personal identity data stored and exchanged since these are where user 
concerns emanates from. Inherent challenges in this regard are the constant availability of the 
systems and accuracy. Greater transparency in the enrolment and system use will increase 
citizens’ trust in institutions.  
Table 3 summarizes the identified responsibilities of the various stakeholders in order to pro-
mote the secondary use of personal information. 
Table 3 – Stakeholders responsibilities in promoting secondary use of personal information  
Principles and guide-
lines 
Credential issuers Service providers Policy makers 
The Laws of Identity & 
Privacy by Design (PbD) 
Guidelines, etc. 
Review existing IdMSs to 
ensure trusted identities  
Develop easy to use 
privacy enhancing 
applications  
Privacy audit of existing 
mainstream IdMS  
Privacy Research Initia-
tives 
Adopt and adapt attribute 
based privacy enhancing 
credentials 
Develop minimum 
disclosure applica-
tions  
Empower users by pro-
moting awareness pro-
grammes  
OECD Guidelines and Implementation of in- Focus on PbD & Review policies to en-
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Data protection laws teroperability policies Training sure process interopera-
bility 
Institutional Specific 
Laws 
Identify conflicting areas  Report conflicting 
laws 
Review laws to ensure 
legal interoperability 
 
Conclusion and further research  
Central to effective uses of personal information is an efficient civic registration system, a 
regulatory framework that encourages institutional collaboration, clear policies and guidelines 
that provide assurance of citizens' privacy and cost effective application systems. This is what 
the paper attempted to highlight by using the stakeholder approach and is considered its major 
achievement. The study has also helped to raise awareness of current technological develop-
ments and in IdMS and how developing countries can adapt and apply them. This call has 
been guided by the fact that application of Digital identity management is a process, rather 
than a state, the integrity of which depends on: how reliable were the initial processes of reg-
istration, verification and enrolment, and how hard is it to duplicate or alter the credentials 
used? (WILTON, 2008).  
Moreover, the use of the stakeholder workshop was as an attempt to bring together users and 
researchers, public and private sector organizations. It is a key methodological contribution 
and also a response to BÉLANGER & CROSSLER's (2011) call for closer collaboration be-
tween researchers, developers and users to ensure effective uses of privacy enhancing identity 
management systems.  
Like many qualitative research methodologies a key limitation of our study is its lack of em-
pirical testing of the claims compared to quantitative research. Also given that certain societal 
dynamics are peculiar to different countries, care must be taken in generalizing the findings 
from our study to other countries.  
A follow-up stakeholder workshop that combines focus group discussions to recommend 
practical solutions for secondary uses of personal information for commercial purposes is 
planned in the last quarter of 2012. 
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Abstract—This paper discusses the effect of trust and information privacy concerns on citi-
zens’ attitude towards national identity management systems. We propose the privacy-
concerns-trust model, which shows the role of trust in mediating and moderating citizens’ 
attitude towards identity management systems. We adopted a qualitative research approach in 
our analysis of data that was gathered through a series of interviews and a stakeholder work-
shop in Ghana. Our findings indicate that, beyond the threshold level of trust, societal infor-
mation privacy concern is low; hence, trust is high, thereby encouraging further institutional 
collaboration and acceptance of citizens’ informational self-determination.   
Keywords-Identity Management; PCT Curve; Privacy Concern; Trust; Trusted Identities. 
Introduction 
Although digital Identity Management (IdM) is fundamental to electronic government, glob-
ally, its implementation and adoption by citizens usually presents complex issues for its many 
stakeholders. The complexity has been attributed to the fact that it transcends technological 
issues as well as policy, legal, institutional, and economic aspects of society. The complexity 
is also compounded by the rate, at which standards and technological solutions become obso-
lete; the flexibility and ease of collection, use, dissemination of data; and the increased link-
ability of information to the data subject. This raises the potential for privacy concerns [1].  
Ironically, previous privacy research has shown that individuals disclose personal information 
in exchange for some economic or social benefit subject to the "privacy calculus", an assess-
ment that their personal information will subsequently be used fairly, and that they will not 
suffer negative consequences [2]. Moreover, where individuals can exercise some degree of 
control over data collection and use; information is collected in the context of an existing rela-
tionship; the information collected or used is relevant to the transaction; and they believe the 
information will be used to draw reliable and valid inferences about them; citizens are less 
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likely to raise concerns. Unfortunately, this is usually not the case. These phenomena often 
occur without direct involvement or control of the data subjects. 
Governments in many countries have implemented some form of identity management as a 
critical enabler of government to citizens’ interactions, and in the facilitation of business 
transactions. Unfortunately, the costs of implementations are usually not matched by the ben-
efits and citizens’ adoption of the expected or improvement in public services. This makes it 
difficult for governments to justify the implementation, since it often leads to embarrassment 
[3, 4].  
In spite of its use being lower than expected, identity management can play a leading role, if 
the factors that affect its takeoff are properly addressed. Trusted identities ecosystems have 
been found to be very critical to the success of digital IdMS. This research focuses on under-
standing the key stakeholder concerns on information privacy in regards to the collection, 
storage, use, and transmission of personal identity information [5], and how such concerns 
should be addressed to ensure trusted identities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the next section discusses the theoretical back-
ground for trust and privacy concerns, followed by a description of our research design and 
methods. We then discuss our findings from the stakeholder workshop and the interviews. We 
present our conclusions and recommendations for further studies in the final part of the paper. 
Theoretical Background 
The growing deployment of innovative systems for collecting, processing, and sharing per-
sonally-identifiable information place data subjects in a vulnerable situation and has a pro-
pensity to undermine confidence in identity management systems. A 2012 Europe-wide sur-
vey [6] revealed that online users are naturally concerned about risks in online transactions, 
and that users are not in control of their personal information disclosed on the Internet. The 
survey also revealed that users employ a variety of offline and online methods to protect their 
identity; 62 % of users better understand how to protect their identity in the offline transac-
tions using data minimization techniques, whilst 90% trust national institutions and banks 
more than Internet service providers and e-shops [6]. Such observations cannot be true in 
many developing countries.  
In developing countries many of the electronic government projects are viewed with suspi-
cion with very low level of trust in the institutions that manage credentials. The source docu-
ments required for proofs of identities, i.e., civil registration systems are often unreliable [7] 
due to several instances of multiple registrations and enrollments of unqualified people. Busi-
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nesses, usually, have difficulties in verifying the authenticity of credentials individuals pre-
sented for access to services. Credentials can in many instances only be verified manually, 
resulting in undue delays and customer frustration with its attendant privacy information im-
plications. 
 
Information Privacy Concerns 
The issue of privacy is generally based on cognitive perceptions rather than on rational as-
sessments. Privacy concern has been used as a key privacy construct by researchers [8, 9]. 
Smith et al. [10] developed the concern for information privacy (CFIP) model for operational-
izing privacy concerns based on data collection, errors, secondary use, and unauthorized ac-
cess to information or invasion. Collection, use and transmission of personal information by 
identity providers and relying parties must in principle be based on tacit or explicit consent by 
service providers to protect the interest of data subjects [2]. Citizens, therefore, become ap-
prehensive, when their interests are not observed, or the perceived risk of the abuse exceeds 
the benefits derived from such implied social contracts.  
These tensions between organizational use of personal information and societal information 
privacy concern are very topical in privacy research [11]. Previous studies have defined pri-
vacy as the ability of an individual to exercise some degree of control of the access that others 
have to their personal information [12]. Privacy is at risk, if individuals are unable to exercise 
control over their personal information during social interactions and business transactions 
(Solove, 2006; Clarke R. , 1999), and it is therefore disheartening for privacy-aware citizens 
to find out that inaccurate, out-dated, excessive or irrelevant data about them are stored by 
others. 
Information privacy concerns can be categorised as 
• Illegitimate use of information [10], and  
• Secondary use of personal information without the consent of the data subject, for 
purposes outside the primary reason for data collection [1]. 
Therefore, it is imperative that organizations develop information practices that address the 
perceived risks and citizens concerns in order to project an innate trust (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995; Adjei & Olesen, 2011). Although privacy concerns are almost always 
measured at an individual level of analysis, societal concern (overall privacy concerns of a 
nation) should reflect the concerns of its citizens and organizations [17, 18]. Various govern-
mental interventions like regulations and controls are implemented to address societal infor-
mation privacy concerns. Although Bélanger & Crossler [17] and others have discussed the 
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privacy concern, there is still a need to clarify how privacy concern and trust affect each other 
within the context of identity management. This is one of the objectives of this study. 
Trust 
Trust plays an important role in societal discourses and attitudes towards electronic identifica-
tion systems. Due process requires that organizations apply best practices in data acquisition 
and also strive to prevent illegitimate access by others to personal data in their custody. 
Bhattacharya et al. [19] describes trust as having a multidimensional construct and defined 
trust as an expectancy of positive or nonnegative outcomes that one can receive based on the 
expected action of another party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty [19]. Broadly, 
trust is considered as a firm belief in the reliability, competence, qualification, ability, 
strength, integrity, truthfulness, honesty, sincerity, and loyalty of the other party to transaction 
or interaction [20].  
In their study on “an alternative model of trust”, Mayer et al. [15] modelled the concept of 
trust by categorizing the key attributes of trustworthiness as the trustees’ ability to fulfil the 
trusting action, the benevolence of trustees’ intentions, and their integrity [15, 21]. Their defi-
nition was based on one person’s beliefs about the characteristics of another person. In effect, 
trustworthiness can be operationalized using these three attributes of the trustee. Ability signi-
fies competence or perceived expertise, business sense and judgement. Consistency, fairness 
and reliability describe integrity, whereas loyalty, openness and availability signify benevo-
lence (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Adjei & Olesen, 2011). These attributes are im-
portant determinants of the success of IdMS, since it can affect the usage behaviours of the 
systems.  
Figure 1: Qualitative relationship between privacy concern and trust. 
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A trust relationship is made up of three elements – the truster, the trustee, and the context in 
which trust is conferred [20]. Trusters are the citizens and relying parties, the trustees are the 
credential issuers and service providers, and the context is an IdMS or the electronic identity 
card scheme.  
Perception of trust can be either due to the technology or the institutions [22]. A low citizens 
trust in credentials issuers and IdMS will be a major disincentive to accept the IdMS, since 
there is lack of identity assurance [23]. Such lack of trust can lead to unfavourable outcomes 
of the IdMS. Likewise, a low trust in credential issuers coupled with a high trust in the tech-
nology leads to a situation, where citizens might use technology as a competitive tool against 
the unpredictable and sporadic results. In such a scenario the IdMS will be viewed with suspi-
cion and cynicism by the citizens [24, 22]. 
 
Relationship Between Trust and Privacy Concern 
Various studies have established a relationship between trust and people’s willingness to for-
go their privacy concerns [25, 26]. What is not certain is the nature of the relationship be-
tween privacy, trust and societal attitude towards identity management systems. Trust is 
known to be a mediator between privacy concerns and behaviour [26, 27]. Thus, trust (the 
mediator) is what explains the effect that privacy concern (independent or predictor variable) 
has on societal attitude (the dependent or criterion variable). For instance, a correlation be-
tween income and cancer might be explained by a correlation between income and smoking 
(the mediator), and then between smoking and cancer. Thus, according to mediation models, 
privacy has little or no direct effect on behaviour; instead any effect can be explained by the 
links between privacy and trust, and then between trust and behaviour.  
The relationship between privacy concern and trust can also be explained using the concept of 
moderation [28]. Moderators are variables that affect the directions and strengths of a rela-
tionship between an independent and a dependent variable [28]. Thus, in the case of privacy 
and trust, where there is high trust, privacy concern exerts an influence on behaviour, while in 
low trust environments privacy concern may have a negligible impact on behaviour, since 
behaviour is limited by the lack of trust. This study explains mediator and moderator relation-
ships between privacy concerns, trust and citizens' attitudes towards national identity man-
agement systems. 
Modelling Identity 
Wilton [29] described digital identity as the relationship of idenenrollmenteen a person at the 
time of enrolment, and a person at the time of authentication [29]. Thus, identity is not just a 
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snapshot of a person, but part of a process from enrollment and credential issue of credential 
presentation, authentication and revocation [29]. When such a process is not followed or 
abused, citizens become concerned and lose confidence in the system or the identity service 
providers. 
Privacy Concern-Trust Curve 
Generally, societal interactions and business relationships begin from a low level of trust (dis-
trust) and high privacy concern. With disclosure of more information, strong institutional co-
operation and user awareness, users are able to exercise some degree of user control over their 
personal information, resulting in the establishment of a certain level of trust. Thus, citizens 
become more empowered and revise their negative perceptions about the IdMS and identity 
service providers. This establishment of trust reduces the initial privacy concerns. Thus, a 
high privacy concern is associated with low level of trust, and reduction in privacy concern 
results in an increase in trust. In other words, the mediating and moderating effect of trust can 
result in either a negative or positive societal attitude changes towards IdMS. 
The qualitative relationship between trust and privacy concern is shown in Fig. 1. A certain 
threshold level of trust must be overcome, before the citizens are ready to open up for interac-
tion. The figure also shows that absolute trust or zero privacy concern is not possible within a 
trusted identities environment, and hence the curve can only asymptotically approach the two 
axes. The purpose of the trust framework therefore is for society to establish the framework 
that can overcome the trust threshold. Beyond this level, trust and privacy is adequate to en-
courage more collaboration, creation of new identity-based services, institutional collabora-
tion, etc.  
Research Design and Methods 
This study entailed two main phases – an exploratory phase, which saw the development of 
the model based on literature, and a qualitative based confirmatory phase, which was used to 
evaluate the model. The conceptual model on the basis of theoretical considerations is part of 
an on-going research project that seeks to present a reliable and valid instrument for measur-
ing trusted identities ecosystem. The exploratory phase of the study was organized in line 
with two-step approach for operationalizing constructs and identifying measures [30]. Due to 
the multi-stakeholder nature of trusted national identities, we decided to adopt a research ap-
proach that engages the key actors and hence a qualitative methodological approach was 
deemed the most appropriate means for data collection from a societal perspective [31, 32]. 
We also applied the concepts of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis [33] in our data 
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analysis because of its usefulness in understanding the experiences of individuals. The over-
arching research question was “what are the key requirements for crafting a trusted identities 
ecosystem”. 
Stakeholder Workshop 
Given the societal level of analysis, a stakeholder workshop was organized in Accra, Ghana.  
 
All the major stakeholders involved in the collection, storage, use and issue of identity were 
represented, including Registrar of Births & Death, The Passport Office, Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency (DVLA), National Identification Authority (NIA), National Health Insur-
ance Authority (NHIA), Electoral Commission (EC), Ghana Revenue Authority, financial 
institutions and identity-related businesses, academic institutions, national institutions and 
non-governmental organisations involved in civil right advocacy, and the general public. The 
identification challenges in Ghana are considered to be typical of many developing countries. 
During the workshop participants were offered the opportunity to discuss a number of pre-
pared questions and scenarios. To inform discussions, participants listened to presentations on 
various aspects of trust, privacy and secondary uses of personal information. The presenta-
tions also highlighted the key concepts of trusted identities and the policy, technological and 
regulatory implications as well as related IdMS research and practices in OECD countries 
[34, 35]. The ideal situation as illustrated on Figure 2 was used to explain the benefits of 
trusted identities. 
Some of the discussion questions were: 
 
 
Figure II: Dimensions of Trusted Identity Management Policies 
Page | 216 
1. What are the potential benefits and risks regarding the secondary uses of personal infor-
mation? 
2. What are the major challenges in relying on existing credentials presented for access to ser-
vices? 
3. How can institutional cooperation be encouraged given the conflicting regulations? 
4. What attributes do citizens look for before trusting organizations with respect to secondary use 
of personal information? 
5. What can be done to address issues arising from inappropriate use and/or exploitation of per-
sonal information? 
6. What regulations, legislation, and/or policies are needed to address the evolving challenges? 
 
Interviews 
A series of stakeholder interviews were conducted before and after the workshop. The pre-
workshop interviews were made to identify the key issues and challenges from different per-
spectives. This helped in choosing and phrasing the discussion questions for the stakeholder 
workshop. The follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify some of the points raised dur-
ing the workshop to solicit for further information. Interviewees included the officials of iden-
tity issuers, policy makers, journalists, private businesses involved in identity verification, and 
identity card manufacturers. 
Transcription and Coding 
Although raw data can sometimes be of interest in research they do not usually help the read-
er to understand the world under scrutiny and participants’ views without a systematic analy-
sis to illuminate the situation under investigation [36]. Transcripts were thus initially coded to 
aid meaningful analysis. Data coding, which is an important part of analysis, involves subdi-
viding data into chunks of varying-sized words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, and 
assigning categories [37]. Thus, codes are labels for allocating units of meaning to descriptive 
or inferential information compiled during a study. One of the key objectives of our coding 
approach is to identify relevant examples of the phenomena and analysis of the phenomena to 
discover distinct patterns, differences and commonalities [37].  
Transcript of the workshop discussions and the interviews, in the form of audio-visual record-
ings, interview notes and summary of discussion sessions, were produced by the authors. The 
introductory background of speakers and interviewees were, however, included for coding 
and analysis purposes. This was meant to maintain speaker anonymity. No attempt was made 
to identify speech patterns, since that was not the focus of our research. The nature of the dis-
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cussions and interviews was such that initial coding would not have been helpful since partic-
ipant interviewees were from diverse backgrounds, and opinions were varied. Each of the 
transcripts was coded on the basis of the background of the various speakers, since each of the 
participants and interviewees were told to introduce themselves before speaking. This served 
as basis for coding and sub-categorization of the transcript. 
Discussion of Findings 
Societal Concerns 
Comments and statements made by participants during the interviews and workshop revealed 
a number of societal concerns and the various sources of them. Some of the concerns are 
listed below: 
• “The identity agencies are only there to please their political party and not because they 
are skilled”. 
• “If the electoral commission knew what they are doing, why will they opt for a biometric 
system without a means of verification”? 
• “The information on the National Identification Authority website is so scanty that I have 
no idea what is going on.” 
• “I wonder if the officials of the identification agencies read our emails or even if the 
emails get to the organisations in the first place, because they never respond to emails 
sent to addresses they have provided”. 
• “If I have a problem, I have no idea how to reach them by phone or on the Internet, ex-
cept if I walk to their head office” 
• “I do not know the use of all the information collected by many of the identification 
agencies. For instance, I do not understand, why my actual date of birth is stated on my 
driving license, when they could have simply stated that I am over eighteen or qualified 
to drive.”  
• “Since one can present different documents as proof of identity during voter registration 
or drivers’ license acquisition, it gives room for multiple registrations.” 
Such comments show the need for societal assurance that their opinions are taken seriously. 
In a situation, where citizens do not get responses for the concerns raised, it gives the impres-
sion that citizens are not involved in decisions that concern them. It is therefore important to 
empower citizens in order to generate commitment and contributions. In essence, when citi-
zens’ opinions are taken seriously, they feel that they are involved in decision-making and 
empowered, resulting in increased trust [38, 39].  
Moreover, recruitment of unqualified personnel shows a lack of ability and integrity, which 
are all key attributes of trustworthiness [15, 40]. This is also manifested in comments like  
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• “I always read stories in the dailies about impersonation and people making fake documents especially pass-
ports and birth certificates; many of the officials are involved”.  
 
However, citizens would like to have informational self-determination - a sense of freedom to 
do what is interesting, personally important, and psychologically vitalizing [41]. Such con-
cerns lead to distrust in government institutions and therefore very critical that the system for 
tracking vital source documents like birth and marriage certificates is improved. The key as-
pects of the civil registration that need to be made efficient include, birth, marriage and death 
registration.  
Segregation of Personally Identifiable Information  
Article 7.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states that “the child 
shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the 
right to acquire a nationality, and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his 
or her parents”. The birth certificate for instance contains the given name, surname (or fami-
ly name), gender, date of birth, place of birth, and father and mother names. Given the im-
portance of the birth certificate in the establishment of the core identity, its abuse in the form 
of multiple registration and registration of illegitimate people defeats its usefulness. If the 
birth registration system were to be strengthened, it could act as the basic document that all 
residents must rely on for initial registration.  
The information on the birth certificate represents the ‘Basic Identifier Set’ (BIS) – infor-
mation that can help identify a person and does not change over time [29]. Hence, the birth 
certificate can be a very useful document in addressing issues of multiple registrations, espe-
cially when individuals are made to use the number throughout life. In that case, enrolment of 
foreign nationals who reside in the country should be based on travel documents as part of the 
processing of residence permit.  
Certain transactions requiring proofs of additional information might require credentials that 
show the individual’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII) – additional information that is 
useful for identifying a person but may change over time, such as addresses, marital status, 
physical characteristics like height, hair/eye colour, or complexion [29]. The PII provides 
additional information that can typically not be found in the BIS. For border control purposes 
passport may be preferred more than a birth certificate. In other sector-specific transactions 
and interactions, other attribute data are necessary for effective identity verification. This kind 
of data is information that on its own might not be able to identify a person, but will provide 
important traces when linked to either the BIS or PII data, or when such data are aggregated 
over time and space (e.g. healthcare records, tax return information, driver’s and vehicle li-
Page | 219 
cence, banking and insurance information. Given the sometimes sensitive nature of such in-
formation, e.g. health records, it might require additional level of security to avoid linkability 
to the BIS and PII. In essence, other attribute data are identity-related, albeit ‘sector-specific’,  
 
Strong Focus on Identity and not Credentials  
A common misunderstanding on the part of credential issuers and policy makers during the 
workshop was the equation of strong credentials to efficient identity management systems. 
This became apparent from statements like “we have introduced biometric based ID cards 
that are difficult to forge”.  
There is, therefore, the need to move away from credentials towards unique identification. A 
credential such as a passport or driving licence typically includes some items from each of the 
three aspects of identity – the BIS, PII such as height, eye colour, and some sector-specific 
data such as entitlement to drive specific classes of vehicle, or visas indicating entitlement to 
enter a specific country. This is illustrated on Fig. 3.  
A distinct feature of a credential is that it encapsulates attributes and entitlements in a reliably 
verifiable form. There is therefore the tendency to equate such documents as representing the 
identity of a person when in fact they might not be representative in a given context. For in-
stance, passports and driving licences have historically been presented as foolproof docu-
ments loaded with the necessary information that can enable the holder to access services and 
for authentication purposes. This is not without drawbacks, since it is susceptible to revealing 
more information about the holder than is necessary in any given authentication context. Us-
ing a passport for proof of age will no doubt reveal the passport holder’s name, place of birth 
and citizenship, and a driver’s licence used for similar purpose can also reveal your date of 
birth and address.  
A focus on identity will also make it easier to enforce policies appropriate to the data in ques-
tion, particularly when different sector-specific data items entail different policy controls. For 
instance, entitlement to drive a vehicle may not be part of major privacy concern, whereas 
credit status will, hence data security policies could be segregated to address such data. On 
the other hand, since healthcare history and medical conditions are very sensitive, a different 
set of policies will apply. Graphically, one might think of this as the ability to segregate iden-
tity data into sector-specific segments and cater for discrete management policies by sector 
and data type (cf. Fig. 3). Thus, within a given data segment, assertions of identity (‘the hold-
er of this credential is XX’) may make one kind of data security policy appropriate, while 
Page | 220 
assertions of other attributes (‘the holder of this credential has been treated for Repetitive 
Stress Injury’) may require quite different policy treatment. 
Application of Privacy Enhancing Tools   
Various privacy-enhancing and minimal disclosure technologies have been tested that address 
the requirement not to reveal unnecessary details in transactions. 
 
 
For instance, the touch2ID biometric application allows users to prove their age without stor-
ing or revealing extra details about the individual [42]. Similarly, the ABC4Trust project has 
released and tested guidelines for implementing attribute-based credential technologies focus-
ing on trust, based on Idemix and U-prove technologies [43, 44, 45]. 
In an online context disclosure of excess data can be avoided. Credentials can realistically 
encapsulate just those data items, which serve to uniquely identify the holder (such as the 
BIS), as long as they provide a way of linking to the rest of the holder’s personal data, which 
may be held elsewhere. In other words, the option now exists to make use of the distributed 
nature of networked computing, so as to allow much more flexible ‘placement’ of identity 
data of different types. This is valuable in terms of policy control, because it makes it possible 
to apply controls at the place where the data is held, rather than trying to enforce it wherever 
the credentials are verified.  
Encouraging Trusted Environment 
Trust is what moderates and mediates citizens’ privacy concerns and attitudes towards IdMS. 
Thus, individuals are likely to engage in transactions, if their level of trust exceeds their per-
sonal privacy concern threshold, which is reached, when the potential benefits outweigh the 
risks. This threshold will always depend on the type of transaction and the amount of identifi-
able information revealed. For instance, transactions requiring the revelation of other attribute 
data might require a lower trust threshold. Thus, when positive steps (i.e., data minimisation) 
 
Figure III: Personal Information and how it can be segregated 
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are taken to improve the IdMS, the moderation effect of trust will cause citizens to revise their 
attitude towards the IdMS, leading to more trust in the credential issuers and the technology 
and thereby moving down and to the right on the trust threshold. Similarly any negative ac-
tions on the part of credential issuers will increase the privacy concern and thereby causing a 
move upwards and to the left on the privacy trust curve. The trusted identities framework in 
the United States, where the interest of all stakeholders in the identity ecosystems are taken 
into account, is a clear step taken by the US government to increase trust [35]. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
This paper discussed the issues and challenges associated with accountable management of 
personal identifiable information and the provision of more user control over personal infor-
mation. The findings from this study suggest that information privacy concerns can affect the 
posture of society in relation to attitudes and preferences for regulatory environments and 
willingness to accept a particular identity management system [8, 18, 46, 26]. We also high-
lighted the relationship between information privacy concern and trust from a societal per-
spective, and its effect on trusted identity management systems.  
Our findings show that the unreliable civil registration system can be a major reason for such 
concerns. Given that the civil register is in many instances a key source document for creden-
tial acquisition, its unreliability leads to all kinds of credential abuses. Hence, governments 
especially in developing countries must focus on strengthening the civil registration system in 
order to avert such abuses of personal identity information.  
Our work clearly shows the two steps towards establishment of a trusted national framework, 
which are typical for the situation in many developing countries. Initially, trust is low and 
privacy concerns are high, because of poor implementations, but once the initial problems are 
identified and addressed, it is possible to meet  a threshold level of trust, thereby reducing 
privacy concerns and paving the way for effective business transactions and societal  interac-
tion. This is the point at which societal trust in Identity service providers is high enough to 
encourage institutional collaboration [22], and citizens’ informational self-determination [41]. 
We also highlight the need for policy makers to categorise personal information in a way that 
will encourage secondary uses of personal information whilst ensuring that sensitive personal 
information is released only to legitimate people.  
This study focused mainly on citizens’ attitudes towards identification systems in Ghana and 
that poses a number of issues in terms of generalizability that will need to be tested. For in-
stance, there are peculiar dynamics pertaining to every country and for that matter the infer-
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ences drawn might not be representative for all developing countries. Moreover, the use of a 
qualitative research approach also gives room for inferences that are not tested empirically, as 
is the case of quantitative research. In the future it will be interesting to examine quantitative-
ly the relationship between trust and privacy concerns in relation to citizens’ attitudes towards 
identity management systems. 
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Towards a Trusted National Identities Framework 
Adjei, J. K. (2013). Towards a trusted national identities framework.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Identity assurance and management play a critical role in modern business transactions, socie-
tal interactions as well as national security and border control. Its criticality is compounded by 
the interdependence of communication networks and its convergence with information tech-
nologies in cyberspace. This presents challenges, particularly to policy makers, law enforce-
ment agencies and business executives in addressing the growing trend of identity fraud, other 
forms of identity abuses and misuse of personal information. The issue of trust is thus brought 
to the fore owing to its importance in communication (Giffin, 1967), institutional collabora-
tion (Farrell and Knight, 2003), implementation of self-managed systems (Lawler, 1992) and 
in user empowerment (Smith, 2004). Trust is thus a key foundation of an effective identity 
ecosystem and is shaped by the confidence placed in the systems that create and manage user 
identities (NSTIC, 2011; Grant, 2011). 
Trust is also an important step in the provision of identity assurance (EnCoRe, 2012; Crosby, 
2008) to citizens and in instilling discipline in the use of personal information. In a trusted 
identities ecosystem all stakeholders can effectively collaborate with the assurance of a cer-
tain degree of trust and informational self-determination in their interactions and business 
transactions (NSTIC, 2011; Grant, 2011). The overarching question then is “what are the key 
requirements for crafting a trusted identities ecosystem?”  
This paper addresses this research question using a trusted identities framework by adapting 
concepts from the DeLone and McLean information systems (IS) success model (DeLone & 
McLean, 2003). The IS success model has been applied to evaluate the contributing factors to 
information systems success at the individual and at organisational levels of analysis (Urbach 
and Müller, 2012; Petter, et al., 2008). However, trusted identities ecosystem is a multi-
stakeholder issue and hence has societal level of analysis. We therefore introduce institutional 
co-operation and user empowerment to the DeLone and McLean IS success model as addi-
tional independent variables.  
The paper is organised as follows. The paper begins with a brief background to the study and 
a discussion of the key concepts of trust, personal information uses and information privacy. 
A conceptual model of trusted identities framework is subsequently introduced followed by 
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the research design and methods. The results and discussion of the findings, which includes 
the privacy concern–trust curve and its implication on the trusted identities framework, is then 
presented. The last section presents our conclusions and opportunities for further research. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
A Trusted Identities Ecosystem is a digital identity environment where individuals, organiza-
tions and services can trust each other because all participants in the ecosystem follow estab-
lished standards for digital identity verification and authentication (NSTIC, 2011; Grant, 
2011). The aim of an identity ecosystem is to provide better and more reliable assurances for 
digital identities both physically and online. In a trusted identity ecosystem, users have a high 
degree of assurance that their identity (business, social, health records) will be secure with a 
certain degree of physical and digital anonymity (NSTIC, 2011). “To craft such an environ-
ment, entities relying on claims information must be able to determine what assertions they 
require, the validity of the assertions and whether it is certified or supported with information 
about the credential or claim issuer.”  
The US government is spearheading a scheme to address which claims issuers would be des-
ignated as trustworthy as part of its “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace; 
Enhancing Online Choice, Efficiency, Security, and Privacy” (NSTIC, 2011) through an ac-
creditation process. A key part of their strategy is the recommendations for a series of trust 
frameworks through interoperable policies. The strategy does not describe how a trust frame-
work could be crafted to make the identity ecosystem successful. The strategy although laud-
able also focuses mainly on internet-based transactions as evidenced in its definition of an 
identity ecosystem (NSTIC, 2011). The strategy which is an attempt at democratisation of 
personal information use (Bradwell, 2010) seems laudable and governments in other countries 
might want to emulate it. However, many developing countries were still not able to deal with 
fundamental identification challenges. Primary uses of tokens and credentials are for physical 
verification, by the credential users in pursuit of their core objectives, with little room for 
identity assurance and real-time verification by third parties. 
The identification challenges could in part be traced to the unreliable civil registration sys-
tems which are a key source for identity documents. For instance, in Ghana, birth registration 
coverage is only 71% according to WHO’s 2012 Health Statistics Report (WHO, 2012) which 
indicates that close to a third of the nation’s population are not registered. This challenges the 
reliability of identity tokens for secondary uses by businesses and government agencies. Ex-
isting identity management systems also remain heterogeneous and independently managed 
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identity silos with little involvement of users and service providers (Adjei and Olesen, 2011). 
Changes of address, update of personal details (e.g. surname change owing to marriage), can-
not be handled seamlessly without going through each individual identity provider. Elections 
and landed property acquisitions are usually characterised by controversy because of the lack 
of trust in the identity authentication and verification. Such instances have resulted in a rela-
tively low and declining level of citizens’ trust in credential issuers and service providers 
(Hardin, 1993). 
 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Trust 
The concept of trust has been studied from different perspectives such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, economics and political sciences but a willingness to take risks may be one of the  
few characteristics common to all trust situations (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982; Mayer, 
et al., 1995). In the context of using personal identity information, parties are likely to act and 
react willingly. This is in line with the  definition of trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform 
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party” (Mayer, et al., 1995). This presupposes that in the identity management pro-
cess, data subjects are perceived to be in a vulnerable position and trust is what will induce 
parties to engage in transactions irrespective of the vulnerability levels. Thus, trust is  the 
TABLE I 
KEY CONCEPTS AND STAKEHOLDERS IN IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM 
Con-
cepts/Stakeholders 
Description of Activities 
Data Subjects  (e.g. 
citizens)  
Trustees in the trust framework. To be issued digital identities and credentials to 
complete transactions. 
Identity Providers  Responsible for the processes involved in enrolling subjects in the system and 
issue of credentials. Referred to as trustors in the trust model. 
Attribute Providers Oversee the processes involved in creating, validating, and keeping up the at-
tributes associated with identities. Could be either trustors or trustees in the trust 
model. 
Relying Parties Make transaction decisions based on the receipt of credentials. Trustees in the 
trust model. 
Credential Credential is a generic term that can apply to both paper documents like Pass-
ports or Birth Certificates, and non-paper based objects such as smartcards and 
other tokens. 
Claims A claim is a statement that a person, organization, etc (data subject) makes 
about itself or another subject e.g. name, date of birth citizenship, etc. 
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probability that a party to a transaction will act in a way that is beneficial or at least not detri-
mental to the interest of the other party  for the latter to cooperate (Gambetta, 1988). The 
above definitions make the differences between predictability and trust unclear and hence the 
need to situate trust in its proper context. Although the two are a means of reducing uncertain-
ty, trust goes beyond predictability and hence reduction of uncertainties. Otherwise those who 
can consistently ignore the desires and intentions of trustors and act in their own self-interest 
can be deemed to be trusted, because of their predictability (Mayer, et al., 1995). 
3.2 Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness can be better explained by reference to the three main actors in a trusting 
relationship – trustor, trustee and context (Kramer, 1999; FIDIS, 2009). In this study, trustors 
are the citizens (or virtual citizens since trust can also be a matter between virtual persons 
(Cofta, 2008)). The trustees are the credential issuers and relying parties and the context is the 
identification scheme. Trustworthiness is based on the attributes exhibited by the trustees 
within the context. Mayer et al, (1995) identified three important characteristics that help in 
building the foundation for the development of a trust framework (Mayer, et al., 1995). Abil-
ity, integrity and benevolence have been identified as the key characteristics of trustees in the 
trust development process. Ability signifies competences, perceived expertise, business acu-
men and judgement that enable the trustee to have influence within a particular domain. Be-
nevolence on the other hand connotes the extent to which the trustee can be assured of going 
beyond the profit motive to serve the interest of the trustor. Essentially, benevolence suggests 
that the trustee will behave in a desirable manner towards a set objective, irrespective of their 
personal preferences (Rosen and Jerdee, 1977). Integrity is premised on the trustor having a 
positive perception that the trustee will adhere to a set of acceptable principles. Thus adher-
ence to a set of moral principles accepted by the trustor defines personal integrity. The con-
cept of trust and trustworthiness thus has multidimensional constructs of ability, integrity and 
benevolence. Ability is characterised by competence or perceived expertise; integrity signify-
ing consistency, fairness and reliability; whereas loyalty, openness and availability describe 
benevolence (Mayer, et al., 1995; Adjei and Olesen, 2011).  Therefore a trust relationship can 
be negatively affected when the trustee consistently provides wrong information, refuses to 
provide or delays in the delivery of personal information to a legitimate recipient, or provides 
legitimate information to the wrong persons. Hence, users’ perception of trust towards an 
identity management system (IdMS) is an important determinant of its success as they can 
affect the usage behaviors of the systems.  
3.3 Personal Information Uses and Privacy 
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Personal information comprises  information that  specifically identifies an individual (e.g. 
name, date of birth, address, telephone number, email address, or account number, their loca-
tion, or activities on the Internet that can be linked to that person (Wilton, 2008). Thus it is 
any information describing a natural person or an identifiable individual (Trubow, 1992). Per-
sonal information uses have become central to the business models of the digital age, such as 
the management of government institutions; and to people’s everyday lives and relationships 
(Bradwell, 2010). Such practices could offer user convenience, efficiency and personalisation 
but inherently requires collection of pieces of data subjects’ personal attributes. Although 
such practices can be regarded as an “implied social contract” (Jos P. H., 2006) between ser-
vice providers and users, there are a number of complex legal, privacy and trust issues regard-
ing collection,  storage and use of information for purposes other than the primary intention 
(Milne and Gordon, 1993). To feel private, data subjects must be able to trust credential issu-
ers and service providers to prevent access by others, and to follow best practices and appli-
cable laws in legitimate data acquisition. It is therefore a discomfort for a privacy-aware indi-
vidual to find out that inaccurate, outdated, excessive and irrelevant data about them are 
stored by others (Raab, 2005).  
Privacy in effect is the claim to or the right of individuals to exercise a measure of control 
over the collection, use and disclosure of their personal information (Adjei & Olesen, 2011; 
Pavlou P. A., 2011). However the Internet and allied information technologies continue to 
make the idea of assuming physical control over the collection and use very elusive given that 
data can easily be mishandled (Adjei and Olesen, 2011). Moreover, the concept of privacy has 
both collective and individual dimensions (Regan, 2002) given the privacy implications in 
accessing, storage, use and data sharing of data – information privacy. Clarke defined infor-
mation privacy specifically as “the interest an individual has in controlling, or at least signifi-
cantly influencing, the handling of data about themselves” (Clarke R. , 1994). Hence, infor-
mation privacy refers to the claims of individuals that their personal data should generally not 
be available to others, and that, where data are possessed by another party, the individual 
must be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over the data and their use (Bélanger 
and Crossler, 2011).  
 
Information privacy concerns in effect refer to the factors affecting a person’s willingness to 
render personal information (Dinev and Paul, 2006), engage in online transaction activity 
(Pavlou, et al., 2007), and to comply with government regulations – such as enrolling in na-
tional IdMS programs or acceptance to be profiled (Milberg, Smith, & Burke, 2000; Pavlou P. 
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A., 2011). Generally, individuals are less likely to perceive information practices as privacy-
invasive when (Culnan M. J., 1993; Clarke R. , 1994; Tolchinsky, et al., 1981): 
• information is collected in the context of an existing relationship; 
• they perceive that they have the ability to control future use of the information; 
• the information collected or used is relevant to the transaction; and 
• they believe the information will be used to draw reliable and valid inferences about 
them.  
Hence users are likely to avoid using an IdMS if there is a perception that their personal in-
formation will be subjected to various forms of privacy abuses. It is therefore imperative that 
users are given privacy assurances in IdMS implementations. Such assurances could lead to 
enforcement of privacy regulations, user education and secure and trusted systems. The more 
individuals value privacy, the less control they perceive to have over their personal infor-
mation and this will have a negative implication on trust (Stone, et al., 1983). 
 
4 TRUSTED IDENTITIES FRAMEWORK  
 
 “When the agencies have vague or inconsistent goals (as is usually the case), what the workers do will be shaped by the 
circumstances they encounter at the job, the beliefs and experiences they bring to the job, or the external pressures on the 
job” (Wilson, 1989) 
 
Many user-centric, privacy enhancing identity management systems models have been pro-
posed (Microsoft_Connect, 2010; IBM_Research, 2010; NSTIC, 2011). A key aspect of these 
proposals is the need for user trust and trust frameworks to ensure the cooperation of all 
stakeholders within the identity ecosystem. We propose a conceptual model for a trusted iden-
tities framework based on the Delone and Mclean IS success model (see Figure I) since it has 
been used extensively to evaluate information systems success (DeLone & McLean, 1992; 
DeLone & McLean, The DeLone and McLean model of information systems success: a ten-
year update, 2003). Many of its applications are within organisational or individual levels of 
analysis. Since national identities go beyond individual organisations within the ecosystem to 
become a societal issue, we adapted the model by examining the definition of the dimensions 
and excluded those that are not applicable to a trusted identities framework within a societal 
context. The following constructs are proposed:  
• System quality must not only consider performance characteristics, functionality, and 
ease of use of the system but also the skill set of the people, availability of documenta-
tion and the reliability of the processes. This is in line with the definition of infor-
mation systems, which is the combination of technology, people, procedures and pro-
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cesses (O'Brien and Marakas, 2010). For instance, if the system has all the attributes 
as described in (DeLone & McLean, 2003) with no skilled personnel to run it or inef-
fective processes, the performance of the system can be affected as well as the trus-
tee’s relationship with the trustor. 
• Information is said to be of good quality when it is useful, timely, cost effective, relia-
ble and understandable. These are critical factors in identity management systems, and 
play a prominent role in affecting how all the stakeholders in the identities ecosystem 
trust the system and each other (Schaupp, et al., 2006; Petter, et al., 2008).  
• User empowerment: this includes the extent of user participation in decision making, 
the user’s ability to exercise a degree of control over their personal information or in-
formational self-determination, and to have confidence that third parties respect their 
privacy (Biskup and Brüggemann, 1988). Previous research found that individuals 
who believe they can exert more control over events, such as the secondary use of per-
sonal information, are less likely to perceive that their privacy is being invaded 
(Tolchinsky, et al., 1981). When users are involved and empowered they are more 
likely to have positive attitudes toward secondary information use and hence will also 
have a lower concern for privacy. Deci et al (1989) have posited that self-determined 
individuals experience a sense of freedom to do what is interesting, personally im-
portant, and vitalizing (Deci, et al., 1989). User empowerment therefore leads to state 
of belief in individuals that they can influence the system of which they are an integral 
part. 
• Institutional cooperation: This describes the aspects of key stakeholders working to-
gether to ensure interoperable laws, technologies, systems and standards. This type of 
collaboration also leads to effective communication and compliance with standards 
with the identities ecosystem. 
• Service quality is used to measure the overall support that users receive from service 
providers. Key aspects of service quality; responsiveness, reliability, empathy, compe-
tence (DeLone & McLean, 2003; Urbach & Müller, 2012).  
• Use, user satisfaction and net benefits: The trusted identities framework describes how 
stakeholders in the identity ecosystem (societal level of analysis) trust each other and 
not necessarily the use of the credentials or services by the service providers systems. 
Hence the use, user satisfaction and net benefit dimensions are not necessary in that 
respect since they are usually organisational associated (DeLone & McLean, 2003; 
Petter, DeLone, & McLean, 2008; Urbach & Müller, 2012). Instead we consider per-
ceived trust and perceived privacy which then lead to trusted identities.  
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Where there is a positive perception of trust and privacy among the stakeholders in an 
identity ecosystem, and the services they provide, it can engender collaborative envi-
ronment and more innovative use of personal information for secondary purposes. 
 
               
 
 
Figure II describes the trusted identities framework. Institutional cooperation has a positive 
influence on trustworthiness. Interoperable laws, technologies, policies and standard are typi-
cal examples of institutional cooperation. Also, strict enforcement of regulation and ability to 
seek redress are also signs of institutional cooperation. Systems quality and information quali-
ty have also a positive relationship with trustworthiness. Usefulness and ease of use (Davis, 
1989; DeLone & McLean, 2003) skilled and reliable credential issuers signify their abilities 
whilst information signifies integrity on the part of the identity and relying parties. These are 
the attributes of trustworthiness (Mayer, et al., 1995; Adjei and Olesen, 2011). User empow-
erment, information quality and service quality have the potential of minimizing societal pri-
vacy concerns. Positive societal privacy concerns are signs that identity and service providers 
are benevolent – which is an attribute of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness and positive privacy 
concerns result in a trusted identities ecosystem.  
 
FIGURE I 
DELONE AND MCLEAN IS SUCCESS MODEL (DELONE AND MCLEAN, 2003) 
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This study comprises two main phases – an exploratory phase, which saw the development of 
the model based on literature and a qualitative based confirmatory phase which was used to 
evaluate the model. The conceptual model on the basis of the theoretical consideration is part 
of an ongoing research project that seeks to present a reliable and valid instrument for meas-
uring trusted identities ecosystems. The exploratory phase of the study was organised in line 
with the two-step approach (Burton-Jones and Straub, 2006) for operationalising constructs 
and identifying measures. Owing to the multi-stakeholder nature of trusted national identities, 
we decided to adopt a research approach that engages the key actors and hence a qualitative 
methodological approach was deemed the most appropriate means for data collection 
(Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2011) by means of stakeholder interviews and a workshop/forum. We 
also applied the concepts of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, 2004) in our 
data analysis because of its usefulness in understanding the experiences of individuals. The 
overarching research question was “what are the key requirements for crafting a trusted iden-
tities ecosystem”. 
Stakeholder Workshop 
The stakeholder workshop was organised in Accra, Ghana, during which participants were 
offered the opportunity to discuss a number of prepared questions and to listen to presenta-
tions on issues ranging from secondary issues of personal information and trusted national 
identities. The workshop convened on January 16, 2012, in an auditorium at Ghana Telecom 
FIGURE II 
TRUSTED IDENTITIES FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
System Quality: 
- Perceived Usefulness 
- Ease of Use 
- Reliable Team /Documentation 
 
User Empowerment: 
- Information Sharing 
- Assurance & Involvement 
- Informational Self-determination 
 
Information Quality: 
- Timeliness, Cost-Effective 
- Understandable 
- Accuracy 
 
Trustworthiness 
 Ability, Integrity, 
Benevolence 
 
Perceived Privacy 
User Control, User Consent, 
Minimum Disclosure 
 
Trusted Identities 
Privacy Concern – Trust 
Equilibrium 
 
Service Quality: 
- Competent Personnel 
- Responsiveness, Compliance 
- Empathy and Flexibility, etc. 
 
Institutional Co-op: 
- Interoperable Regulations 
- Interoperable Technologies  
- Compliance with Standards  
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University College (GTUC), Accra. Accra was chosen mainly because the identification chal-
lenges in Ghana typifies many developing countries with respect to secondary uses of person-
al information, privacy concern and trust. The workshop brought together all the major na-
tional institutions involved in the collection and storage of personal information, such as the 
Registrar of Births and Death, The Passport Office, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA), National Identification Authority (NIA), National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA), Electoral Commission (EC), Ghana Revenue Authority, financial institutions, bio-
metric and identity-related businesses, academic institutions, national institutions and non-
governmental organisations involved in civil right advocacy, and the general public. To in-
form discussions participants were given background information and copies of the discussion 
questions during a presentation on privacy and identity management. The presentation high-
lighted the key concepts on identity management, including major policy, technological and 
regulatory issues and related IdMS research and practices in OECD countries (OECD, 2009; 
NSTIC, 2011; OECD, 2011). Participants were given copies of the prepared questions and 
key issues raised. The facilitator asked questions and invited participants to speak about the 
issues and share their experiences and any reservations they might have. Where particular 
issues or questions were sector-specific, the agencies concerned were given the opportunity to 
respond to such questions. Discussion questions included: 
1. What are the potential benefits and risks regarding the secondary uses of personal 
information? 
2. What are the major challenges in relying on existing claims and credentials pre-
sented for access to services?  
3. How can institutional cooperation be encouraged given the conflicting regula-
tions? 
4. What are the evolving public trust issues with respect to secondary use of person-
al information?  
5. What problems may develop as innovative technologies enhance the ability and 
ease of widespread personal data sharing for secondary purpose and commercial 
uses? 
6. What can be done to address issues arising from inappropriate use and/or exploi-
tation of personal information?  
7. What regulations, legislation, and/or policies are needed to address the evolving 
challenges? 
Interviews 
A series of stakeholder interviews were conducted before and after the workshop. The pre-
workshop interviews were used in identifying the key issues and challenges from different 
stakeholder perspectives. It helped in choosing and phrasing the discussion questions for the 
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stakeholder workshop. Follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify some of the points 
raised during the workshop and to solicit further information. Interviewees included officials 
of identity issuers, policy makers, journalists, private businesses involved in identity verifica-
tion, and identity card manufacturers. 
Transcription and Coding 
A transcript of the workshop discussions and the interviews, in the form of audio-visual re-
cordings, interview notes and a summary of discussion sessions were produced. The introduc-
tory background of the speakers and interviewees were included for coding and analysis pur-
poses. This was meant to maintain speaker anonymity. No attempt was also made to identify 
speech patterns, since that was not the focus of our research. The nature of the discussions 
and interviews were such that initial coding would not have been helpful since participant 
interviewees were from diverse background and opinions were varied. Each of the transcripts 
was coded on the basis of the background of the various speakers since each of the partici-
pants and interviewees were told to introduce themselves before speaking. This served as the 
basis for coding and sub-categorisation of the transcript.  
 
6 FINDINGS 
The workshop generated a significant amount of research data and for the purposes of this 
paper; a subset of the data is presented so as to maintain narrative coherence (Mcadams, 
2006). Thus, this paper mainly presents a reconstructed subset of the research themes that 
were explored during the discussions and the interviews (Whitley and Kanellopoulou, 2010). 
The participants’ accounts of their experiences and impressions clustered around the follow-
ing key thematic areas: Empowerment, system quality, institutional cooperation, and the qual-
ity of service and information quality. 
Participants were offered the opportunity to share their knowledge and impressions of identity 
management in general or a particular credential. A lack of user involvement or awareness 
usually affects the opinions and perceptions of a system (Davis, 1989).  Examples of state-
ments included: “I do not know how the biometric based voter identity card will be verified”; 
“if I lose my national identity card I am not sure how and who to report to and how I can get 
another card”; “I do not know what the National Identity authority is trying to achieve. For 
instance how is it different from my voter ID card or my driving license? Do I have carry the 
card or I can only mention the card number and get served”. These are all legitimate com-
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ments that clearly show a lack of awareness and public education. Hence statements of this 
nature were categorised under user empowerment (Wilkinson, 1998).  
 
Statements suggesting ease of use and usefulness, the experience of the credential issuers and 
the reliability of the system were all grouped under the common heading “system quality”. 
Typical comments here included: “I think biometric based voter identity cards can help weed 
out ghost names on the electoral register”; “I think with a biometric based voting systems the 
issue of long queues just to vote will be a thing of the past”; “I think national ID will make it 
easy to prove your citizenship or resident status since all must have one”. These were expres-
sions that indicate a perception of ease of use. However, many of the statements in this re-
gards portrayed lack of reliability of the system. For instance: “Prompt verification of my cre-
dential require Internet or mobile connectivity, how is this going to be possible given that in 
my village there is no Internet connection and the mobile connectivity is very poor”; “the 
technology used to store information on the NID card is a two dimensional barcode and so it 
will be difficult to store additional information on the card for secondary use purposes”. Ob-
viously this shows that for a system to be of certain quality it is not just a question of the per-
ceived usefulness and ease of use but also the reliability of the system is also very critical. 
Trust in institutions emerged as vital element for adoption and usage of any government initi-
atives. As one of the respondents remarked:  
“If the systems were to be run by qualified personnel, identity abuses like forged passports 
and driving licenses will be minimised. The appointment of many of the key decision makers 
in these organisations are based on factors other than qualification and experience. We only 
use it because we have no option for alternative”. 
Such statements clearly show a lack of trust in the institutions which issue credentials due to 
the perception that personnel handling the credentials are unqualified and inefficient. Trust in 
the institutions is also dependent on previous experiences with policy enforcement as re-
counted by another respondent;  
“My brother sent me to withdraw foreign currency remittance from abroad, when I got to the 
bank the following day, I was told I had already collected the money. When I insisted that I 
had not been to the bank, I was shown a voter identity card bearing my name except the pic-
ture was different. I was advised to go the electoral commission for redress instead. It turned 
out that the other card was forged and the bank had no means of verifying. So at the moment I 
do not trust the voter’s ID card or any other credential for that matter since they can easily be 
forged”.  This obviously implies lack of confidence in identity service providers. 
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We also noted from the discussions that one source of the distrust is as a result of lack of in-
teroperability as chided by a participant; “Why can’t I present my drivers’ license as proof of 
identity for voting in an election, if I misplace my voter ID card and why can’t I present my 
voter ID as proof of qualification to drive if the police stops me whilst driving?. They all bear 
my name and other details”. 
A key reason for the lack of trust is the unreliability of important source documents like the 
birth certificate. This assertion is consistent to a statement made by a participant with national 
security background; “if I am in doubt of the validity of the source document or can’t verify its 
authenticity, why would I want to accept a secondary source as evidence”. 
Lack of citizens’ trust in IdMS technology also play important role in trusted identities eco-
systems, especially in relation to payment systems (Teo, et al., 2008). This is in relation to a 
remark by an interviewee with regard to the e-zwich32 biometric based payment system in 
Ghana: “I have confidence in agencies of the Bank of Ghana, but I think there is something 
wrong with the e-zwich technology – how can I make ATM withdrawal using my fingerprint 
details in a world where many of the available ATM’s are not biometric based?” Another 
stated “assuming I transfer money to my parents in the village, how will they withdraw or 
receive the money when there is no e-zwich terminal in the area, and it will cost them about a 
third of the money sent in transport to go and withdraw the money in the district capital 
where there is no internet connection and the cell phone network is nothing to write home 
about?” Such comments are indicative of a perceived lack of trust in the technology even 
when the agencies issuing the credentials are trustworthy.  
The security aspect of the IdMS technology has also contributed to a lack of trust in the tech-
nology even where credential issuers are trusted institutions. For instance a major issue that 
resulted in a long debate and citizen’s’ apprehension towards the biometric based voter identi-
ty card system was when it became apparent that there would be no verification of identity. 
This raised the issue that “if there will be no electronic verification card systems then what is 
the point of enrolling citizens into a card that cannot be verified”, as remarked by a social 
commentator.  
                                                 
 
32
 e-zwich (GNA, 2012) is a biometric-based payment systems in Ghana that was aimed at making citizens adopt 
card based payments and also to offer a platform for the unbanked and less banked to be part of the banking 
system. The system is still operating but has since not been able to take-off as expected.  
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A factor that can inculcate citizens’ confidence in IdMS technology is cyber and privacy laws 
and their enforcement. For instance in Ghana, privacy protection act was only passed into law 
on the 18th of May 2012, which obviously implies that prior to that, there was no specific in-
formation privacy law. Citizens’ trust in IdMS technology will be enhanced if measures are 
taken to create awareness and public education about the system. This claim is in line with the 
following comments by interviewees; “we have no idea how identity verification will be done 
on the Election Day, think the electoral commission should tell us how they will go about it”. 
“If I do not know how they are going to verify my identity how can I trust such a system”. An-
other participant’s comment was even clearer that participants had no clue as to what is going 
on. “How can laminated voter identity card store biometric details, are they going to use the 
number on the card to verify or what?” This clearly shows that in implementing the biometric 
voter identification systems the implementing agency failed to adequately educate the public. 
6.1 Privacy Concern -Trust Curve (PCTC) 
The above analysis of the trust framework implies that society begins from a position of high 
privacy concern and thus distrust in identity management systems and service providers. As 
society begins to be more involved and understand the systems and there is more regulatory 
and technological interoperability, users are able to exercise some control over the presenta-
tion, authentication and verification of claims and credentials. Society becomes more empow-
ered and also changes its negative perceptions about the institutions. This reduces the initial 
privacy concerns and increases trust. By implication a high privacy concern is associated with 
a low level of trust, and reduction in privacy concern can lead to an increase in trust. This 
relationship is represented in the privacy concern-trust curve in Figure III. The figure also 
depicts that absolute trust with zero privacy concerns might not be possible within a trusted 
identities framework and that is why the curve becomes asymptotic the closer we move to the 
further extremes of the curve. The purpose of the trust framework therefore is for society to 
work towards what we call privacy concern–trust equilibrium. The privacy concern–trust 
equilibrium is the point where trust and privacy is adequate enough to encourage more col-
laboration, creation of new identity based services, etc. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
This study has shown that to ensure trusted identities, each stakeholder must be able to au-
thenticate and verify identities on common terms and understanding. Undoubtedly, it is not 
enough to focus on system quality but also institutional corporation and collaboration with 
respect to interoperable technology, legal framework and standards on the supply side. On the 
demand side, there is the need for user empowerment which will result in informational self-
determination in addition to service and information quality. The study also makes a profound 
contribution to the trusted identities literature by introducing what we have termed as privacy 
concern–trust curvilinear model for measuring the point of equilibrium between privacy con-
cern and trust. The study has also shown that any attempt to ensure institutional cooperation 
and collaboration have the effect of enriching the trust within the identities ecosystem. In ef-
fect, through a collaborative effort and societal empowerment it is possible to realise trusted 
identities, which have the effect of pushing the relationship between trust and privacy concern 
towards equilibrium. It is at this equilibrium where majority of the benefits of trusted identi-
ties ecosystems can be realised.  
It is however important to test empirically how realistic this is and whether the relationship 
between privacy concern and trust is a straight-line or curvilinear. Since our preliminary eval-
uation of the trusted identities framework was based on qualitative analysis, it will be interest-
ing to evaluate the causality as noted in the trust framework quantitatively.  
 
FIGURE III 
PRIVACY CONCERN-TRUST CURVE (PCTC) 
 
     
 
Privacy-Trust Equilibrium 
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Appendices 
Stakeholder Workshop Invitation Letters and Programs 
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November 6, 2012 
The Head of IT 
Central University College 
Accra 
 
Dear Sir, 
INVITATION TO STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP 
Ghana Technology University College (GTUC) in conjunction with Aalborg University, 
Denmark, is pleased to invite you to a one day stakeholder’s workshop on the theme "Best 
Practices in Crafting Trusted Identity Management Systems". This is a follow-up on a previ-
ous workshop in January which addressed the technological, regulatory and policy implica-
tions on secondary uses and commercialisation of personal identity information. The details 
are as follows: 
Date: Tuesday 6th November, 2012 
Time: 9:00am – 4:00pm 
Venue: Ghana Telecom University College, Tesano Campus  
 
Governments in many countries have implemented some form of identity management sys-
tems as a critical enabler of government to citizens’ interactions, and in facilitation of sensi-
tive transactions and activities like elections, cross-border control, online banking, accessing 
electronic health records, etc. Unfortunately, there is the tendency to equate identity creden-
tials to “identity of a person” resulting in the issue of various forms of credentials to citizens 
for specific purposes. Many of the Identity credentials focus on physical verification with 
little emphasis on digital and Internet-based authentication, which reduces the expected im-
provement in public services and societal interactions. 
The objective of the workshop is to bring key stakeholders together to identify the major is-
sues involved in crafting trusted identities that can help in removing the barriers that preclude 
key stakeholders from easily adopting digital identification technologies that are secure and 
trusted and for commercial purposes.  
The program will take the form of plenary sessions during which invited participants will be 
given the opportunity to ask questions and address issues from their perspective. This will be 
followed by focus group discussions. The outcome of the workshop will help policy formula-
tion and research work in trusted identity management and Commercial uses of Personal In-
formation. Your input is therefore critical to the success of the workshop.  
We look forward to welcoming you. 
Yours Sincerely, 
DR. GILBERT ARYEE 
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, GTUC 
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GHANA TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
PROGRAM- RESEARCH SEMINAR 
Date:  Tuesday, 6th November, 2012 
Time: 9:00am – 3:00pm 
Venue: Eva Von Hirsch Auditorium 
 
Theme: Best Practices in Implementation of Trusted Identity Management Systems 
 
9:00am – 9:15am   Arrival and Registration   
 
9:15am – 9:20am  Opening Prayer 
     
9:20am – 9:30am  Opening Remarks   
Dr. Gilbert Aryee, Director of Research, GTUC 
 
9:30am – 9:40am  Remarks 
    National Identification Authority 
    Dr. William Ahadzie,  Executive Secretary, NIA 
 
9:40am – 9:50am  Remarks by The Electoral Commission 
     
9:50am – 10:05am  Keynote Address  
    Dr. Robert Awuah Baffour, President, GTUC 
 
10:05am – 10:20am  Group Picture and Snack Break 
 
10:20am – 10:40am  Presentation 
Joseph Kwame Adjei, PhD Fellow, CMI, Aalborg 
 
10:40am – 10:50am  Q & A 
 
10:50am – 11:10am   Presentation  
    Registrar, Birth & Death Registry 
 
11:10am – 11:30am   Presentation, 
Victoria Boateng, National ICT Authority (NITA) 
 
11:30am – 11:50am   Presentation  
    Mr. Thomas Baafi, CEO, B-Systems 
 
11:50am – 12:30pm   Question and Answer Session 
     
12:30pm – 1:30pm  Lunch 
 
1:30pm – 2:30pm   Group Discussion 
 
2:30pm – 3:00pm   Group Presentation 
 
3:00pm – 3:05pm   Closing Remarks,  
    Dr. Gilbert Aryee, Director of Research, GTUC 
 
3:05pm     Closing Prayer 
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SAMPLE LIST OF SECOND WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
NAME ORGANIZATION TEL NO EMAIL ADDRESS 
Enock Kyei Ministry Of Foreign 
Affairs 
0277602112 enokyei@yahoo.com  
Kweku William 
Halm 
Registrar General’s De-
partment 
0202728931 kwekuhalm@yahoo.com 
Divine Akuoko Dataspace Consulting 0243104021 divine.barrack@gmail.com 
Mawutodzi 
Abissath 
Information Service 
Department 
0244773085 abissath@gmail.com 
Frank Kwasi 
Asante 
Information Service 
Department 
0277406979 asante_fk@hotmail.com 
E. L. Asiedu Ghana Post 0244995261 elasiedu@yahoo.com 
Gilbert Aryee Ghana Telecom Univer-
isty College 
0202698320 garyee@GTUC.edu.gh 
Henry Myers-
Aboagye 
National Identification 
Authorit Y 
0208135079 hmaboagye@gmail.com 
Joana Nyarko-
Mensah 
Ministry Of Foreign 
Affairs 
0261174036 maameafrifa@yahoo.com 
Salim Ibrahim Ministry Of Foreign 
Affairs 
0242859565 salinkoex@gmail.com 
Godson Lazekpo Ssnit 0202015486 gladzekpo@SSNIT.org.g 
Danny Ham-
mond 
Ministry Of Defence 0242958000 dnahammond@gmod.gove.gh 
Amevor Prince 
Albert 
Ministry Of Defence 0244012492 princeogy@yahoo.com 
Kwame Ofosu 
Obeng 
Ghana Institute Of Joun-
alism 
0244749885 obeng_ofosu@yahoo.com 
Goerge Tudzi MWRWH 0208192249 evangelsys@yahoo.com 
Alex Q. Papafio Ecobank 0261128722 alqp7@gmail.com  
Magmus Awuah Ghana Revenue Au-
thority 
0243346776 magmus.awuah@gra.gov.gh 
Dennis Okyere Bsystems Ltd 0247235291 dennis@bsystemslimited.com  
Victor A. Sackey Mofa Passport Office 
Ridge 
0243571052 vaswoa@yahoo.com  
Kingsley A. Ad-
do 
Birth & Death 0244215830 kingaddo@yahoo.com  
Seth Bosompem 
Kissi 
 0244642817 swagahs@gmail.com 
Veronica Boat-
eng 
NITA 0202050187 veronica.boateng@nita.gov.gh 
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Tweneboah Ko-
duah 
GIMPA 0245349741 stkoduah@gimpa.edu.gh 
Kevin Philip 
Quansah 
Bsystems 0244857028 kevinquansah@gmail.com 
Salomey 
Braimah 
Births & Deaths 0208257824 braimah_s@ymail.com 
Andy Fosu Ghana News Agency 0244293247  
Comfort Fetrie Ghana News Agency 0244293247  
J. Gambo M.E.R.Taz - koranza@gmail.com 
Sebasting A. 
Yevugah 
Ministry Of Foreign 
Affairs 
0244284300 syevugah@yahoo.com  
Veronica Adjei Brookes Institute 0276634162 ronikay25@hotmail.com  
Participant Electoral Commission   
Francis Akwasi-
Kuma 
Ghana Revenue Au-
thority 
0244262111 fkuma@gra.gov.gh  
Kwasi Aboagye Ministry of Lands And 
Natural Res. 
0208628730 kwasiaboagye1988@yahoo.com  
Frank Oye Margins Group 0200721293 frankoye@googlemail.com 
Joseph Tetteh Ministry of Communica-
tion 
0208161609 joseph.tetteh@moc.gov.gh 
Emmanuel Fi-
agbenu 
Ghana Multimedia Inc. 
(Gmic) 
0244289856 e.fiagbenu@yahoo.com  
Daniel Moham-
med 
Data Link University 0244569211 danblow000@yahoo.com  
Dorgbetor Solo-
mon 
Data Link University 0208259154 sdorgbetor@gmail.com  
Emmanuel N. 
Botchway 
Births & Deaths 0244161894 emmabotchway@yahoo.co.uk  
F. Agyenim GTUC 0202698369 kingaddo@yahoo.com  
Nancy Essien NCCE 0244998873 swagahs@gmail.com 
Cephas Adjei 
Mensah 
MOE 0244888566 veronica.boateng@nita.gov.gh 
Tweneboah Ko-
dua 
GIMPA 0244667590 stkoduah@gimpa.edu.gh 
Farouk CIO, Ghana Commercial 
Bank 
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